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ABSTRACT 
The rescaling of conservation globally is engendering an increase in private sector stake-
holders in conservation practice. Recent moves to allow private interests to develop and manage 
services within national parks have sparked significant countermovements in several states, in-
cluding Canada and Thailand. Political ecologists have widely elucidated the socio-economic 
implications of the neoliberalsiation of conservation, but have been rather quiet on the political 
implications in terms of public and Indigenous participation in conservation governance. This 
research explores the relationship between political economy and the politics of conservation 
governance through two case studies of public protest against private tourism development with-
in protected areas: Jasper National Park, Canada and Doi Suthep-Pui National Park, Thailand. I 
analyze the nature and scope of both countermovements, looking at how and why situated actors 
articulate different visions of conservation and the role of national parks, what strategies propo-
nents and opponents employ to enrol allies, and how and why certain knowledge claims about 
conservation gain currency over others. I argue that neoliberalisation, and austerity politics more 
specifically, create the structural conditions for the post-politicization of conservation gover-
nance, reducing democratic oversight of public provisioning. In such conditions, park authorities 
employ a series of strategies to remove debate from the public sphere, orchestrate the appearance 
of consensus and ultimately to legitimize unpopular tourism development decisions.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
“It's almost like you're in a bizarre marketplace haggling with some vendor. You start out here, 
and they start out there, and you sort of come together.”  
  I’m sitting with Sean Nichols of the Alberta Wildlife Association, listening to his impas-
sioned frustration in dealing with Parks Canada consultation processes on a recurring basis. 
Nichols, like countless other conservation organization workers and engaged citizens, feels com-
pelled to watch Parks Canada’s actions. Critics feel the Agency is growing friendlier and friend-
lier with private tourism interests and that, perhaps consequently, decision-making on develop-
ment projects is becoming ever more opaque. The recent decision to allow Brewster Travel to 
develop their Glacier Skywalk attraction in Jasper National Park despite an unprecedentedly 
tremendous and overwhelmingly negative response from the Canadian public left many feeling 
jaded with the public consultation process and suspicious of Parks Canada’s intended future di-
rections. To add insult to injury, since that approval in 2013, countless other controversial devel-
opment projects have been proposed across the Canadian park system, including but not limited 
to: Maligne Tours’ hotel proposal in Jasper, the Mother Canada statue in Cape Breton National 
Park, and the Lake Louise development guideline changes in Banff National Park. Public outcry 
against these projects has been significant. Former Parks Canada bosses and head scientists have 
been uniting and sending well-informed open letters to the Minister of the Environment and 
Parks Canada denouncing the developments as threatening to ecological integrity (Derworiz, 
2015; Weber, 2014). A grassroots coalition in Jasper and Banff has also been gaining momentum 
!1
with a campaign titled “Fight For Your Parks,” asking citizens across Canada to demand political 
action in protecting parks from commercial interests.  
  One of the prime concerns for opponents is the troubling political economic trend they 
are seeing at the national level. Successive rounds of budget cuts have elevated the importance of 
revenues and land rents from private companies in the mountain parks (Interview with former 
Superintendent of Jasper National Park, 2015), to the point that opponents of development 
projects feel that even if Parks Canada wanted to maintain hard limits on growth, their ‘hands are 
tied’. Because it appears that Parks Canada needs private partnerships now more than ever, and 
because it’s no secret that the private sector’s perpetual modus operandi is to increase profits, 
many local Albertans and park visitors fear that an increasing reliance on private revenues is in-
appropriate and entirely antithetical to conservation.  
  Despite the sense of helplessness against what they see as a much broader political 
project, local organizations and citizens in areas around Edmonton, Calgary, Banff and Jasper are 
committed to ‘protecting the parks from the politicians’, as they say. Even though losses like the 
Skywalk and the Lake Louise guideline changes leave opponents feeling like their efforts are fu-
tile, those losses also convince them that they are needed now more than ever to be the watch-
dogs for the Agency and the Government of Canada more generally. “It's easy to say, ‘Oh, we 
fought against it, and it happened anyway,’” Nichols explained. “The more valuable thing, I 
think, is to say, ‘Yeah, but what would have happened if we hadn't?’ What would have happened 
with the development if there had been no one to say anything?” 
*** 
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 Interestingly, although perhaps not surprisingly, debates around the appropriateness of 
private interests in protected areas and profit-seeking versus conservation are not limited to 
Canada, but have been animated worldwide, particularly since the 1980s or so when global con-
servation practice began rescaling to include local peoples and (often transnational) non-state 
market-based actors (Brockington et al., 2008; MacDonald, 2010). On the other side of the 
world, I am sitting in the garden (complete with roaming deer and peacocks) of the palatial 
Bangkok estate of the former Director General of Thailand’s Royal Forestry Department, and the 
very first Director General of the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conserva-
tion, Plodprasop Suraswadi. He is currently the Acting Deputy of Thailand’s Pheu Thai party 
which was recently ousted by the military junta in the 2014 coup. Suraswadi has been wanting to 
remove the restrictions on private development in Thai parks for some time now. “You say you 
love Banff and Jasper…,” he said. “Tell me whether you allow the private sector to build hotels, 
shops, you know, golf courses in the national parks? Yes? I told you already, I went to school in 
Canada, I learned from you. I went to school in the USA, I learned from them,” he said confi-
dently. Thailand needs to let the private sector get more involved in parks, “otherwise Thailand 
will be left in the Stone Age, as is happening now,” he said.   
  But like Nichols and his fellow Albertans, many Thai citizens vehemently disagree with 
Suraswadi’s philosophy. The private sector is far more regulated inside protected areas in Thai-
land than in Canada. There have been many cases where the Thai government has actually lev-
eled private resorts that encroached even slightly into protected land, especially since the military 
government took over in 2014 and has since been looking for opportunities to prove their compe-
tency as leaders (Bangkok Post, 2015). But private interests are still ‘invading’ in national parks 
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in more inconspicuous ways, through recently formed quasi-private state agencies that can be 
granted permission to develop in protected areas where purely private bodies can not. Suraswadi 
is the Director of the Pingkanakorn Development Agency, the quasi-private state agency that is 
now proposing to build a giant cable car through Doi Suthep-Pui National Park in Chiang Mai. 
Opponents have been protesting the cable car idea since it was first proposed in the 1980s, and 
they continue to protest today based on concerns for ecological integrity, religious sanctity (there 
is a sacred Buddhist temple within Doi Suthep-Pui National Park), and concerns around the ap-
propriateness of a for-profit business operating within ostensibly public lands. Many are also tak-
ing a stand against the paucity of the public consultation process and the lack of transparency 
around how opportunities and benefits will be shared.  
 Even though Canada’s public processes are purportedly more democratic and transparent, 
opponents of the cable car in Thailand have had more success in forestalling the project than 
have opponents of mandate creep and development in Jasper. Members of conservation organiza-
tions in Chiang Mai feel that they have considerable power and influence in decision-making 
outside of official consultation channels. They understand that if they can create a social move-
ment around an issue, the government will surely listen, even if that may be only to promote the 
appearance of benevolence or to avoid corruption charges. This is not to say that Thai citizens 
are confident in the public process. Critics feel that decision-making is opaque and that public 
consultation processes are purely pro forma if not set up by the proponents as PR exercises. But 
despite this, or perhaps because of it, opponents are again resilient and committed to holding 
park authorities and politicians to account.  
*** 
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  Despite the tendency of some of the critical literature to treat neoliberalisation as an un-
stoppable juggernaut (see Gibson-Graham, 2006; Lansing et al., 2015), there has been consider-
able public and Indigenous pushback against various top-down projects worldwide (Arsel and 
Buscher, 2012; Cavanagh and Benjaminsen, 2014; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). Networks of 
actants have been resisting the increasing inclusion of and power wielded by private sector inter-
ests in protected areas, questioning to what extent national parks are public versus private spaces 
(Friesen, 2015; Matichon, 2014). While neoliberalisation and decentralization are often touted as 
mechanisms to increase levels of local participation, critics have noted that neither are inherently 
democratizing (Brown, 2003; Vandergeest and Chusak, 2002). Some have actually argued the 
opposite - that neoliberalisation tends towards authoritarianism, oligarchy and/or overt attacks on 
democracy and civil liberties (Chomsky, 1999; Harvey, 2005). This is because a heavy hand is 
needed to make the populace swallow the hard pill of painful but “necessary” austerity-induced 
reforms (Zizek, 2008), among other reasons. Indeed, many fear that austerity politics will erode 
institutions of political democracy as “the freedom of the masses [is].. restricted in favour of the 
freedoms of the few” (Harvey, 2005: 70) and one’s political purchase is bound to one’s ability to 
generate capital (Brown, 2003; Ong, 2006).  
 As policies favouring deregulation, privatization, and cuts to public spending are becom-
ing normalized around the globe, it’s critical that we query to what extent there is space for polit-
ical resistance and democratic participation in public provisioning such as conservation. The lit-
erature on neoliberal conservation has critiqued the ways in which integrated conservation and 
development interventions have narrowed the space for local forest-dwelling communities to 
participate in dictating the terms of their own development (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Gardiner, 
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2012; Holmes and Cavanagh, 2015) and have served to replicate previous forms of fortress con-
servation (Dressler and Roth, 2011). It has been rather silent, however, on the ways in which ne-
oliberalisation rearticulates the politics of conservation and the terms of democratic participation 
through consultation, particularly in the Global North. Does neoliberalisation erode participatory 
democracy in conservation zones, and if so, in what ways? Understanding the links between po-
litical economies of conservation, consultation and participation mechanisms, and depoliticiza-
tion is pertinent to understanding the outcomes of contemporary struggles and countermove-
ments against the privatization of park services.  
  Of course, ‘participation’ in conservation governance can mean anything from participat-
ing in park-led programs to actual partnership and power sharing between local people and con-
servation authorities. The most influential typology of participation is Arnstein’s (1969) Ladder 
of Citizen Participation, with eight rungs ranking participation systems from those that are top-
down and uni-directional to those where citizens have full control (see Figure 1.0). The first five 
rungs represent varying degrees of ‘non-participation’ and ‘tokenism’, where power is held firm-
ly by government actors. Under ‘tokenism’, citizens or local people can either be (3) merely in-
formed about government-made plans, (4) informed and able to provide feedback, while the 
government holds final decision-making power and is not obligated to comply with public sen-
timent, or (5) placated with an advisory role while the government again holds the power to de-
cide. When these are “proffered by powerholers as the total extent of participation, citizens may 
indeed hear and be heard... [but] they lack the power to insure that their views will be heeded by 
the powerful... There is no follow through, no “muscle,” hence no assurance of changing the sta-
tus quo” (Arnstein, 1969: 217). 
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Figure 1.0 - Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation 
 This typology, which is now dated, has been critiqued as being overly simplistic and for 
the blanket assumption that moving up the ladder towards increasing citizen control is unques-
tionably desirable in all circumstances (Ross et al., 2002; Wondolleck et al., 1996). It is also dis-
connected from how political economy may influence how participation is structured, and cer-
tainly this configuration may not be applicable globally. At the very least, it does offer some in-
sight into the ways in which the status quo might be in fact reproduced and secured through con-
sultation mechanisms, particularly those that do not devolve any decision-making authority to 
local or Indigenous actors and/or where there is a lack of transparency around how public feed-
back will be treated in decision-making. It is not my aim to characterize consultation or partici-
pation using such a typology here, but rather to explore local and Indigenous satisfaction with 
consultation processes and how they perceive their role in decision-making in relation to private 
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proponents within the context of neoliberalisation. Further, the cases I investigate shed light on 
the ways in which different political economies of conservation contribute to social movement 
success or failure, and the extent to which citizens and Indigenous peoples are able to create 
space for the practice of politics (Swyngedouw, 2010, 2011). The contribution of this disserta-
tion, then, will be in elucidating the intersections between political economy, social activism and 
the democratic process in conservation practice. I’ll be exploring these intersections through a 
comparison of two grounded case studies, one in the Global North (Jasper National Park, Cana-
da) and one in the Global South (Doi Suthep-Pui National Park, Thailand), which I will detail 
more thoroughly in Chapter 2.  
  These two cases, among others, evidence that conservation practice is a site of struggle; 
the outcome of continual debates and (re)negotiations about the role of national parks, the nature 
of ‘nature,’ and broader political economic imperatives. These debates are tied to a confluence of 
other truth claims about where humans fit within the non-human world; about national identity; 
about progress and development; and about the roles that governments and private companies 
should play in managing social services and public goods. Competing knowledge claims are ad-
vanced by networks of a multitude of actants, as both proponents and opponents of neoliberalis-
tion or private development projects attempt to scale up the visibility of certain lines of thought, 
enrol allies and ultimately make their version of the truth stabilize and become accepted in 
broader arenas (Jasanoff, 2004; Matthews, 2011). The claims that do stabilize and have authority 
find practical application in conservation policy and practice (Forsyth and Walker, 2014). 
  Because conservation policy and practice are the contingent products of the iterative in-
teractions of a multitude of human and non-human actants, there is ample potential to find and 
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exploit the cracks and fissures and advance particular interests. Proponents of development 
projects may exploit legal loopholes, for one example among many, and likewise opponents may 
be able to exploit media attention to build public pressure on decision-makers. In other words, 
the collective performativity (Butler, 1990) of conservation practice leaves it perpetually open to 
change and reinterpretation. The results of any given struggle are arrived at through the relational 
agency of all actants (human and non-human) involved, rarely if ever the intended outcome of a 
single or small group of human actors (Jasanoff, 2004; Goldman et al., 2011; Whatmore, 2002). 
Although there is push and pull and negotiation around what is appropriate practice in conserva-
tion zones, the production of conservation authority is far from apolitical (Matthews, 2011). Po-
litical economic pressures and conflicts feature prominently in contestations around private in-
terests in protected areas. 
  The increase of private sector involvement in and funding of conservation practice glob-
ally is often understood as part of the neoliberalisation of conservation, broadly involving some 
combination of the marketization, commodification, privatization, deregulation and financializa-
tion of environmental goods and services and the rescaling of conservation practice to include 
non-state and market-based actors (Buscher et al., 2014; Castree, 2010; Holmes and Cavanagh, 
2015; Roth and Dressler, 2012). The neoliberalisation of conservation has been studied exceed-
ingly in the last decade or so as scholars the world over recognize the potentially concerning so-
cial, environmental, economic and political implications of “the market knows best” philosophy. 
While the social and environmental implications have been roundly studied (Buscher et al., 
2012; Holmes and Cavanagh, 2015), less attention has been paid to the political implications in 
terms of democratic environmental governance.  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 In terms of governance, an emerging body of literature suggests that neoliberalisation 
may tend toward the use of anti-political or post-political strategies which evacuate political de-
bate and antagonism from the public sphere and produce the appearance of consensual decision-
making through techno-managerial planning (Fletcher, 2014; Rancière, 1998; Swyngedouw, 
2010, 2011; Zizek, 1999). While the concepts of anti- and post-politics treat depoliticization in 
slightly different ways and come out of different traditions —development studies and political 
philosophy, respectively— both explore strategies of depoliticization that contain challenges to 
the status quo. Given that there is a broad trend in global conservation practice towards neoliber-
alisation and the rescaling of practice to include non-state and (increasingly) private market-
based interests, it is critical that we question how political economies of conservation relate to 
the exact strategies of depoliticization that proponents deploy and the factors that lead to their 
relative success or failure. If neoliberalisation does indeed represent a trend towards a concentra-
tion of political power and an erosion of participatory democracy (Brown, 2003; Harvey, 2005), 
what are the mechanisms through which this is achieved and how do these play out on the 
ground in varying geographical and socio-political settings? 
  Since there are so many moving parts in neoliberal political economic philosophy, a mul-
titude of disparate interventions can and have been critiqued as ‘neoliberal’, which can take away 
from the potency of critique and generate confusion around how and why certain conservation 
practices are neoliberalised and what is at stake. Here I will be talking specifically about austeri-
ty politics and moves to allow private development of tourism infrastructure or privatization of 
tourism services in parks. I argue that political economy factors prominently into the degree to 
which opponents of development are able to exert power in decision-making through official 
!10
channels. Economic incentives prompt the use of antipolitical or post-political strategies to nulli-
fy resistance, orchestrate the appearance of consensus (Fletcher, 2014) and uphold the legitimacy 
of conservation authorities in the face of broad public and Indigenous discontent. In what fol-
lows, I tease out how the networks of actors/actants, tools, strategies, processes, places and poli-
tics interact to produce the divergent outcomes we see in two very similar struggles against pri-
vate interests in protected areas in two very different geographical and socio-political settings.  
Conceptual Framework  
 I situate my research within the field of political ecology. My central framework of in-
quiry surrounds depoliticization, drawing from development studies (antipolitics) and political 
philosophy (post-politics) in particular. Under the umbrella of political ecology, I also draw ele-
ments from science and technology studies (the production, circulation and application of 
knowledge) and political economy (neoliberalisation). Very broadly, political ecology “combines 
the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the 
constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within classes 
and groups within society itself”(Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 17). Key concepts in political 
ecology include: the production of marginality through political, economic and social processes 
(Li, 1999; Peluso, 1992; Scott, 2009); the relationship between marginality and resource con-
flicts (often interrogating the political and economic barriers to access to resources) (Fairhead 
and Leach, 1996; Peluso, 1992; Roth, 2004; Vandergeest, 1996); the politics of representations of 
nature (Braun, 2002; Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Haraway, 1992) and attention to the agency of 
nonhumans (Castree and MacMillan, 2001; Haraway, 1992; Latour, 1993; Whatmore, 2002); 
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critical analyses of meta-narratives of environmental degradation (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; 
Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Forsyth and Walker, 2008); and deconstructing conservation and de-
velopment discourse and practice and the related technologies of governing/technologies of the 
self (Li, 2007; Tsing, 1999; Sundberg, 2004). The underlying consensus in the field is that the 
ways in which nature or environmental problems are understood and represented are inescapably 
political; they are at once socially constructed and have material implications for local peoples 
whose lives will be altered by policies based on those particular understandings of nature and 
society (Forsyth, 2003a; Fairhead and Leach, 1996). Understanding nature as both socially con-
structed and materially independent of our knowledge of it is termed ‘critical realism’, the philo-
sophical foundation for political ecological inquiry. Critical realism “acknowledges the ontologi-
cal independence of the biophysical world while at the same time recognizing that our under-
standing of the natural world is partial, situational, and contingent” (Neumann, 2005: 10).  
  As knowledge of ‘nature’ is partial and contingent, political ecologists emphasize the idea 
that science itself is a discourse (Forsyth, 2003a; Haraway, 1992; Jasnoff, 2004), not the objec-
tive representation of a true ‘nature’, and as such it can be wielded as a tool of power to legiti-
mate coercive or unequal conservation regimes (Forsyth, 2003; Forsyth and Walker, 2008). Fem-
inist and poststructuralist work in political ecology challenges the assumptions of objectivity and 
neutrality that underlie scientific practice, arguing instead that all observation is situated, embod-
ied and partial (Haraway, 1992; Rocheleau, 2008). The scientific and/or technocratic ‘rule of ex-
perts’ (Mitchell, 2002) has been criticized as being exclusionary and for legitimating the central-
ization of decision-making authority, particularly in relation to marginalized and Indigenous 
groups (Ellis, 2005; Spak, 2005). It is important to take seriously the limitations and biases laden 
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in scientific claims about nature because contestations around environmental governance often 
centre around tools like environmental assessments produced by hired scientific ‘experts,’ which 
can stage consensus through official documentation (Fletcher, 2014). For proponents these may 
be tools used for political legitimation, and for opponents these may offer opportunities to cri-
tique the policy in question, although often based only on scientific merit. Opponents may also 
enrol science to make claims or counter-claims about the potential impacts of any given policy 
decision. If accessible, science can be enrolled in the service of social or environmental justice 
(Peet and Watts, 2002), where a multitude of factors coalesce to determine which claims will sta-
bilize over others, or who will be authorized to speak as ‘expert’. There is therefore much ongo-
ing boundary work (Jasanoff, 2004) to determine what is ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ science in many 
struggles around conservation policy, including those in Jasper and Doi Suthep-Pui. 
  For this reason I draw from science and technology studies (STS) to add to the political 
ecology framework. STS looks explicitly at the kind of boundary work that is necessary to police 
and stabilize certain knowledge claims, acknowledging that there are debates within science it-
self, it is not monolithic (Goldman et al., 2011). STS also posits that analysis of how and why 
certain ‘states of knowledge’ are arrived at and either held in place or abandoned is necessary to 
understand how science and society are coproduced (Forsyth, 2003a; Goldman et al., 2011; 
Jasanoff, 2004). Certain claims gain currency as they resonate with broader discourses through 
the relational agency of networks of human and non-human actants, and not all outcomes are ex-
plicable solely by human intention or interests (Mitchell, 2002; Whatmore, 2002). As Latour 
(1996) explains, an actant is “something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It im-
plies no special motivation of human individual actors, nor of humans in general. An actant can 
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literally be anything provided it is granted to be the source of an action” (Latour, 1996: 375, un-
derine in original). A caribou may have no conscious intention of altering conservation practice, 
for example, but through their daily struggle to subsist in the park they may inspire Species at 
Risk legislation and/or may be enrolled into environmentalist movements. The daily, iterative 
actions, however mundane, of all actants involved make up the ‘performativity’ (Butler, 1990) of 
conservation practice - or, in other words, these daily actions and interactions bring conservation 
practice into being, where conservation is a process that is always becoming.  
  Further, a solely political economic focus on material interests and structures of power 
ignores the “broader politics that shapes the production and circulation of the competing knowl-
edge claims that are enrolled by actors and help shape the outcome of struggles” (Goldman et al, 
2011: 4). In contestations around private interests in protected areas, proponents and opponents 
strive to produce, circulate, and ultimately apply particular environmental knowledges in conser-
vation practice. The relative abilities of different actors to enrol allies into certain ways of know-
ing, representing and valuing non-human nature will affect the ways in which parks are man-
aged, by whom and for whom.  
 Political economy is the other major determinant of how conservation and development 
projects will be managed, by whom and for whom. Neoliberal political economy and ideology 
are important concepts in this study as they relate to the anti- and post-politics of environmental 
governance. Neoliberalism is notoriously packed term, and in practice is always an incomplete 
and contested process, never a static thing. In the literature, neoliberalism is understood in sever-
al distinct but related ways: 1) as a political-economic theory that reorganizes capitalism with a 
focus on controlling inflation, offering an alternative to the Keynesian fiscal policies that preced-
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ed it which focused on providing full employment (Harvey, 2005, 2006; McCarthy, 2012), 2) as 
a political project concerned with the restoration of elite class power (Harvey, 2005), 3) as an ‘art 
of government’ in the Foucaultian sense, a technology of governing that produces a new kind of 
neoliberal political subject (Fletcher, 2013; Foucault, 2008; Ong, 2006), and 4) as an ideology, 
one that is not independent of class struggle but provides intellectual and moral justifications for 
particular interventions and political-economic restructuring (McCarthy, 2012). 
 As a political-economic theory, neoliberalism proposes that the ‘self-regulating’ market is 
the best means to deliver all necessary goods and services to society (Castree, 2008). Individual 
(or corporate) entrepreneurial freedom is considered the best means to advance human well-be-
ing.  The state is not to interfere directly in market transactions, but must play a strong role in 
securing private property rights and in creating an institutional framework that supports the effi-
cient operation of free markets and free trade. Neoliberal enthusiasts seek to dismantle the wel-
fare state, cutting state spending in the public sphere and allowing private enterprises or NGOs to 
step in to fill the void left by state rollback in service provision (Harvey, 2005; Castree, 2010) —
a trend witnessed in this dissertation. 
  While most scholars believe these logics are common to ‘ideal type’ neoliberal projects 
(Castree, 2008; Bakker, 2010), they also recognize that in practice, neoliberalisation is a path-
based and contingent process that is never found in this ‘ideal’ type.  “A focus on process (ne-
oliberalisation rather than neoliberalism), plurality (neoliberalisations rather than neoliberalisa-
tion), unevenness (the geographical, temporal, and sectoral variability of neoliberalisations) and 
incompleteness (the always in-process nature of utopian projects) has been central to this evolv-
ing way of thinking about and doing research on neoliberalism” (McCarthy, 2012: 184). As I will 
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explain in Chapter 2, the variegated, uneven and incomplete nature of neoliberalisation was one 
of my motivations to take a comparative case study approach to this research.  
  In Canada, particularly under the Conservative Harper government between 2006 and 
2015 when the bulk of the development controversies were unfolding, neoliberalisation of envi-
ronmental governance proceeded at the state level in several ways. The federal government cut 
the budgets of various departments and agencies (like Parks Canada), removed environmental 
protections (Bill C-45) and streamlined the environmental assessment process to facilitate devel-
opment and resource extraction projects (Peyton and Franks, 2015), and signed Canada onto 
transnational trade deals like the Trans Pacific Partnership that would deregulate trade barriers 
and allow foreign multinationals to sue our state government in a tribunal outside of our judicial 
system if we enacted environmental protections that interfered with global trade. In Thailand, the 
push and pull between neoliberalisation and more developmental political economic formations 
has been rather complex and contradictory (Glassman et al., 2008; Hill et al, 2011; LaRocco, 
2011). I will expand on the history of politics and economics in Thailand in Chapter 4, but in 
terms of environmental policy, the neoliberalisation of conservation has advanced primarily in 
terms of rescaling conservation practice to increase entrepreneurial participation from local 
communities (such as through community-based ecotourism projects) (Dressler and Roth, 2011; 
Youdelis, 2013) and through the creation of various quasi-private state agencies that may be 
granted licenses to develop in protected areas in co-operation with private companies. Politically, 
it is more difficult to make claims on a private company than on government; governments hold 
responsibility to citizens while corporations hold responsibility to their shareholders, so public 
versus private management affects the possibilities for political action (Ong, 2006).  
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  Neoliberalisation is also increasingly understood as more than just an economic project 
but as an entire way of thinking and being (Foucault, 2008). While I will not be dealing directly 
with the governmentalizing technologies associated with neoliberalisation in this dissertation, 
Peyton and Franks (2015) argue that the Harper government in particular pursued a ‘totalizing 
strategy’ to produce new citizen-subjects who understand non-human nature as mere fodder for 
economic development, and who accept or are even complicit in its commodification. In Thai-
land, discourses around nature conservation and neoliberalism are more contested. Particularly in 
the northern region, there is a history of Keynesian-style populism and an environmental move-
ment that is concertedly anti-capitalist (Glassman et al., 2008; Hirsch, 1997). I point to these dis-
tinctions as competing knowledge claims gain currency through resonating with the broader dis-
courses around neoliberalisation and conservation in any given struggle. 
 The relationship between neoliberalisation and the depoliticization of citizen and Indige-
nous participation in conservation governance is the central thread tying the two contestations 
featured in this dissertation together. I draw on two prominent and related frameworks for ana-
lyzing depoliticization/the practice of politics: anti-politics, which grew out of development stud-
ies, and post-politics, which grew out of political philosophy. Although each concept comes out 
of a different academic tradition, I would characterize post-politics as a subset of anti-politics, 
where anti-politics obscures and depoliticizes the role of political economy in perpetuating the 
status quo while post-politics more explicitly involves the orchestration of consensus around ne-
oliberal political and economic ideology, containing dissent and foreclosing alternatives.  
  More specifically, the notion of antipolitics was born from Ferguson’s (1994) critique of 
development discourse and practice. Using an anthropological approach, Ferguson took the de-
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velopment apparatus itself as the subject of inquiry, not the people who were subject to the de-
velopment interventions. He argued that development interventions obscure the political and 
economic reasons that poverty exists and thus continually fail to improve a given population’s 
standing because interventions ironically reproduce existing relations of inequality. Development 
interventions are designed to operate within existing political economic structures, not to ques-
tion or alter those structures themselves, and thus developers must portray interventions as tech-
nical as opposed to political solutions (Ferguson, 1994; Li, 2007). In a Foucaultian sense, devel-
opers construct different populations as particular kinds of “object[s] of knowledge, and create a 
structure of knowledge around [those objects]” (Ferguson, 1994: xiv), which then informs the 
interventions they enact. Although the interventions ‘fail’ on their own terms (due to the obfusca-
tion of the political economic determinants of the problem), development interventions are not 
abandoned because they serve other important political functions, such as extending state bu-
reaucratic power into the distressed communities (Ferguson, 1994). Ferguson writes, “[the de-
velopment apparatus] is an “antipolitics machine,” depoliticizing everything it touches, every-
where whisking political realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its 
own pre-eminently political operation of expanding bureaucratic state power” (1994: xv). An-
tipolitics in the context of development, then, means that political debate around inequality in 
access to resources is foreclosed and the political economic structures that contribute to the need 
for ‘development’ are left unquestioned. Meanwhile, the political motivations of state actors to 
pursue particular interventions and not others are obscured. 
 Büscher (2010) re-operationalizes the concept of antipolitics in his critique of neoliberal 
conservation discourse and practice, arguing that antipolitics is an essential political strategy 
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within neoliberal conservation interventions and within a neoliberal political economy more gen-
erally (Büscher, 2010). He argues, as does Ong (2006), that antipolitical strategies fit especially 
well within a neoliberal political economy as commoditization or trading of interests are used to 
replace debate over the unequal distribution of power and benefits. Antipolitics goes beyond 
mere technocratization and involves positioning interventions outside the realm of politics in or-
der to do away with social contemplative processes and “pre-determine decisions and/or social 
and public outcomes” (Büscher, 2010: 24). Antipolitics thus involves designing measures to con-
tain challenges to the status quo (Li, 2007), and is understood to be anti-democratic (Büscher, 
2010; Ong, 2006). Ong (2006) elaborates that neoliberalisation produces new political subjects 
where those with more available capital and/or more potential to contribute to development 
agendas hold greater political influence than those without. Antipolitics in the context of the ne-
oliberalisation of conservation, then, means that political debate around how the park should be 
managed, for whom and by whom, is removed from the public sphere and policy decisions be-
come technical exercises that attempt to maximize both conservation goals and economic devel-
opment. Nadasdy (2005) also critiques the antipolitics of comanagement arrangements with In-
digenous peoples in Canada, which I will elaborate on in detail in Chapter 5 along with the colo-
niality of the Indigenous consultation process in Canada.  
  Post-politics is a closely related and emerging body of literature coming out of discus-
sions between French political philosophers around the meaning of politics and democracy in 
liberal democracies (Badiou, 2008; Mouffe, 2005; Rancière, 1998). Post-politics builds on these 
philosophers’ distinctions between ‘the political’ (le politique) and ‘polic(e)y/politics’ (la poli-
tique). ‘The political’ signifies the “antagonistic differences that cut through the social” (Swyn-
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gedouw, 2011: 373), or the non-existence of society as a cohesive political community. Rancière 
(1998) understands the properly political to be a disruption on the part of ‘those who have no 
part,’ or those whose material conditions are not such that they can enjoy the same liberty and 
political influence as the capitalist or oligarch classes. Liberal democracy posits the demos as 
encompassing the whole, imagining freedom and equality of opportunity to be similarly univer-
sal, which obscures the domination of private property owners and the “monopolizers of the 
common property” (Rancière, 1998:8). This, he argues, is the ‘miscount’ of liberal democratic 
ideology, which imagines that there is a ‘common good’ that can be arrived at through a mere 
balancing of interests and not a fundamental reorganization of society. ‘The political’ is inherent-
ly antagonistic, which the post-political order disavows (Mouffe, 2005).   
  If ‘the political’ represents the antagonistic encounters initiated by those who have no 
part, ’the police/politics’ represents the institutionally choreographed field of policy-making that 
attempts to structure or grant cohesion to the otherwise absent social order (Marchart, 2007; 
Nancy, 1992; Rancière, 1998; Swyngedouw, 2011). ‘The police’ therefore reproduce the “mis-
count” of liberal democracies by taking for granted and erasing the structures and processes that 
marginalize ‘those who have no part,’ and by reducing democracy to the technocratic manage-
ment of what Badiou (2008) calls the ‘capitalo-parliamentary order.’ ’The police’ depoliticize the 
economy itself and reduce politics to the construction and management of consensus around the 
market as the preferred institution for resource allocation and social provisioning, which “limits 
or circumscribes the political choices offered to the citizen” (Swyngedouw, 2011: 372). Crouch 
and others consider this new regime ‘post-democratic’, where public debate is a “tightly con-
trolled spectacle” managed by “professional experts in the techniques of persuasion, and consid-
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ering a small range of issues selected by those teams” (2004: 4). In such a regime, citizens have 
increasingly passive roles while elected officials predominantly represent business interests. The 
understandable growing apathy of the citizenry with respect to political processes only allows for 
a more seamlessly choreographed spectacle (Crouch, 2004: Giroux, 2004; Swyngedouw, 2011). 
Particularly pertinent to the cases in this dissertation, “the public management of consensus relies 
on the opinion poll (rather than the ballot box), the perpetual canvassing of ‘popular’ views, sig-
nalling the parameters of what needs to be ‘policed’” (Swyngedouw, 2011: 372).  
  In a post-political regime, then, ’the political’ as the space for the practice of politics 
proper (ie. the open expression of dissensus and agonistic struggle for recognition) is sutured by 
‘the police’ (ie. consensual techno-managerial policy-making and administration). The political 
dissensus and debate requisite for the practice of democracy is evacuated from the sphere of pol-
icy negotiation, and governance is reduced to ‘policing’ consensual politics and technocratic pol-
icy-making (Mouffe, 2005; Rancière, 1998; Swyngedouw, 2010, 2011; Zizek, 1999). Post-politi-
cal governance is based around several ‘taken-for-granted’ discourses such as ‘there is no alter-
native’ thinking around neoliberal capitalism as the basic socio-economic order, and other 
‘agreed upon’ aims such as sustainability, participation, etc. (Fletcher, 2014; Swyngedouw, 
2011). Indeed neoliberalism’s rhetorical celebration of decentralization and public participation 
can serve to enrol a wider network of people into the decision-making process, but perhaps on 
narrow and circumscribed terms, keeping important political economic decisions beyond public 
debate. Consensus is not manufactured (Herman and Chomsky, 1988) in the sense that consensus 
is actually achieved, but the appearance of consent is ‘orchestrated’ (Fletcher, 2014) “as one of 
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the tactics through which spaces of conflict and antagonism are smoothed over and 
displaced” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 226). 
 Taking a political ecology approach, this research thus unites the lines of thinking around, 
political economy, anti- and post-politics and participatory environmental governance. I show 
how debates around private interests in parks and our understandings and practices of conserva-
tion policy co-evolve, as well as how the increasing inclusion of private sector stakeholders 
shapes public and Indigenous participation in conservation governance. 
  Chapter 2, the methods chapter, will outline my main research questions and the method-
ology I employed carrying out this research. I detail the specifics about the two controversies and 
the two field sites, along with an explanation of why these two sites were chosen and what we 
gain by looking at two cases together.  I also discuss my positionality and how this may have im-
pacted the research. 
  Chapter 3 is a revision of an article being published in Conservation and Society 
(Youdelis, Forthcoming). In this chapter I investigate the co-evolution of social activism and 
conservation policy in Jasper National Park in Alberta, Canada. Countless controversies around 
private sector interests in national parks have erupted throughout Canada within the last 5 years. 
These controversies have been arising within the context of budget cuts to Parks Canada and re-
lated imperatives to increase visitor numbers and ‘visitor experience’ to recoup costs and 
strengthen public support for Canadian parks. This chapter explores the post-politicization of 
consultation in Jasper through a study of two public contestations around Brewster Travel’s 
Glacier Skywalk development and Maligne Tours’ hotel proposal. I argue that due to substantial 
budget cuts, the interests of Parks Canada and certain corporate interests are aligning, to the 
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detriment of democratic decision-making in the park. Park authorities, under fiscal pressure, em-
ploy post-political strategies to remove debate from the public sphere, 'orchestrate' the appear-
ance of consensus and ultimately to legitimize unpopular tourism development decisions. 
 Chapter 4 is also a revised version of an article I published in Environment and Planning 
A (Youdelis, 2016). This chapter looks at the degree to which Indigenous actors in Jasper are able 
to participate in park decision-making. Although Canada has been applauded for its co-manage-
ment arrangements in recently established national parks, it continues to struggle with its legacy 
of colonial dispossession of Indigenous peoples, especially in its older and more iconic parks. 
First Nations were evicted from the earliest parks such as Banff and Jasper in a process of colo-
nial territorialization that facilitated a ‘wilderness’ model of park management and made space 
for capitalist enterprises like sport hunting and tourism (Binnema and Niemi, 2006; MacLaren, 
2011). In Jasper National Park today, private tourism development proposals trigger a Duty to 
Consult with nations whose Aboriginal or Treaty rights may be impacted by development. In the 
last few decades Jasper has made strides towards “reconciliation” including forming the Jasper 
Aboriginal Forum in an attempt to improve consultation with First Nations. I argue that Jasper’s 
approach to reconciliation and consultation reproduces and further entrenches unequal colonial-
capitalist power dynamics, relying on antipolitical strategies to produce the appearance of inclu-
sion and to naturalize the park’s ultimate decision-making authority in First Nations’ traditional 
territories. Park management attempts to incorporate First Nations’ input and certain “cultural” 
rights into existing state-led science-based management structures while leaving the legitimacy 
and justness of those structures unquestioned. As a result, Jasper’s approach to consultation ob-
scures the ongoing neocolonial political and economic violence of alienating First Nations from 
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their land bases and consequently reinforces existing inequalities. Ultimately I argue that this an-
tipolitical approach facilitates tourism development projects that benefit government and indus-
try and not Indigenous communities.  
  Chapter 5 explores the co-evolution of social activism and conservation policy in Doi 
Suthep-Pui National Park in Chiang Mai, Thailand. ‘Forest encroachers’, be they private devel-
opers or local communities, have long been a hot topic for the Department of National Parks, 
Wildlife and Plant Conservation in Thailand. The military has been more fervently targeting and 
demolishing private tourist resorts that encroach onto park lands across the country since the 
coup in 2014, while ironically simultaneously entertaining a quasi-private proposal to build a ca-
ble car through Doi Suthep-Pui National Park in Chiang Mai. This proposal elicited a significant 
public countermovement. Proponents here similarly employ antipolitical strategies to contain 
dissent and reduce the public’s role in decision-making. However, I argue that due to the unique 
political economy of conservation, opponents in Chiang Mai have had great success in shelving 
the cable car project since the 1980s and feel that they have considerable power in decision-mak-
ing. Steady federal funding to the national parks has reduced pressure to streamline the approval 
process or allow private development to recoup costs, and thus despite having relatively weak 
consultation mechanisms and a repressive military government, local people and ethnic minori-
ties feel relatively empowered.  
  Chapter 6, the discussion chapter, will bring the two cases into conversation with one an-
other. I will reflect on how looking at these cases alongside one another can contribute to broader 
discussions around political economies of conservation, anti- and post-politics, understandings of 
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nature, and settler-colonialism. Chapter 7 will be a brief concluding chapter where I return to my 
research questions and discuss some of the implications of this work. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Design and Methods 
 This research project compares two case studies in two different countries to help tease 
out the discursive and material politics associated with private infrastructure development in 
public national parks. Consistent with a political ecology framework, I take a critical realist per-
spective on the nature of reality, recognizing that although there is a material nature out there in-
dependent of our consciousness, our knowledge of nature is always socially mediated, partial, 
and contingent (Haraway, 1993; Neumann, 2005). Although there are material forests and 
ecosystems that opponents of development are concerned for, and that may be impacted by the 
developments in question, there are multiple and contested ways of knowing those ecosystems 
and of understanding concepts like conservation, national parks or ‘ecological integrity’. As this 
dissertation will explore the production, circulation and application of competing knowledge 
claims, I should make clear that I understand the construction of knowledge as an iterative, per-
formative process involving both human and non-human actants (Butler, 1990; Jasanoff, 2004; 
Whatmore, 2002). I see bureaucratic or ‘expert’ knowledge and authority as does Matthews 
(2011), “as a public fiction, which can only be sustained by a skillful collaboration between ap-
parently authoritative officials and their audiences, in a kind of public intimacy” (loc323). The 
power of conservation officials is halting and vulnerable because public audiences can act to 
refuse assent to these performances (Li, 2007; Matthews, 2011). Given that moves towards ne-
oliberalisation are often met with public pushback demanding more protectionist markets 
(Youdelis, 2013), the performative nature of conservation authority offers countless opportunities 
for various actors to subvert or obstruct the rollout of neoliberalised conservation projects. 
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 Thinking about knowledge and power in this way, I must highlight the important inter-
play between structure and agency throughout this dissertation. When tracing associations it is 
possible to lose oneself in the network and downplay the very important political and economic 
structural processes that produce (and maintain) marginality and contribute to determining who 
has the power to speak truths and whose voices become silenced. Conversely, critics of an overly 
materialist perspective argue that structures become superficially reified and granted agency with 
such an approach. Instead, I attempt to recognize and respect the pressures that structural pro-
cesses exert on socionatures while also understanding that those processes are enacted by people 
in relation with each other and non-humans and thus outcomes are not pre-determined but 
emerge from the relational agency of all actants involved (Whatmore, 2002). This leaves all po-
litical ‘outcomes’ perpetually open to be taken in a new direction. 
 I do not purport that my work is value neutral. I am undertaking this research, like all of 
my work, with a desire to contribute to emancipatory politics within academic scholarship, with-
in the field sites where I am active, and, if possible, beyond. I am concerned with the political 
implications of the increasing influence of private sector stakeholders in conservation practice 
because although the majority of critical literature on neoliberalisation focuses on economic and 
socio-environmental consequences (Buscher et al., 2014; Holmes and Cavanagh, 2015), there is 
increasing evidence that despite the rhetoric of decentralisation being democratising, moving to-
wards ‘free’ markets or private governance tends toward authoritarianism, oligarchy, and/or at-
tacks on civil liberties, putting democratic decision-making at stake (Brown, 2003; Chomsky, 
1999; Klein, 2008; Zizek, 2008). Many parks globally are facing funding cutbacks, particularly 
in times of recession and austerity, and thus private sector partnerships and/or and donor funding 
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for protected areas can be enthusiastically welcomed if not deliberately sought out (Higgins-
Desbiolles, 2011). It is therefore imperative to understand how private sector influence might 
shape or transform public and Indigenous participation on ‘public’ lands —contested as Indige-
nous nations’ traditional territory— in addition to the implications of this kind of rescaling for 
the future of conservation practice.  
  My initial fear or hypothesis was that if there are indeed consequences for democratic 
decision-making, along with environmental and socio-economic implications, then these would 
be very difficult to reverse as more and more authority and responsibility for funding is rescaled 
to private interests. As discussed in the Introduction, however, I do not want to treat neoliberali-
sation as an unstoppable juggernaut. Like capitalism, neoliberal governance is a social relation 
(Hardt and Negri, 2000); an unstable set of relations between people, institutions, corporations, 
and non-human actants that requires continual performance and public assent, as does conserva-
tion governance. Methodologically, it is challenging to trace the unstable set of relations in-
volved in neoliberalisation. Treating neoliberalisation as unstable methodologically means being 
attentive to the multiple and variegated ways neoliberalisation presents itself. It also means tak-
ing seriously the public countermovements and local realities that temper and adjust what is pos-
sible in terms of implementation. Controversy and contestation police the boundaries of what is 
and is not possible for alternative political economies of conservation, and it is this sort of per-
formative boundary work on which I focus. 
  In the chapters that follow, I explore how and why public countermovements against pri-
vate sector partnerships and development take shape, how debates around private actors in parks 
shape and are shaped by changes in conservation policy, and to what extent corporate-govern-
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ment partnerships transform public participation in park decision-making. I have two main re-
search questions. The first is how do social activism and conservation policy co-evolve? Flowing 
from this major question, I am interested in how and why situated actors articulate different vi-
sions of conservation and the role of national parks, what strategies proponents and opponents 
employ to enrol allies, how and why certain knowledge claims gain currency above or exclude 
others, and how debates around private interests in parks shape understandings and practices of 
conservation. The second major question is how does the increasing inclusion of private sector 
stakeholders shape or transform public and Indigenous participation in conservation governance? 
I am interested in how consultation processes have evolved over time, how public and indige-
nous actors perceive the consultation process and understand their role in decision-making, and 
ultimately whether the rescaling of conservation influences who exerts power in park manage-
ment.  
  I chose to take a comparative case study approach to these research questions to reflect 
my commitment to take seriously that neoliberalisation is a variegated and unstable process. 
Within debates in political ecology, scholars have called for more attention to the variegation and 
path-dependency of “actually existing neoliberalisms” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002) in response 
to the inadvertent tendency of some of the literature on the neoliberalisation of nature to paint 
neoliberalism as an unstoppable juggernaut. In seeking to understand how the dynamics of ne-
oliberalisation influence and are influenced by social activism and consultation mechanisms in 
conservation practice, I believe that it’s important to understand how the path-dependency inher-
ent to neoliberalisation might come to bear on the linkages we may observe in any one specific 
locale. It is undeniable now that neoliberalisation unfolds very differently in different cultural 
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and geographical locations, and thus a comparative approach helps us to develop a more com-
prehensive picture of which dynamics of neoliberalisation in particular may facilitate the post-
politicization of conservation governance, and how a variety of other factors (politics, history, 
institutions, etc.) influence the relationship between political economy, conservation practice, 
and depoliticization. Differences in how consultation operates in differing field sites may also 
hold implications for how opponents organize countermovements and attempt to politicize the 
issues. I have therefore chosen to explore and compare the experiences of citizens and Indige-
nous actors in two case studies, one in the “Global North” and the other in the “Global South”, to 
interrogate how neoliberalisation might be either reified, reshaped or subverted in interaction 
with context-specific histories, institutions, regulatory landscapes, and on-the-ground engage-
ments with conservation practice.  
  A final motivation for the multi-sited approach is to bring critical literature on conserva-
tion in Canada into better conversation with the rich body of critical literature on conservation 
and neoliberalisation globally. The majority of the literature on neoliberal conservation focuses 
on interventions in the Global South, which are often funded and implemented by donors and 
organizations from the Global North. I believe that a more sustained investigation of the implica-
tions of the neoliberalisation of conservation in the Global North —and an exploration of how 
these dynamics either mirror or diverge from experiences in the Global South— is pertinent to 
better understanding the challenges faced by both conservation officials and citizen-activists in 
different political economic settings. This understanding has political import for the networks of 
opponents trying to challenge both neoliberalisation and depoliticization, as more comprehensive 
understandings of the ‘problem’ can inform better targeted and more holistic political interven-
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tions and ‘solutions’.  
  I chose these two field sites in particular because despite having very different histories 
with colonialism, democratic engagement and economic development, the details of the contro-
versies in both sites are starkly similar. The truth claims advanced by opponents as well as the 
strategies of depoliticization employed by proponents hold many parallels. However, the sites 
differ drastically in terms of political economies of conservation and in the organization of and 
politics espoused by civil society. Looking at the two together, then, can help us shed light on 
which political economic dynamics in particular hold implications for the post-politicization of 
consultation, and can enhance our understandings of political economies of conservation, theo-
ries of settler-colonialism, strategies of depoliticization, and consultation and protest. I will re-
turn to these themes in the Discussion chapter, Chapter 6.   
  For context, Canada is a ‘developed’ settler-colonial and liberal democratic constitutional 
monarchy (where the role of the British monarchy has been curtailed and is largely symbolic). 
Thailand is a ‘developing’ constitutional monarchy, where the King’s role has been similarly cur-
tailed but arguably has a greater role in public life. Thailand has also been described as having 
the "world's harshest lèse majesté law” (Cochrane, 2017), severely punishing anyone who speaks 
ill of the royal family. Politically, Thailand has recently been usurped by a military coup, posing 
serious deleterious implications for democracy. Both Canada and Thailand’s national park 
frameworks have been shaped by colonialism despite the fact that Thailand has never been for-
mally colonized. As I will outline in detail in Chapters 3 and 4, Canada’s park system began as 
unabashedly colonial, and, in many respects, continues to be to this day.  
  Following the Yellowstone model, conservation in Canada was a mechanism through 
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which settler-colonizers amassed power over land and resources and opened these up to white 
settlers for commercial gain (Campbell, 2011; Binnema and Niemi, 2006). Sir John A. Macdon-
ald, Canada’s first prime minister, sought to develop the West, and so collaborated with the 
Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR) company to link the disparate parts of the country together. 
Banff and Jasper were sold as spectacular destinations to the CPR’s upper- and middle-class 
tourists. Bella writes:  
 “[The early parks] were built not to preserve a natural landscape, but to centralize control  
 of that landscape in the hands of the railroads. That control was used to reduce  
  competition in the parks, and to restrict access to the mountains. Businesses that might be 
 patronized by the working class were not sufficiently aesthetic. Access to the mountains   
 was provided instead to upper- and middle-income tourists willing to pay substantial   
 sums for a sanitized view of the mountains.” (1987: 24)  
In seeking to produce this sanitized view for tourists, other commercial operators were similarly 
grandfathered into the early mountain parks, including Brewter Travel and Maligne Tours, the 
two companies responsible for the proposals under scrutiny in Jasper.  
  Brewster in particular has a long history in the park. In 1886, the government hired Bill 
Brewster senior as a carpenter to work on the bath houses by the hot springs in Banff. Bill no-
ticed that there were no dairy farms between Calgary and Revelstoke and suggested to his broth-
er, John, that this was a potential business opportunity. John travelled to Banff with his two sons, 
Bill and Jim, and serviced the new park townsite and hotel with milk. Guided by a member of the 
Stoney Nakoda Nation, William Twin, Bill and Jim explored the mountains and developed a 
knack for guiding (Bella, 1987; Pitts, 2017). They set up a small outfitting operation with profits 
made from their father’s dairy business, and when the CPR decided to move away from outfit-
ting, they sold the Brewsters the Banff concession. “This allowed the brothers to build a large 
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outfitting and livery empire under CPR protection” (Bella, 1987: 17). When the automobile re-
placed the railroads as the preferred method of transport in the parks, the Brewsters began offer-
ing tours via bus fleets under the name of Brewster Transport (Brennan, 2005; Pitts, 2017). The 
Brewsters have thus played an important role in producing Banff and Jasper as tourist destina-
tions for middle-class settlers, which continues to this day. Eighteen years after Jim’s death, 
Brewster Transport sold to Greyhound (Brennan, 2005), and was then acquired by Viad Corpora-
tion, based in Phoenix, Arizona. Viad’s Travel and Recreation Branch, recently rebranded as Pur-
suit, offers ‘experiential’ travel and recreation services in national parks in the U.S. and Canada 
(Viad, 2018). Brewster Travel is now among the companies under Pursuit’s umbrella, as is the 
recently acquired Maligne Tours (Katz, 2017).  
  Maligne Tours is the second company coming under fire in recent controversies in Jasper, 
for their luxury hotel proposal at Maligne Lake. Maligne Tours is also historically connected to 
the Brewsters. Fred Brewster built the Maligne Lake Chalet and guest houses in 1927, setting up 
a popular backcountry camp. In 1928, Donald “Curly” Phillips built the Maligne boathouse and 
set up the first boat tour of the lake and Spirit Island, a popular and well-photographed tourist 
destination (Interview with General Manager of Maligne Tours). Boat tours are today the main 
attraction of Maligne Tours Ltd., which has proposed to expand operations to include a luxury 
hotel, tent cabins, and other attractions such as horseback riding and wilderness mazes. Viad 
Corporation acquired the company in 2016.  
  Given that private interests have been operating in the mountain parks since their incep-
tion, there have been periodic clashes and movements organized against profit-seeking and de-
velopment in Banff-Jasper, first in 1910-1930 and then in the late 60s and 70s. Between 
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1910-1930, the Alpine Club of Canada and the National Parks Association fought proposals for 
hydroelectric dams in the parks. In the 60s and 70s, environmental groups fought urbanization, 
the expansion of highways, and ski developments (Bella, 1987; Campbell, 2011). Interviewees 
who were part of those movements felt that they had more leverage at that time —that public 
hearings were more involved and that decisions did not appear to be foregone conclusions. For 
example, opponents of the proposal to build a lower village at the ski hill of Lake Louise were 
successful in their movement despite the power and pressure wielded by the ski lobby (see Bella, 
1987).  The conflicts between citizens and developers culminated in two independent reviews of 1
Parks Canada in the 1980s and 90s, and stricter wording around ecological integrity in the Na-
tional Parks Act of 2001. Ecological integrity is now the top priority of the Minister when mak-
ing decisions relating to park governance, although in recent years Parks Canada has positioned 
visitor experience as an (almost) equally important pillar. Parks Canada was transformed into a 
business headed by a CEO in 1988, and has since faced subsequent rounds of austerity whereby 
the importance of revenues from private interests has increased. Chapter 3 will explore to what 
extent the changes to how parks are managed and funded since the 1980s influence the degree to 
which citizens and Indigenous actors have continued space for political debate and democratic 
participation in decision-making.  
  While Thailand is not a settler colonial state, the treatment of ethnic minority communi-
ties has been starkly similar to the treatment of Indigenous peoples in Canada, with parks simi-
larly used as tools of territorialization (Leblond, 2010; Vandergeest, 1996). Thai forest laws were 
 Respondents who participated at that time explained that pubic consultation involved lengthy public hearings, 1
where the press was invited and each person or environmental organization that wished to speak was given floor 
time. Organizations were given the opportunity to make entire presentations, recorded by the press, and there was 
room for open debate. 
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adapted from the British colonial system in India and Burma. Protected area laws were, like in 
Canada, adapted from the American ‘Yosemite’ model (Vandergeest, 1996). Thus although Thai-
land was never formerly colonized, colonial understandings of nature, territory and conservation 
are nonetheless imbued in the Thai park system. While there have also been tensions between 
tourism development and conservation in certain popular parks in Thailand (FAO, 1998), partic-
ularly in the popular southern parks like Koh Phi Phi (the set of the 2000 movie The Beach), the 
private sector remains barred from developing in parks. Private businesses have not been grand-
fathered into the northern parks like Doi Suthep-Pui. In fact, there have been several cases where 
federal authorities demolished private operations that were encroaching into park territory (The 
Nation, 2014a, 2014b). Protecting the environment from encroachment (loosely protecting ‘eco-
logical integrity’) is the top priority of park authorities, however officials are allowed to break 
the rules laid out for private persons or the private sector in order to facilitate public education or 
tourism (National Parks Act, 1961). Despite the unique history and political economy of each 
field site, the proposals and countermovements, including the knowledge claims put forward for 
and against, have looked remarkably similar in both countries. 
  
Research Sites 
 I’ve been intrigued by the ‘conservation versus development’ conundrum (understood as 
capitalist development) since my undergrad. My Master’s work grew out of this interest and 
looked at the contradictions involved in using ecotourism as a market-oriented conservation 
strategy in Doi Inthanon National Park in northern Thailand. This work critiqued the issues that 
arise when interventions simultaneously encourage profit maximization and conservation-friend-
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ly living. That project explored processes of neoliberalisation in terms of the rescaling of conser-
vation to include local actors and encouraging increased entrepreneurial market engagement 
through neoliberal environmentality (Youdelis, 2013), but ecotourism was run and managed by 
local ethnic minorities and was not a consequence of budget cuts or a restructuring of how parks 
are funded at the state level. When I began my PhD, I began to think about what might happen if 
national parks, like other areas of state spending, were to be privatized or managed in partnership 
with private sector actors due to broader political economic imperatives. After doing some dig-
ging, I realized that there were many controversies around private interests trying to develop and 
manage new tourism opportunities in national parks in Canada. I knew that this was very likely 
an issue that many parks were facing globally, so I began looking for other examples of contro-
versies around the world. I found there had been similar conservation versus development con-
troversies occurring around Thailand as well, with one particularly interesting case of ongoing 
opposition to a cable car proposal in Doi Suthep-Pui National Park in Chiang Mai. Since I al-
ready had a well-established network of contacts in Chiang Mai and was familiar with the critical 
literature on conservation in Thailand, I thought this would be the perfect second field site to an-
alyze alongside the Canadian experience. I thus chose my two research sites for both personal 
and intellectual reasons.  
  I will outline the specifics of the two cases below, but both involve considerable public 
countermovements to proposals for private/quasi-private tourism development proposals within 
national parks. The two cases underscore that these kinds of contestations are playing out in both 
quote unquote ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, and that the concerns of opponents and 
the philosophical debates around public vs. private development and management of national 
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parks take similar shape in very different geographical and socio-political settings. They also un-
derscore Polanyi’s (1944) point that moves towards ‘freer’ markets are often if not always met by 
public push back and demands for more protectionist market engagement to tether the troubling 
social and environmental externalities of the pursuit of the ‘free market’ ideal. Neoliberalisation 
looks very different in the two sites, attesting that it is a messy, path-dependent process – an al-
ways incomplete achievement. 
  I take local and Indigenous satisfaction with public consultation and decision-making 
processes as a central concern, exploring the nature and scope of countermovements to develop-
ment projects posed by these actors and how and why we see certain results. In Chapter 6, I will 
be putting the cases into conversation with one another to draw some broader conclusions about 
the relationship between market governance and the democratic process.  
Jasper National Park, Canada: The Glacier Skywalk 
Figure 2.0 - Map of Jasper, Banff, Yoho and Kootenay National Parks   2
 Source: http://thecanadianrockies.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Station-Map.png2
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  Jasper National Park straddles the border between the provinces of Alberta and British 
Columbia in Canada, and connects with the other mountain parks of Banff, Yoho, and Kootenay 
via the Yellowhead Highway. Since 2011, Parks Canada has been entertaining several proposals 
to privatize tourism services in these parks and others across the country.  Well-known contro3 -
versial cases include the privatization of the hot springs in both Banff National Park and Jasper 
National Park in Alberta (Stephenson and Ellis, 2012), the private operation of the golf course 
and the recent Mother Canada Statue development proposal in Cape Breton Highlands National 
Park in Nova Scotia (Collins, 2012), the construction of the Glacier Skywalk and the proposal to 
build a hotel at Maligne Lake in Jasper National Park (CPAWS, 2012; Mertz, 2015), the Lake 
Louise ski guideline changes in Banff National Park (Derworiz, 2015), and the fracking contro-
versy in Gros Morne National Park in Newfoundland (CBC News, 2013).  These proposals were 
being put forth within the context of budget cuts to Parks Canada, changes to Canada’s environ-
mental protections (Bill C-45), and recent calls to enhance visitor experience and attract new 
Canadians and urban youth (Parks Canada, 2011a).   
  The Glacier Skywalk in Jasper National Park, proposed by the now American-owned 
company Brewster Travel Ltd., was and remains an especially contentious project.  The Glacier 
Skywalk has been described as a “theme park-like attraction” (CPAWS, 2011) that includes a 
400-metre walkway, meant to be an educational trail, and a glass-floored ‘skywalk’ extending 30 
 As explained, there is a long history of private interests in the mountain parks in particular, where certain operators 3
have been grandfathered in. However, guidelines that cap or limit the scope of future development are being recon-
sidered in the current climate of austerity-related restructuring, which I detail more fully in Chapter 3. Further, other 
parks across the system such as Cape Breton and Gros Morne are experiencing similar controversies around private 
interests in protected areas.
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metres over the Sunwapta Valley (CPAWS, 2011; Wittmeier, 2012).  Figure 2.0 below shows pic-
tures of the completed product I took on various visits to the site. 
 
Figure 3.0 - Glacier Skywalk Visit, May 2014 
 Until now, public visitors to the area could take in the views over the Sunwapta Valley for 
free (although they would still need to pay the park entrance fee).  Visitors are now charged $32 
dollars before tax to visit the attraction, and they are no longer allowed to stop at the viewpoint 
but must drive another 6km down the road to the Columbia Icefields centre where Brewster 
Travel operates a commercial stage coach attraction, taking tourists out onto the Athabasca Glac-
ier. A black tarp has been placed over the fence that surrounds the Glacier Skywalk so that visi-
tors driving by can no longer take in the views without paying Brewster Travel, which many find 
highly egregious. The fee and the removal of a public viewpoint is deemed reasonable by Parks 
Canada and Brewster Travel, as they are marketing the Glacier Walkway as an educational expe-
rience meant to connect Canadians with the land and each other, as well as a possible world 
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tourism icon in which Canadians can take pride (Bajula, 2012; Parks Canada, 2011b; Wittmeier, 
2012). 
  This proposal elicited a significant countermovement, with citizens, environmental 
groups, journalists, academics, politicians and foreign tourists all expressing offense and disap-
proval of the project.  Public concerns included: corporate-government partnerships seeking 
profits over conservation principles, the ability for all Canadians to access park services, public 
resources becoming privatized, a commitment to democratic participation, and respecting the 
role of parks as understood to protect ‘wilderness’ or our national heritage. The campaign began 
with Jasper residents sending letters to Parks Canada and voicing their concerns at public meet-
ings (CBC News, 2012). Opponents then turned to Avaaz.org, an on-line activist organization, to 
publicize and broaden the campaign by initiating an on-line petition titled “Save Jasper National 
Park”. They collected over 180,000 signatures by asking Canadians to save our ‘natural wonders’ 
from American development, highlighting the fact that Brewster Travel is now owned by the 
American multinational Viad Corporation. The petition letters, sent to former superintendent of 
Jasper Park Greg Fenton, begin as follows: 
  “Privatising Jasper National Park will set a dangerous precedent to allow destructive  
  development by private corporations in World Heritage Sites across Canada. This goes  
  entirely against what Canadians – and visitors – expect and deserve from Canada's wild  
  and magnificent national parks.” (Avaaz.org, 2011)  
Additionally, thousands of letters were sent to former Minister of the Environment Peter Kent 
and over 5,000 postcards were sent directly to former Prime Minister Stephen Harper in hopes of 
halting construction (Jasper Environmental Association, 2012; Wittmeier, 2012).   
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 Despite public outcry, Parks Canada framed opposition to the project as a matter of ‘per-
sonal values’ and not a legitimate reason to turn down the proposal.  Then Minister of the Envi-
ronment Peter Kent stepped in to approve the project despite the fact that Parks Canada assured 
stakeholders that the decision was made at the park level by former superintendent Greg Fenton. 
Several stakeholders believe the decision to approve was made in Ottawa prior to public consul-
tation, pointing to the fact that Brewster Travel was lobbying the government (OCL-C, 2013). 
The experience left citizens and environmental groups concerned with the efficacy of public con-
sultation and the ability of Canadians to participate in park decision-making.   
 Parks Canada and Brewster Travel frame the Glacier Walkway as important to attract new 
Canadians and increase visitor numbers. This is related to their Learn To Camp programs, which 
aim to teach new Canadians how to camp and appreciate Canadian wilderness in order to accli-
mate to Canadian life and perform particular Canadian identities (Fitzhugh, 2013a; Keung, 
2012).  These programs target new Canadians from particular geographical regions (not typically 
from America or Europe, for example). Opponents argue that the Glacier Walkway and other pri-
vate developments within parks have less to do with reaching different groups of people, as they 
question the evidence that new Canadians want this sort of attraction, and instead point to the 
significant budget cuts to Parks Canada over the years that have created opportunities for private 
market-based actors whose visions appear to depart from conventional public understandings of 
conservation and the role of national parks (CPAWS, 2012).   
 Parks Canada also claims to have consulted with several First Nations regarding their 
concerns with the project, but little information about these consultations is publicly available. 
There are currently no Indigenous nations residing within Jasper National Park, as they were 
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forced to leave in 1907 when the park was established and they were barred from practicing tra-
ditional livelihoods (Fitzhugh, 2012). Parks Canada states that after discussions with Elders, the 
majority did not oppose the project and in fact several nations showed interest in employment 
opportunities at the Glacier Walkway (Parks Canada, 2012). Chapter 4 will tell quite a different 
story.  
Jasper National Park, Canada: Maligne Tours Hotel 
 A year after the Glacier Walkway was approved, Maligne Tours proposed building a 66-
suite hotel along with 15 tent cabins, horseback riding trails and other attractions like a wildlife-
themed maze at Maligne Lake in Jasper National Park (Fitzhugh, 2013b; Global News, 2013; 
Plummer, 2013). Once again, attracting new Canadians and urban youth is the stated goal of 
most of the proposed attractions. The lake is home to the iconic Spirit Island, where Maligne 
Tours currently operates a small boat service that brings tourists to visit the island and back.  
There are only 7 commercial boats allowed on the lake, and none can go beyond Spirit Island as 
the rest of the lake ecosystem and surrounding area is considered ecologically sensitive. Oppo-
nents feel that this new proposal gives credence to public concerns that the Glacier Walkway 
would set a precedent for more private tourism development within the park (Green Party, 2012).  
Again, citizen and environmental groups, journalists, academics, and tourists came together to 
protest this development. Letters were sent to Parks Canada, the Ministry of the Environment 
and former PM Stephen Harper opposing the project, and another Avaaz.org petition gathered 
over 2,700 signatures (Avaaz.org, 2014). The petition script reads as follows: 
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 Right now, Maligne Lake – home to the world-famous Spirit Island – is under   
 threat from a tour company that wants to build a hotel for “premium-paying    
 customers” on its north shore. We must speak out now if we are to save this crown jewel   
 of the Rocky Mountain World Heritage Site.  
 The Maligne Valley is home to grizzly bears, harlequin ducks, and a small herd of   
 threatened caribou that could be at risk if this project is approved by the federal    
 government.  
 Since 1969, Parks Canada has refused overnight accommodation at this iconic    
 wilderness lake. But the government has slashed funding for our parks and is    
 slowly re-shaping the places we love. Two years ago, they approved a monstrous 
 "skywalk" alongside the Icefields Parkway. Now they're considering approval of this  
 hotel on the lovely Maligne Lake even though it would go against Jasper National Park’s   
 policies and guidelines.  
 Let’s send a clear message now to the Harper government that defiling our    
 national parks is not an option.” (Avaaz.org, 2014, bold in original) 
  
 In a letter to Superintendent Greg Fenton, the Jasper Environmental Association and the 
Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society partnered with Ecojustice, an environmental law charity, 
and jointly argued that the proposed development at Maligne Lake should not be approved, as it 
is contrary to the 2010 Management Plan for Jasper National Park, contrary to the Parks Canada 
Guiding Principles and Operational Policies and the Outlying Commercial Accommodation 
Guidelines (2007), and contrary to the conditions set on the 2003 renewal of the lease and licens-
es of occupation for Maligne Lake developments. They argued that the proposed development 
would jeopardize the survival and recovery of caribou herds, an endangered species in the area, 
and would interfere with sensitive and threatened species like grizzly bears and harlequin ducks. 
They also argued that there is a lack of social science evidence that supports the need for ac-
commodations at Maligne Lake. 
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 Three former Canadian Wildlife Service biologists argued that the development will seri-
ously threaten the endangered caribou herd. They wrote an open letter stating that at the time 
there were only 55 individual caribou in Jasper National Park, with only 5 individuals left in the 
Maligne subherd. That number has now dropped to 4. Increased traffic along the road to the lake, 
along with increased visitor numbers, power generation, and waste will arguably disturb or dis-
place the remaining caribou from the area (Global News, 2013; Jasper Environmental Associa-
tion, 2014; Plummer, 2013). Opponents argue that within a protected area, endangered species 
and ecological integrity should be given top priority, which should preclude the possibility for 
hotel development in critical habitat.  
 Several stakeholders also feel that, as in the Glacier Walkway dispute, public consultation 
on the project has not been adequate, as ‘open houses’ and informational sessions have replaced 
public hearings, and initially all public comments and concerns were being sent directly to Ma-
ligne Tours, not to Parks Canada (Fitzhugh, 2013b; Gadd, 2013). Given the result of the Glacier 
Walkway controversy, opponents were very wary of the consultation process and were pes-
simistic about their ability to stop development, but pressed on with opposition despite this. The 
Jasper Environmental Association (JEA) organized a protest along the road leading to Maligne 
Lake, and partnered with the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society (CPAWS) to organize a 
written petition. CPAWS distributed these petitions in Mountain Equipment Co-op stores across 
Canada. This time, Parks Canada appears to have listened to public sentiment, along with their 
own evaluation of the merits and drawbacks for ecological integrity, and turned down the hotel 
portion of the proposal, but greenlighted all of the other proposed attractions for further consid-
eration. This includes the 15 overnight tent cabins, which opponents feel would have the many of 
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the same impacts as the hotel and which remain contrary to the park management plan, so oppo-
sition is ongoing from both public actors and certain First Nations.  
  Interestingly, Brewster Travel acquired Maligne Tours in January of 2016, after it was 
clear that the hotel would not be going forward. The acquisition means that Viad Corporation, 
based in Phoenix, Arizona, now owns two of the biggest money-makers in the mountain parks. It 
is unclear at this point whether they will continue to pursue the greenlighted attractions including 
the overnight tent cabins. 
Doi Suthep-Doi Pui National Park, Thailand: The Chiang Mai Cable Car 
Figure 4.0 - Map of Thailand, Chiang Mai and Doi Suthep-Pui National Park  4
 Map sources: 1) http://www.emapsworld.com/images/thailand-provinces-map-black-and-white.gif  4
2) http://www.trekthailand.net/north11/map.html
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 Doi Suthep-Doi Pui National Park is a 265 square kilometre protected area just northwest 
of Chiang Mai in northern Thailand, home to over 300 bird species, over 500 species of butter-
flies and thousands of species of plants and ferns (Swearer, 2001). The park also contains Phra 
Tamnak Bhubhing, a summer palace and gardens for the royal family, two Hmong ethnic minori-
ty villages (including Ban Doi Pui which features an ethnic market popular with tourists), and 
one of the most sacred sites in the northern region, Wat Phra That Doi Suthep (Doi Suthep Tem-
ple), which sits at the peak of Doi Suthep (1676m) overlooking Chiang Mai (Lonely Planet, 
2014; Swearer, 2001).  Given its proximity to Chiang Mai, development within and around the 
park has long been a sensitive issue, as it has been in several parks throughout Thailand. Several 
national parks have been critiqued for allowing “inappropriate facilities” (FAO, 1998) within 
park borders, such as Koh Samet’s bungalow resorts and Khao Yai’s golf course. One of the ear-
liest and most controversial projects to spur public opposition was the Doi Suthep cable car 
project proposal, first suggested in the 1970s but officially proposed and protested in 1985 
(Forsyth, 2003b; Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989). 
 In the 1980s, the Tourism Authority of Thailand hired consultants to conduct feasibility 
studies for potential new tourist locations in and around Chiang Mai. A private architectural firm 
based in Bangkok, Four Aces Consultants, was hired to produce a master plan for tourism devel-
opment in Chiang Mai. They identified Doi Suthep as an area of great potential and proposed a 
3-km, 115 million baht (US$4.6 million in 1985 rates) cable car, which would have run from the 
base of Doi Suthep mountain in Chiang Mai to the Wat Phra That Doi Suthep monastery at its 
peak (Pholpoke, 1998; Swearer, 2001).  The project would have been a joint venture involving 
!46
Four Aces, another real estate company in Bangkok, and a finance company in the Thai Farmers’ 
Bank Group (Pholpoke, 1998).   
 Protest emerged as soon as the government submitted the proposal. Citizens, environ-
mental groups, academics, journalists, students, and Buddhist monks came out in strong opposi-
tion to the project. The campaign began with academics in Chiang Mai University arguing that 
the cable car would negatively impact the park’s high levels of plant biodiversity (Elliott et al., 
1989). Opponents strongly opposed the destruction of forests required to build the cable car, ar-
guing that this was inappropriate within the national park and would be a disturbance to rare an-
imals (Hirsch and Lohmann, 1989; Pholpoke, 1998). Academics and local people also challenged 
claims that there was need for an expansion of facilities, asserting that the existing road to the 
summit was sufficient. Opponents were also protesting the notion that part of an ostensibly pub-
lic resource, the national park, would become private without adequate democratic input into the 
planning and decision-making processes (Darlington, 2009; Pholpoke, 1998). Activists critiqued 
the conflict of interest involved as hired consultants became planners and then investors and 
would-be developers in the project. They argued that the social science data supporting the no-
tion that Chiang Mai citizens were in favour of the project was also suspect, as surveys were 
conducted by close associates of Four Aces Consultants and only selected sympathetic respon-
dents (no monks were surveyed, for example) (Pholpoke, 1998).  In these regards, this controver-
sy drew and continues to draw many parallels with the countermovements arising in response to 
private tourism development in Jasper National Park.   
 There was also a strong religious aspect to the 1985 protests in Chiang Mai, led by an 
emerging group of environmentalist monks. Environmentalist monks use Buddhist principles and 
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concepts to inform environmental projects at local levels, reflecting the broader international 
movement of ‘engaged Buddhism’ (Masayuki, 2011). The 1985 Chiang Mai cable car controver-
sy represents the first involvement of a large group of environmental monks in northern Thai-
land. Wat Phra That Doi Suthep is so highly revered by both monks and northern Thais in part 
due to the myth that surrounds its construction.  According to legend, the monastery was estab-
lished in the 14th century to house a Buddha relic requested by Ku’ena, the ruler of Chiang Mai 
between 1355-1385 (Darlington, 2009; Swearer, 2001). The relic is said to have divided itself in 
half, with half enshrined at the royal Flower Garden Monastery, Wat Suan Dok, and “the other 
half was placed on the back of an elephant to be enshrined wherever the animal was led by the 
gods, suggesting that supernatural forces determined its location on the mountain” (Swearer, 
2001: 238). The Abbot of Wat Muen Lan, Phra Khru Anusorn Silakhan, argued that the 
monastery was “deliberately located in the mountain to make access difficult so that the pilgrim-
age emerges as a task of devotion” (The Nation, 1987).  A strong motivating factor for public op-
position was thus that people felt the cable car and the resulting increased commercialization 
would violate the sanctity of the site and devalue the intended pilgrimage up the mountain. 
 Protesters held peaceful demonstrations in Chiang Mai in 1986 and submitted a petition 
with 30,000 signatures to the government. Their combined efforts successfully shelved the 
project in 1986 (Darlington; 2009; Pholpoke, 1998). The cable car idea resurfaced once again in 
2005-6, but again met protest and was shelved. It had not made much headway until 2013 when 
the Pinkanakorn Development Agency officially proposed a new and remodeled project. The 
PDA is a quasi-private government agency established in 2013 to promote tourism in Chiang 
Mai and the rest of the province (Bangkok Post, 2013; Bangkok Post, 2014). It manages several 
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attractions including the controversial Chiang Mai Night Safari, the Royal Botanical Gardens, 
and the Chiang Mai International Convention Centre. The agency is led by Plodprasop Suraswa-
di, the former Director General of the Royal Forestry Department and Department of National 
Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation, and acting head of Thaksin’s Pheu Thai party while 
Thaksin is in exile. He has proposed a 10-km, 2-billion baht (US$56 million in current rates) ca-
ble car to link the Night Safari with other sites throughout Doi Suthep-Doi Pui National Park 
(Bangkok Post, 2014; Gondola Project, 2014). The cable car would be the longest in the world if 
approved, and would cut through Wat Phra That Doi Kham, Wat Phra That Doi Suthep and 
Bhubing Palace (Chiang Mai Mail, 2013), which opponents find particularly upsetting as these 
are important cultural and religious sites.  An environmental assessment report was conducted by 
the Department of Environmental Science at Kasetsart University and Tesco Company Limited, 
and, like in Jasper, both opponents and proponents are suspect of the document. Most feel it is 
more of a PR publication as it focuses predominantly on the benefits of the cable car with little 
exploration of the potential consequences or how benefits might be shared. Opponents spoke out 
at public meetings, held public protest events and press conferences, wrote letters to local author-
ities, published pieces in local and national media, and have been doing TV spots and interviews 
to gain visibility. Again, public concerns include the sanctity of the religious sites, the ecological 
impacts of such a development within the national park, and the transfer of a common resource 
to a for-profit business without the democratic consent of residents of the province (Bangkok 
Post, 2013; The Nation, 2014). 
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Research Design, Positionality and Challenges 
 This research takes a case study approach with semi-structured interviews furnishing the 
majority of the research data, supplemented by observation and document analysis. I was in the 
field from May 2014 to May 2015. I spent 5-6 months in each field site, beginning with Jasper 
National Park from May to October, 2014 followed by Doi Suthep-Pui National Park from No-
vember 2014 through April 2015. I lived in the township of Jasper in Alberta for the Canadian 
site, a small town of under 5,000 people entirely within the national park. In Thailand, I lived in 
Chiang Mai, the second largest city in Thailand with a metropolitan region pushing 1 million in 
population. It was a short (5 minute) drive to the national park office and to the park itself, which 
is immediately adjacent to Chiang Mai city.  
  Living close to the parks in both field sites, I was able to keep my ear to the ground on 
public sentiment around the development projects and observe when and how opponents orga-
nized protests. In Jasper, I attended the protest along the road leading to Maligne Lake on June 
29, 2014. Members of the Jasper Environmental Organization met in the parking lot of Maligne 
Canyon and distributed big placard signs to everyone, about 12 people (see Figure 3.0).  
Figure 5.0 - Maligne Lake Hotel Protest, June 2015 
!50
 We spread out along the road and held up signs to cars as they headed towards Maligne 
Lake. At the lake, one of the members was there to greet the travelers and take signatures on the 
petition organized by JEA and CPAWS. This was a remarkable experience as I was able to ob-
serve and learn about the concerns, passions, and future plans of the environmental group as well 
as to see first hand the reactions from tourists. It was also a worrying and uncomfortable experi-
ence, though, trying to navigate my own positionality with the group. I had originally gone think-
ing I would observe how the group worked together and how they attempted to enroll allies, not 
wanting to be seen by business owners or parks people as being a protester. I soon realized once 
there, though, that this would not be possible, as everyone was to be splitting up and manning 
different positions along the road. A reporter from the local Fitzhugh paper came to cover the 
protest, so I kindly asked him not to take photos of me for the paper because I became very self 
conscious about certain interviewees seeing them. The environmental group was so glad that I 
came out, I did not want to let my discomfort and concern show either. Not knowing exactly 
what to do, I put on my big aviator glasses and pulled my hood over my head (luckily it was a 
cold, rainy and windy day), and I held the signs up in a way that didn’t show much of my face to 
the road. The reactions from drivers going by were predominantly positive and in support of the 
messages shared by the JEA. Most would honk and give thumbs up at the signs, cheer to show 
support. Many would pull over and ask what was going on, and once I explained that there was a 
proposal for a hotel at the lake, they would express their disapproval and concern for keeping the 
parks as they are. Only a few cars drove on without showing much interest.  
 Luckily no one spotted me on the road other than Bob Covey, a reporter from the other 
local newspaper in Jasper, The Local. He had actually approached me for an interview because 
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he wanted to feature my research in the paper. He thought that it would be interesting for Jasper 
readers since a great deal of them were fired up in one way or another over the two development 
projects, and he thought it would help me to reach more potential interview respondents. He 
agreed to do an interview with me and help me with information and advice on contacts for my 
project, kind of an ‘I’ll scratch your back, you scratch mine’. I agreed, but again was plagued by 
anxiety over how the piece would read and how it might position me in the eyes of the towns-
people and park staff. I told him that I was concerned about appearing biased in either direction, 
and that the description should focus on my research questions. He assured me that the piece 
would be descriptive, but when it came out, I felt that the tone was more critical of the park than 
neutral, and I worried for a while about what this might affect. I did end up getting some emails 
from people in town and from the outlying commercial accommodations in the park who wanted 
to talk. I will never know for sure if the piece had any affect on my interviews with authorities, 
although I suspect that institutional pressures had much more of an impact.  
 At the time I was in Jasper, many of the conservation authorities I spoke to (and scientists 
in general) were under a strict gag order from the conservative federal government (Turner, 
2013), unable to talk to the media or researchers without first approving their responses with Ot-
tawa. At first this was a huge stumbling block. Although I had been approved to speak with 4 
park staff members from different departments, when I arrived, superintendent Greg Fenton was 
trying to make sure I only had one point of contact, a Senior Land Use Manager. Greg was not 
aware that I had already spoken with the Visitor Experience Manager, but because of the gag or-
der, that interview was frustratingly fruitless. She read official responses to me and skillfully 
dodged my attempts to get her to be candid with her own opinions. Luckily I was able to have a 
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better and more productive talk with the Senior Land Use Manager, although personal opinions 
were also guarded. For a long time Mr. Fenton kept cancelling interviews with me, until it was 
time for me to leave Jasper and we still had not spoken. Thanks to connections via Dr. Roth and 
Dr. Lunstrum, I was able to interview the former CEO of Parks Canada, Alan Latourelle, over the 
phone in the winter of 2014. After this interview, I approached Mr. Fenton’s office again, ex-
plaining that I had spoken with Alan but I still very much needed insight from the park level, 
which only he could provide. He agreed to meet with me in the summer of 2015, so I returned to 
Jasper for a week or so in July. Surprisingly, he was very candid at this time and provided a great 
deal of valuable information, perhaps because he knew he would soon be leaving his post. For 
the most part I believe the short piece in The Local had little to no effect on the interviews with 
park staff compared to the palpable pressure they were under to spout official speak or lose their 
jobs. I had much better luck interviewing retired or laid off wardens and park staff, who were 
extremely candid and informative with their responses.  
 This kind of official repression and opacity was also a challenge in Thailand. I had a very 
frustrating experience trying to obtain official permission to interview park authorities, which 
differed greatly from my experience applying for the same permission in 2011 for my Master’s 
work. The military coup of 2014 shook up the government departments; all new Deputy’s were 
assigned by the junta and dissent or openness with the press had been tethered. In 2011, to obtain 
permission to speak with a park authority, I filled out a straightforward application, dropped it off 
at the park office where I planned to conduct the interview, waited 30 days, and that was it. In 
2014-2015, after filling out an inordinate number of forms and submitting them to the park au-
thority I wished to speak with, the office presented me with an additional stack of forms to fill 
!53
out and told me I needed to print and submit everything in both English and Thai. I had to print 7 
copies of each form and sponsor letter in English, and another 7 copies in Thai. If I was missing 
any of these copies in either language, my application would be thrown out. Additionally, I had 
to have a sponsor at the University of Chiang Mai. I was very privileged to have Dr. Chayan 
Vaddhanaphuti as a mentor, the esteemed head of the Regional Centre for Sustainable Develop-
ment (RCSD) department in Social Sciences . However what they asked of him was extremely 5
invasive. They wanted copies of his passport and extremely detailed personal information, along 
with his assurance that he would be held personally responsible should I do anything illegal. His 
secretary told me that in all the years she has been working with him, she had never seen such an 
invasive and detailed application. My research assistant told me that she felt that the park office 
just did not want to talk to me about my research topic, so they were putting all of these obstacles 
in my way to delay me. I had to go back to the office with new, corrected or more complete ap-
plications 3 times.  
 On one occasion, the superintendent of the park put on a dramatic show of authority. He 
called the Doi Inthanon National Park office, where I had done an interview with a conservation 
authority in 2011 for my Master’s project, and asked if they remembered me. Surely years later 
they would not remember the name of one Canadian girl that spoke to one conservation authori-
ty, who may not even still work there. The head of Doi Suthep-Pui National Park then started to 
accuse the head of Doi Inthanon of allowing me to conduct an interview without going through 
 Dr. Chayan and four others who attended the 13th International Conference on Thai Studies, which I also attended, 5
were recently detained and charged for assembling more than 5 people for a “political event” without the military’s 
permission, and for displaying posters that read “An academic forum is not a military barracks”. It is unclear at this 
time what will come of the charges, but their experience demonstrates the degree of repression facing Thai citizens, 
especially those who are attempting to organize and protest.
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the proper channels, saying that what I had done was illegal. The head of Doi Inthanon, getting 
defensive, said no, if I did in fact get an interview without going through the proper channels 
then I am the one to blame. The head of Doi Suthep then came over to Pim (my research as-
sistant at that time) and I and spoke to Pim in Thai, scolding me for underhandedly (or illegally) 
obtaining my Master’s interview and making us promise to go through the proper channels this 
time. Pim told me not to say anything in defense but to just apologize, smile, and agree. He dis-
missed us with yet more forms to fill out, and told us that we couldn’t hand in the application at 
the park level but must mail the entire package to Bangkok to be processed.  
 After mailing in the phonebook of documents, the application seemed to disappear into a 
black hole. It took a lot of persistent calling on Pim’s part (who was taken in circles, being told 
she had to call a different department, a different person, etc.) to finally get approval. After all of 
this hoopla, the head of Doi Suthep-Pui National Park was not guarded when he spoke with us at 
all, but was quite open about his concerns with government projects and with the cable car in 
particular, making the lengths we had gone to have this interview seem illogical and paranoid. 
But observing officials under pressure like this I think adds invaluable insight into the truly per-
formative and uncertain power they wield. It also shows how volatile the issue of private in-
frastructure in public parks is, and how similarly national parks are understood around the world; 
as public, national treasures.  
 I conducted some more intentional participant observation in the tourist attraction loca-
tions as well. In Jasper, I visited the completed Glacier Skywalk several times and casually asked 
various tourists what they thought of the attraction and whether or not they were aware of the 
controversy that surrounded its construction. I visited Maligne Lake on various occasions as well 
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and took Maligne Tours’ boat cruise to Spirit Island. I observed and listened to tourists’ experi-
ences of the site, and similarly asked some tourists whether they were aware of the pending hotel 
proposal. In Chiang Mai, I visited Doi Suthep temple several times and observed tourists’ and 
locals’ experiences of the site. Due to language barriers, I did not ask tourists there whether they 
were aware of the cable car controversy, but observed locals’ reactions to other events considered 
offensive to the sanctity of the site, such as when a group of Chinese tourists kicked the temple 
bells to make them sound.  
 While observation provided me with a good grounding and sense of place, the majority of 
the data used in this dissertation comes from in-depth semi-structured interviews. I interviewed 
51 people in relation to Jasper National Park and 51 people in relation to Doi Suthep-Pui Nation-
al Park, for a total of 102 interviews (See Appendices A and B for lists of interview questions and 
interviewees). In Jasper, I interviewed the CEO of Parks Canada, the superintendent of the park, 
the senior land use manager, the visitor experience liaison, former bosses like the former superin-
tendent of Banff and former Chief Ecosystem Scientist for Parks Canada, former wardens, envi-
ronmental groups, local business owners, the Chamber of Commerce, Tourism Jasper, outlying 
commercial accommodation owners, journalists, academics, local residents (both opponents and 
proponents), the president of Brewster Travel, the general manager of Maligne Tours, and repre-
sentatives from several First Nations. In Chiang Mai, I interviewed the former Director General 
of the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNPWPC) and father of 
the cable car idea, Plodprasop Suraswadi, the Governor of Chiang Mai, the regional director of 
DNPWPC for the Chiang Mai area, the head of Doi Suthep-Pui National Park, the vice president 
of the Pingkanakorn Development Agency, the representatives from Tesco Ltd. and Kasetsart 
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University that conducted the environmental assessment study, the Tourism Authority of Thai-
land, environmental activists and organizations, academics, journalists, the head of the Doi 
Suthep Temple Administration, the head of the taxi and red truck administration, the mayors of 
all of the four sub-districts affected by the cable car (Suthep, Mae Hia, Ban Pong, and Nong 
Khwai), headmen of 3 villages in each subdistrict (for a total of 12 headmen), and villagers from 
each subdistrict including those along the proposed route of the cable car and those close to the 
Chiang Mai Night Safari. 
 I took a flexible approach to the interview process, allowing space to probe further into 
interesting themes that emerged and giving the interviewee space to talk about what they found 
important outside of my line of questioning. I had a different set of questions for respondents 
from different positions in the debates; for example, a set of questions for park staff that differed 
from the set of questions for local residents. Many questions remained the same for all respon-
dents, but each interview was tailored specifically for the interviewee at hand. Interviews were 
recorded using a digital device and transcribed immediately or at least within 24 hours of con-
ducting the interview so that the conversation was fresh in my mind. In addition to the recording, 
I took notes during each interview and added notes at the end of certain transcriptions highlight-
ing any important observations made about the conversation or any unusual or notable events.  
 For the interviews in Chiang Mai, I employed the help of several translators and research 
assistants. Through the RCSD department in Chiang Mai University, I was initially connected 
with a wonderful research assistant named Pim. She had done her Master’s in the department and 
had gone to school abroad in Australia and Europe, so her English was quite good. We got along 
very well and became fast friends. She is my age, and like me, she was a hard worker and kept 
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herself organized. I didn’t often have to ask her to do things, she would take initiative and follow 
up with people or reach out to contacts of hers for advice or connections. It was thanks to con-
nections of hers that I was able to get a meeting with Plodprasop Suraswadi, a very high ranking 
official that would otherwise have been inaccessible to me. That meeting was in Bangkok, so I 
reached out to a friend from my Master’s research, Saiaew, who had moved to Bangkok for 
work. Her English is also quite good from her time spent abroad in the United States, however 
Plodprasop prefered to speak in English, so she was only really needed to translate a few words 
that we were stuck on. For the initial interviews I had lined up in the Hmong village of Doi Pui, 
at the top of Doi Suthep mountain, I took my former research assistant from Doi Inthanon Na-
tional Park, Sert. He moved from Ban Mae Klang Luang, a small Karen village in the national 
park, to Chiang Mai for work and to live with his girlfriend from Florida. He knew many of the 
Hmong villagers in Doi Pui from attending Community Based Tourism workshops and confer-
ences in the area, so respondents were quite comfortable with him. He also had a motorbike we 
could take up, whereas Pim was too uncomfortable with the thought of biking up there. I had a 
good experience with him, but I did not want to call on him to help often, as he had now moved 
on and was working full time as a tour guide in Chiang Mai. Lastly, for the interview with the 
headman of the more remote Khun Chang Kian, I went with Pan, a friend of Pim’s from Chiang 
Mai University. This was for logisitical reasons —once again, Pan was comfortable biking up to 
the village whereas Pim was not. 
 Pim had told me from the beginning that she would have to return to Bangkok, her home, 
at some point, to live with her parents and look for work. Despite knowing this, I was very dis-
mayed when it came time for her to leave. I know that I would not have had access to many im-
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portant people without her help. Whatever approach she took with officials, it worked; people 
were receptive of our interview requests and were happy to provide information. I asked again 
with the department of RCSD to connect me with another translator, and they connected me with 
Pat, a student completing his Master’s of English at CMU. Pat is a few years older than me, and 
we got along quite well and again became fast friends. Pat was a bit less comfortable calling of-
ficials’ offices, however, and for whatever reason it seemed a bit more difficult to make connec-
tions with official interviewees. I can’t really speculate as to why, but at any rate, we were able to 
interview the majority of the respondents I wanted to speak with, and Pat was very professional 
during the interviews and I was happy with his work and friendship.  
  Working through translation certainly does shape the data, as different translators have 
different styles, and some will give more detailed accounts of what was said versus others where 
more is summarized. I am sure that much of the idioms or facetious remarks that people were 
saying were lost in translation, and likely some of the nuance in their testimonies as well. I 
learned quickly that my research assistant’s contacts and networks were vital in gaining access to 
respondents. How I was viewed in both field sites also influenced who I was able to access and 
how comfortable people felt talking to me. As a young white woman (I was 27 in Jasper and 28 
in Chiang Mai), I feel as though opponents of development in Jasper felt very comfortable with 
me. Since many were feeling a bit hopeless about the direction they saw Parks Canada taking, 
they were very excited to see a young academic taking an interest in the issue and showcasing 
what was going on there for other audiences. I think many saw me as an ally who could spread 
the message of the movement into new arenas, to some extent, especially some of the older for-
mer wardens. This was not so much the case for current park staff, the private companies, or the 
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chamber of commerce, however, who I think largely viewed me as one more person asking un-
comfortable questions that they were sick of answering. However I think that as a young woman, 
I wasn’t very threatening, and I think they were fairly open because of this. The general manager 
of Maligne Tours was especially candid with me, likely because she was frustrated with parks, 
but also likely because she didn’t see me as a threat.  
  In Thailand, as I mentioned, my access to respondents was primarily thanks to connec-
tions of my research assistants, but also thanks to the prestige of Dr. Chayan of RCSD. For most 
official respondents, we would send an official letter of request from RCSD signed by Dr. 
Chayan. This actually helped me gain greater access to politicians and high ranking officials than 
I could in Canada where I was just working on my own, and where public servants feel less 
obliged to honour such requests. I feel as though being a PhD candidate from the west gave me a 
certain degree of privilege there, and interviews felt more official than in Canada. Opponents 
were of course happy to talk to me, again in the hope that I could more broadly publicize the is-
sue, and proponents were oddly quite happy to talk to me as well. The PDA in particular sent 
several high ranking representatives to speak to me and to give an official presentation about the 
project, likely in the hopes that I would advertise back in North America. Again, as a young 
woman I feel I appeared less threatening, especially to high ranking male officials, and I think 
this afforded me a certain degree of openness in their responses.   
 I coded interviews using Dedoose software, which allowed me to code the two projects 
separately within the same interface. I often coded passages under more than one theme, and the 
software allows for compilation of excerpts from overlapping themes, such as ‘ecological in-
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tegrity’ and ‘nationalism’, for example. The software was extremely useful in showing which 
themes and concerns were most prevalent and for keeping excerpts organized. 
In addition to interviews and observation, I conducted document analysis of various publications 
relevant to both cases, such as environmental assessment reports, parks department publications 
and press releases, promotional materials for the proposed attractions, media pieces, blogrolls 
and publications from environmental organizations or activists, legal documents, park manage-
ment plans, etc. In Thailand, Pim and I translated these documents, including information on vis-
itation and budgets for the national parks from the DNPWPC website, promotional materials, the 
EA, Thai newspaper articles and YouTube videos, but I was not able to analyze as many docu-
ments as I could in Jasper. This work gave me insight into how proponents and opponents used 
discursive choices, media representations or legal mechanisms to try to produce and circulate 
particular knowledges in hopes of enrolling allies and stabilizing certain understandings of con-
servation and the role of parks. In the following empirical chapters, I attempt to tease out the 
contestations and boundary conflicts in both sites that regulated what was and was not possible 
in terms of private tourism development.  
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Chapter 3 
Austerity Politics and the Post-Politicization of  
Conservation Governance in Jasper National Park  
Introduction 
 The recent series of contestations around private tourism attractions in Canadian parks, 
along with previous battles, illustrate conservation in Canada as a product of perpetual contesta-
tion around environmental and political economic knowledge claims. In other words, as an 
achievement that is always in the process of becoming. Parks Canada’s authority is a perfor-
mance “which can only be sustained by a skillful collaboration between apparently authoritative 
officials and their audiences” (Matthews, 2011: loc3223). In this way conservation practice is 
open for re-negotiation as public audiences can object to and refuse public assent to knowledge 
claims advanced by bureaucratic actors, and thus disrupt or obstruct the rollout of neoliberal 
projects. Public and Indigenous actors in the Jasper area mounted a significant countermovement 
to the private proposals in an effort to do just that.  
  This chapter will explore 1) the ways in which proponents and opponents mobilize truth 
claims in their contestations, and 2) the strategies as well as the political economic circumstances 
that shape public and Indigenous participation in decision-making. While proponents and oppo-
nents both employ various strategies and tools to enroll allies, I argue that due to substantial fed-
eral budget cuts, the interests of Parks Canada and certain corporate interests in Jasper and Banff 
have been aligning, which is diminishing the efficacy of public and Indigenous consultation. In 
the context of austerity politics and the growing ‘common sense’ of private sector partnerships in 
conservation (Fletcher, 2014), I argue that austerity politics create the conditions for a re-articu-
lation of the politics of conservation governance as the interests of parks departments and private 
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sector interests are brought into alignment. Specifically, the politics of austerity can render sin-
gle-issue controversies post-political. Austerity-related restructuring of conservation practice el-
evates the importance of public-private (P3) partnerships for sustaining the viability of the park 
system into the future, contributing to the construction of a post-political ‘there is no alternative’ 
discourse where neoliberal ideology in conservation is elevated beyond critique. To facilitate de-
velopment, managers employ various strategies to reduce democratic oversight of public provi-
sioning, removing opportunities for political debate and dissensus and orchestrating the appear-
ance of consensual decision-making. Although neoliberal rhetoric stresses the importance of ‘de-
centralization’ and the participation of a wider range of actors, certain actors are brought into the 
process in very circumscribed and depoliticized ways. 
  Neoliberalisation at the state level since the 1980s in terms of shrinking budgets for parks 
and related discourses encouraging private operators and flanking mechanisms to fund and man-
age park services has certainly influenced the direction of policy and practice in Canadian parks. 
But, as explained in Chapter 2, this is also a continuation (and amplification) of past debates and 
struggles around the “balance” between ‘ecological integrity’ and ‘visitor experience’, and 
around the role of the private sector in parks and the extent to which mass tourism is compatible 
with conservation mandates. 
Conservation as a Site of Struggle in Canada 
  The first national parks were created as tourist destinations for passengers of the Canadi-
an Pacific Railway company. Banff, Canada’s first national park, was established in 1885 when 
railroad workers stumbled upon hot springs and attempted to commercialize them (Campbell, 
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2011). The Canadian government recognized that the springs held endless revenue potential, and 
so seized control of the area by declaring a 26 square kilometre reserve around them (Bella, 
1987). The Rocky Mountains National Park Act of 1887 expanded the reserve from 26 to 673 
square kilometres and named it the Rocky Mountains National Park, which was later renamed 
Banff in the early 1960s. The area was originally reserved “as a public park and pleasure ground 
for the benefit, advantage and enjoyment of the people of Canada” (Rocky Mountains Park Act, 
1887), a very clear nod to the importance of tourism and recreation. The CPR built the Banff 
Springs Hotel and the Lake Louise Chalet, two high end choices for accommodation for CPR 
travelers. The other early mountain parks followed this lead —Yoho in 1886, Waterton in 1895, 
Jasper in 1907, and Kootenay in 1920.  
  For a young nation-state, the early mountain parks became icons of a very particular ver-
sion of Canadian identity. Much like the US experience, vast and ‘sublime’ wilderness areas 
helped to distinguish Canada from Europe, which boasted awe-inspiring cathedrals and architec-
ture (Braun, 2002; Cronon, 1996). For wealthy settlers, traveling to the national parks to marvel 
at these natural wonders was part of performing Canadian identity. But the parks as pleasure 
grounds masked a very disturbing and violent history. First Nations were forcefully expelled 
from park territories despite having produced the ‘wilderness’ character of these spaces through 
traditional livelihoods. Although the parks were symbols of a newly forming Canadian identity, 
the close ties between the Canadian Pacific Railroad and the mountain parks prohibited most 
Canadian settlers from experiencing them. The hotels in Banff and Jasper were accessible only to 
those who could pay the exorbitant rates in addition to the rates for railroad travel. The early 
travellers and adventurers thus tended to be wealthy, white and male, making experiencing 
!64
‘wilderness’ and performing Canadian identity very particular and exclusionary (Bella, 1987; 
Braun, 2002; Campbell, 2011). Sandilands et al. (2005) argue that wilderness was also damag-
ingly heteronormative. In short, the parks helped to promote a heteronormative, patriarchal, 
white settler vision of national identity, forcefully expelling Indigenous nations to create wilder-
ness playgrounds for the settler elite (Sandilands et al., 2005; MacLaren, 2007; Sandlos, 2014). 
   This early history of elite tourism continues today, but the idea that it is an environmen-
tally benign practice has been hotly contested from the beginning. Deep green conservationists 
have been battling with tourism promoters over the meanings of ‘sustainable’, ‘conservation’ and 
the role of national parks since the Dominion Parks Branch came into being in 1911 (Bella, 
1987). The ambiguous dedication clause in the National Parks Act of 1930 (which has carried 
forward to today) left much room for differing interpretations of the role of parks and the private 
sector. The clause reads: 
 “The National Parks of Canada are hereby dedicated to the people of Canada for their   
 benefit, education, and enjoyment, subject to this Act and the regulations, and National   
 Parks shall be maintained and made use of so as to leave them unimpaired for future   
 generations.”  
Words like ‘benefit’, ‘enjoyment’, ‘use’ and ‘unimpaired’ are all floating signifiers; they can be 
invested with any number of meanings and are bitterly contested by proponents and opponents of 
tourism development in parks.   
  In Banff and Jasper in particular, these performances have produced what is popularly 
understood as the ‘pendulum effect’, where certain decades saw the pendulum swing closer to 
strict ecological protection and others saw the pendulum swing towards tourism development 
and visitor experience. Banff sees just under 4 million visitors per year, and Jasper is second with 
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just over 2 million (Parks Canada, 2014). Because the early mountain parks were built around 
tourism, many of the private operators —like Brewster Travel and Maligne Tours— and the 
townsites were grandfathered in. Only 7 out of 188 parks in Canada contain townsites, 5 of 
which are in the mountain parks, so it is atypical to have so many private businesses operating 
within a national park. Because both parks also see so much visitation, these are really the mon-
ey-making parks for Parks Canada at the national level, and thus in times of austerity they are 
perhaps under greater pressure to draw in more tourism revenue.  
  In the 1970s and 80s the ‘pendulum’ swung quite far towards the development side in 
Banff in particular. When the Yellowhead Highway from Edmonton through B.C. opened in 
1968, developers in the park took advantage of the increase in middle class tourists flooding in 
by car, spurring urbanization of the townsites, ski developments, hotels, etc. (Bella, 1987). This 
frenzy of development spurred two momentous independent reviews of Parks Canada, the Banff 
Bow Valley Study (1994-96) and the Panel on Ecological Integrity (1998-2000). Both studies 
came to the conclusion that Canadian parks were in serious peril; that ecological integrity was 
increasingly threatened by tourism and infrastructure development. The studies forced Parks 
Canada to take action, which was mainly legislative. The National Parks Act of 2000 proclaimed 
that the maintenance and restoration of ecological integrity shall be the first priority of the Minis-
ter when making decisions. 
  A more targeted action taken as a result of the revelations of the BBVS and the PEI was 
to develop the 2007 Outlying Commercial Accommodation Guidelines and include limits to de-
velopment in management plans. Kevin Van Tighem, who was the superintendent of Banff Na-
tional Park between 2007 and 2011, talked about the great lengths taken to come up with all of 
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the precise limits to development included in the 2007 OCA guidelines. He was the head of the 
task force charged with negotiating with OCA owners to ensure each operator did not develop 
the full span of their leaseholds.  
 “It was a really painful process. Every one of these OCAs was given a certain amount of   
 capacity to grow, like 6 or 10 more rooms you can have, and that was the carrot. The   
 stick was, but you can only get approval to do that if you upgrade this, this, this and this,   
 and do something to mitigate that, so it was sort of our way of saying we recognize what   
 you need, now there's some unfinished business here that we need attended to so that   
 we can say that we're managing well, so here's the package, but that's all you ever get   
 and there ain't no more.”  
  After about 5 years of work, the document was produced, which held each OCA to cer-
tain development limits. The 2010 management plans for both Banff and Jasper state that these 
OCA guidelines are to be respected. The 2010 Jasper Management Plan also states that no new 
land shall be released for overnight commercial accommodation. 
  Despite the stronger wording in the Parks Act and the written limits to development in 
planning documents, many still consider the pendulum to have swung very far to the visitor ex-
perience and tourism development side over the past decade. Ben Gadd, a well-known naturalist 
in the Banff area who was one of the original Parks Canada interpreters in the early 1980s, ex-
plained that when he first started, visitor experience was considered maintenance of trails and 
campgrounds and quality interpretive programming by experienced naturalists. Interpretive 
guides and other programming were free of charge for park visitors, and most if not all park staff 
were trained biologists or ecologists. When the Conservatives came into power in 1984, Gadd 
saw the naturalist program he loved completely dismantled. The free guided hikes and nightly 
programming were cancelled, and people like him with secure positions were let go in favour of 
seasonal low-skilled workers. “They were trying to get the most work out of the fewest people 
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for the least money. It was very unpleasant, so we all quit,” he said. Private tour guides replaced 
the park-run programs, for additional fees to visitors, shifting responsibility for ‘visitor experi-
ence’ largely to private outfitters.   
  While the groundwork was laid in the 1980s, austerity measures really came down in the 
1990s under the Liberal government led by Jean Chretien. Between 1993 and 1998 Parks Canada 
faced budget cuts of $123 million (Kopas, 2007). In 1998 the Agency Act changed Parks Canada 
into a special agency, which opponents of development point to as the beginning of the end. The 
Agency Act legislated that Parks Canada would continue to receive a yearly budget from the fed-
eral government, but that revenues generated at each park could also be retained. Shrinking pub-
lic purses then effectively started to put pressure on parks to make up the difference. Kevin Van 
Tighem, former superintendent of Banff, said:  
 “What [the Agency Act] did was it basically hardwired a potential for serious mandate   
 drift, because it means that now we are completely in the same bed as the tourism    
 industry in the sense that we live or breathe on revenues. So there's a real revenue   
 imperative now. That revenue imperative becomes even more powerful.. It get’s    
 magnified with every bit of budget cut you get.”  
 With such high visitation, Banff and Jasper are also anomalies in the system in terms of 
how much they rely on revenues versus appropriations from the government. Most parks receive 
a combination of appropriations, which is tax dollars, and revenues, coming from things like 
camping, gate fees, commercial land rents and percentage of gross from commercial operators. 
In Banff and Jasper, the great volumes of people coming to the park and the higher number of 
private operators means that 80% to 90% of funds are related to revenues with only about 10% to 
20% from appropriations.The mountain parks have a revenue target to reach each year, some of 
which is shared with other parks across Canada that don’t earn as much in revenues, and any-
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thing earned over and above that target is kept by the park. Even though the mountain parks are 
making much more than other parks in tourism revenues, this does not mean that they have more 
money available for conservation programs. Money collected from visitor offerings is meant to 
be reinvested in visitor experience. There have not been any significant inputs of funding into 
conservation programs since these were significantly depleted in 2012 and the years following. 
Enacting the politics of austerity, the federal government cut $6 million dollars in 2012-2013, 
about $20 million in 2013-2014, and about $29 million for both the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 
seasons, totalling approximately $84 million (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat2016). 
  Stephen Woodley, former Chief Ecosystem Scientist for Parks Canada and current mem-
ber of the IUCN's World Commission on Protected Areas, said that Parks Canada lost 30% of 
their science capacity in the 2012 funding cuts. He said that there has been a reduction in the 
number of major ecosystem types being monitored in each park, a reduction in the number of 
measures from each ecosystem type, and a reduction in sampling frequency. In many cases moni-
toring is simply not being done because there is no one to do it. "I estimate that only about 60% 
of monitoring measures are being properly measured", he said. The restoration and prescribed 
burn programs have also been worryingly reduced.  
    The Visitor Experience and External Relations branch of Parks Canada came into being 
in 2005, which Jasper’s Visitor Experience Manager called a “major organizational shift”. While 
visitor services staff used to be seasonal and mostly operational, after 2005 there were several 
new positions created: promotions officer, operations co-ordinator, product development officer 
(which has additional support staff), and creative/media development staff. Each park now has 
both a conservation branch and visitor experience branch, where visitor experience personnel 
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have degrees in marketing and business instead of ecosystems management. For many of the 
former wardens and environmental activists, this is a completely wrongheaded since marketers 
and advertisers are looking primarily to increase visitation, not necessarily to promote the park 
mandate of maintaining or improving ecological integrity. Karsten Heuer, former warden and 
current head of the Yellowstone 2 Yukon initiative, blamed the budget cuts and the organizational 
push towards visitor experience as the reason he grudgingly left the agency, and he was not 
alone:  
 “When I started with Parks, for instance, we had 12 people covering the full extent of the   
 backcountry. By the time I left there was basically 1 and a half of us, maybe 2. At the   
 field level, you no longer had an ecosystem scientist, there was no longer any    
 communication between what the park was doing and what was happening on the    
 surrounding provincial landscape. It was just this progression of undermining how we   
 could actually even track how the ecology of the park was doing. We saw the ecological   
 side of staffing plummet over the last 10 years, and the visitor experience side is    
 skyrocketing in terms of numbers of positions.”  
He and other former wardens and conservation specialists told me they left for the same reason; 
that suddenly they found they could not support the agency they once loved as its emphasis, 
funding and capacity shifted towards visitor experience, and there simply was not enough money 
on the conservation side for them to carry out their jobs effectively any longer.   
  The perceived pendulum swing towards visitor experience and tourism development in 
Jasper and Banff of the past decade can be attributed to several related factors. As I mentioned, 
the new dedicated focus on marketing and increasing visitation shifted the priorities of the 
agency, which diverted funding and staff capacity to these aims. Federal budget cuts in 2012 ex-
aggerated the importance of gate fees and revenues in Banff-Jasper, including land rents and per-
centage of gross from private tourism operators within the park. This is especially so since the 
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park infrastructure built predominantly in the 60s and 70s has fallen into disrepair, creating a 
$2.8 billion dollar backlog in deferred work across Canada (Boutilier, 2014). To recoup costs and 
stay ‘relevant’ to changing demographics in Canada, Parks Canada’s new target is to increase 
visitation by 2% per year. A senior manager in Jasper said that this is “the first time that's hap-
pened in my career and to my knowledge.” In his 27 years of experience, PC “has been passive 
about visitation, so this is new,” he said. All of this coupled with a conservative government un-
der PM Stephen Harper between 2006-2015 that was unapologetically pro-development and anti-
environment (Peyton and Franks, 2015), created a situation where the interests of Parks Canada 
and private operators in Banff-Jasper began to align. To the dismay of public actors, these fiscal 
pressures and new alliances have left most with little confidence in public consultation and feel-
ing as though the public has no real role in decision-making.  
Co-evolution of Social Activism and Conservation Practice in Jasper 
  At the heart of the two controversies are contested meanings of conservation and national 
parks, which include a confluence of truth claims about nature, national identity, accessibility 
and inclusivity, progress, and political economic imperatives. Although the production of bu-
reaucratic knowledge involves a diffuse network of actants which each have agency, not all ac-
tors exert the same power in decision-making. I argue that the politics of austerity augment the 
private sector’s ability to exert power in park conservation practice, leading Parks Canada to uti-
lize post-political strategies to reduce space for the practice of contentious politics (Swynge-
douw, 2010) and streamline the approval process. In the rest of this chapter, I explore the tools 
and strategies proponents and opponents employ to enrol allies and to what extent public and In-
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digenous actors are able to participate in decision-making. First, I will elucidate the conflicts 
around the series of truth claims that encompass discourses of conservation and the role of na-
tional parks, starting with ‘wilderness’ thinking.  
The ‘Wilderness’ Ethic 
 Both proponents and opponents drew upon ‘wilderness’ tropes in interesting and at times 
contradictory ways to advance their claims. The main take-away points from Cronon’s The 
Trouble With Wilderness are that: 1) wilderness is not natural, it is created; 2) envisioning 
wilderness as depopulated and pristine does violence to First Nations who have lived in and 
shaped that wilderness for centuries, legitimating their expulsion; and 3) an environmentalism 
that does not see humans as an integral part of non-human ecosystems is doomed to failure. As 
mentioned, scholarship in Canada has also critiqued the concept’s hetero-patriarchal, racist and 
classist associations as wilderness was historically a wealthy white straight man’s playground 
(Braun, 2002, 2003; MacLaren, 2007; Sandilands et al., 2005). In the early mountain parks, First 
Nations were expelled from the spaces they had contributed to producing in order to create 
‘wilderness’ as playground for wealthy white travelers. 
  Protecting intact wilderness as the raison d’etre for national parks came through in the 
majority of interviews with opponents of both development projects. The Skywalk was particu-
larly offensive since it was such a large steel and glass structure in the middle of the mountains. 
Mrs. Ogivly, longtime resident of Jasper, said,  
 “Sure, visitors think the glass thing is awesome, but do they have any contact with   
 nature? What they told parks was that it was going to bring people closer to nature to   
 appreciate the parks. Now, I've never felt further from nature in my life walking down   
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 that silly thing.”  
The Skywalk was viewed predominantly as an unnatural thrill-based attraction that took away 
from visitors’ ability to truly appreciate and experience the wilderness character of the park. Sim-
ilarly, the majority of Jasperites found the notion of a luxury hotel by the iconic Maligne Lake to 
be distasteful and insupportable. Monika Schaefer, former warden and current member of the 
JEA, said:  
 “If you impact and sacrifice the ecological integrity because you're trying to quote   
 unquote “balance” it with visitor experience, what do you have left? You don't have the   
 thing that people came for. What they're doing is they're changing the attraction. It’s now   
 the ziplines and the entertainment factor as opposed to coming here to experience    
 wildlife and wilderness at it's core, in it's natural state.”  
This sentiment was echoed by most respondents who felt that highly consumptive infrastructure 
like hotels or intense-use ski hills should be built outside of the national park, it’s not necessary 
or appropriate to offer those activities within. 
  Opponents skillfully appealed to the public’s sense of admiration and want to safeguard 
wilderness spaces in online petitions (as outlined in the previous Chapter), through signage at 
protests, through interviews and spots in the media, and on postcards that were circulated in 
hopes that people would mail them to former PM Stephen Harper. Some of the signs held up at 
the JEA Maligne Lake protest, for example, read “Support nature not more development at Ma-
ligne Lake” and “Grizzlies ✓, Caribou ✓, More Development Ⓧ at Maligne Lake”. CPAWS ran 
a nation-wide petition against the Maligne proposal, asking the public to “help keep Jasper’s 
spirit wild” and say no to overnight commercial accommodation at the lake (CPAWS, n.d.). Al-
though the bulk of their reasoning against the proposal had to do with breach of park policy and 
the Species At Risk Act, appeals to people’s emotional connection with wilderness were recur-
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rent within material circulated by environmental groups, either through impassioned wording or 
spectacular imagery. This was quite an effective strategy for raising awareness and gathering pe-
tition signatures, particularly with European tourists who perhaps shared a Western understand-
ing of ‘wilderness’, many of whom felt that Canadians would be remiss to develop over these 
wild spaces as had largely been done in Europe.  
  While most opponents felt very passionately about protecting the ecological integrity of 
the ‘wilderness’, there were some interesting points of nuance amongst respondents. Several re-
spondents felt that humans were indeed part of nature and wilderness, but that one needs to dis-
tinguish between different kinds of human environmental activities lest we misguidedly conclude 
that any and all human activities in nature are benign because humans are a part of nature (see 
Braun, 2002; Keeling 2008, 2013). Kim Wallace, a teacher in Jasper, said:  
 “For me, ecological integrity includes humans. We are a part of nature. We do belong   
 here. But what I see with Parks Canada in the mandate is a bit of a pathology, because   
 we're not allowed to use what's here to help us live, but we're allowed to destroy what's   
 here to help us have 'visitor experience'.”  
She was referring to the fact that while First Nations’ traditional livelihoods have been banned in 
the park, consumptive townsites are considered benign and individualized environmental action 
via ‘ethical consumption’ through tourism is accepted as best practice.  
  Opponents diverged on what levels of consumption were considered sustainable. Typical-
ly, luxury hotel stays that are highly consumptive in terms of energy use, heat, water and waste 
were considered inappropriate due to their overall ecological and carbon footprints, while activi-
ties such as camping or staying at accommodations like the Maligne Hostel, which is a small 
cabin without electricity or running water, were considered less impactful and thus appropriate in 
!74
a conservation zone. Publicly funded programming was also considered more appropriate than 
private tourism as the growth economy was not considered sustainable and thus antithetical to 
long-term conservation. Opponents considered the privately operated Brewster Skywalk, which 
relies on big bus tours and requires diesel buses running to and from the site every 15 minutes, to 
be overly consumptive and inappropriate within the park. Parks Canada and proponents may ar-
gue that hotels concentrate people in the front country which could be considered less impactful 
than many hikers in the backcountry, but opponents understood these as very different kinds of 
impacts operating at very different scales. 
  Most opponents follow this line of thinking, however there are a few who feel that 
tourism should be drastically reduced and that the townsites should be removed altogether. Those 
that want to see tourism limited are defending a people-free ‘wilderness’ but are giving assent 
only to the creation of wilderness as a very specific kind of ‘low-impact’ form of tourist play-
ground. For those who would prefer low-impact activities over mass tourism, opponents are 
largely against wilderness as white, male playground. The vast majority feel that more activities 
in the park should be free of charge and accessible to all Canadians regardless of race, gender or 
class (I will expand upon this in the next two sections). 
  Additionally, some First Nations have been forming alliances with the environmental 
groups in Jasper to try to stop Parks Canada from developing the parks, and others express simi-
lar desires to protect and respect the land and ecological integrity, echoing sentiments that these 
developments are damaging to the forest ecosystems that Parks Canada are supposed to protect 
(see Chapter 4 for further detail).  6
 Of course, understandings of ecological integrity and the role of traditional livelihoods in environmental steward6 -
ship differed between settlers and Indigenous nations. 
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  Interestingly, the private sector was trying to recognize all that is problematic about 
wilderness thinking and leverage it to further their business interests. Dave Mckenna, former 
president of Brewster Travel, had often used the idea that First Nations had always been a part of 
nature in the Banff-Jasper area to argue that in fact the commercial Skywalk attraction was ap-
propriate and sustainable. “Out at one of the Banff Lake Cruise Tours there's an old archaeologi-
cal site that First Nations have been using for well over 10,000 years,” he said. “So human be-
ings have always been part of this environment, we can't separate that, so it's really about how 
we interact with our environment to make sure we don't over-stress it.” 
  Opponents have pointed out the irony of Brewster developing an attraction based around 
bus trips when the bulk of their revenue comes from taking tourists out onto the rapidly retreat-
ing Athabasca Glacier, questioning what “sustainability” means to business proponents. Dave 
McKenna himself said the impetus for the Skywalk was to create a “zero impact” attraction, but 
was taken aback when I asked if he planned to make his bus fleet run on renewable energy. 
Nonetheless, by strategically aligning themselves as progressives trying to move beyond wilder-
ness thinking, private actors and Parks Canada have been employing the discourse to discredit 
opponents as extremists who are against progress of any kind. There is likely some truth to this, 
but I also question the extent to which mass tourism attractions challenge wilderness thinking in 
parks. While McKenna made reference to First Nations’ use of the land for millennia, First Na-
tions traditional lifeways remain inappropriate within the park while mass tourism attractions 
benefiting parties like Viad Corporation are touted as both inclusive and sustainable. Banff and 
Jasper were built around private tourism operations at the expense of First Nations, which con-
tinues today as multinationals continue to build attractions for profit on stolen territories, the 
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proceeds of which are not shared with Indigenous nations (see Chapter 4). Wilderness here was 
created for commercial tourism, and it appears not much has changed.  
  For opponents, appealing to broader discourses that pit capitalism against wilderness did 
broaden awareness and engagement in their cause. For proponents, including Parks Canada, the 
trope was used to argue for private development as a tool to connect Canadians with 
‘wilderness’. Both proponents and opponents agreed on the creation of wilderness for tourism/
leisure (except the few opponents who wanted to see little to no tourism at all), but only dis-
agreed on what kind of tourism was acceptable. This underlying point of ‘agreement’ about the 
main tenets of wilderness lent support to Parks Canada’s official statements regarding the impor-
tance of connecting visitors with nature via tourism offerings, with official documents and state-
ments performing the appearance of collective agreement (Fletcher, 2014; Forsyth and Walker, 
2014).  
National Nature, New Canadians and Urban Youth 
 Nationalism and national identity are also very much tied up with arguments for and 
against, as nationalism and the wilderness ethic go hand in hand in North America (Braun, 2002; 
Cronon, 1996). Parks Canada and the companies involved position the proposals as opportunities 
to make the park more exciting and accessible for Canadians, many of whom aren’t keen to have 
rugged backcountry experiences but would prefer activities that are easily accessible by car. Ac-
cording to Parks Canada visitor data, approximately 65% of visitors in the mountain parks fall 
into what they call the ‘view from the edge’ category, meaning that they seek activities that don’t 
stray too far from paved roads or trails, or that involve built infrastructure and comfortable facili-
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ties. The Skywalk in particular was marketed as an attraction that is very comfortable, an easy 
way to learn about the wilderness that surrounds, and accessible to handicapped and elderly 
Canadians.  
  Ease of access is also considered vitally important for new Canadians and urban youth, 
two increasingly important demographic segments for Parks Canada. The agency realizes that 
demographics are changing rapidly in Canada, sparking a great deal of anxiety around staying 
relevant to this changing population. Parks Canada’s official position/assumption is that new 
Canadians and urban youth are less interested in wilderness experiences and would prefer attrac-
tions that have the comforts of the city. While senior managers admitted to me that they have no 
social science data that would indicate what new Canadians and urban youth are looking for in 
parks, they assume these demographics would want more ‘view from the edge’ type attractions. 
There has been a significant push to increase tourism by altering park offerings to attract people 
who are looking for more comfort, for example with the introduction of yurts and oTentiks to the 
campgrounds. A 2014 park survey showed that visitation is key for developing a sense of con-
nection to national parks, national pride and feelings of stewardship towards the parks (Parks 
Canada, n.d.), which the Agency asserts is crucial for garnering support for parks in the yearly 
federal budget. Brewster Travel and Maligne Tours very skillfully invoke Parks Canada’s own 
discourses around the dire need to attract new demographics to parks to promote their develop-
ment proposals. 
  Opponents see these tropes as strategies to shut down debate and promote a growth-based 
park agenda. Former warden Monika Schaefer said,  
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 “It's just their way of shutting down debate and discussion. It's politically incorrect to say  
 no, the handicapped or wheelchair bound people can't actually get somewhere, that   
 sounds like you're a crass, cruel individual. It shuts down debate!”   
Many pointed out that the old viewpoint was as accessible or even more accessible than the 
Skywalk attraction. Opponents feel that to some extent the new Canadian and urban youth trope 
similarly shuts down debate as no one can argue that new Canadians should not be able to enjoy 
the parks, but the discourse assumes that people in these demographics wish to enjoy the park in 
this particular way. While urban and new Canadians may very well be drawn to attractions like 
the Skywalk, there remains no evidence to suggest this is the case and no follow up has been 
done to see if indeed this attraction is reaching these target demographics.  
  Peter Duck, former Parks Canada interpreter and current member of the Bow Valley Nat-
uralists, said that like many others, he applauds Parks Canada for trying to make parks more in-
clusive and is enthused about free programs like Learn to Camp. But he and others believe that a 
better way to reach youth and new Canadians is through education, allowing school groups free 
access to come into the park for interpretive programs and providing more programs like Learn 
to Camp or free guided hikes for new Canadians. Though critics disagree with the mass tourism 
approach to reaching these demographics, the underlying points of agreement between propo-
nents and opponents - that parks should be accessible and inclusive - are being mobilized to ‘or-
chestrate’ the appearance of consensus here (Fletcher, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2011), while alterna-
tive visions of how to do this and consequently alternative management options are being fore-
closed (Forsyth and Walker, 2014; Matthews, 2011).  
  Opponents argue that if access is really the issue, then building more for-profit attractions 
make the parks less accessible to all Canadians. They argue that parks belong to all Canadians 
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and thus everyone, rich and poor, should be able to access the full breadth of park experiences. 
Opponents question the Maligne Tours Hotel proposal in particular, which was slated to be very 
high end, around $500 per night, and argued that this would be well beyond the means of most 
new Canadians and urban youth, and that these demographics were just being used as an excuse 
to develop business for wealthy travelers. Nik Lopoukhine, former Director General of Parks 
Canada and current chair of the IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas, said  
 “The thing that really gives me heartburn is the rationale for putting up a high-end hotel   
 is that it falls within the Parks Canada interest of building up visitation from youth and   
 new Canadians. A very valid and worthwhile target group, but frankly I can't see how you 
 can marry a high-end hotel with those two particular target groups.”  
Many argue also that the Skywalk ($32+tax per adult) and Spirit Island cruises ($65+tax per 
adult) are just added expenses for these demographics in an already expensive park.  
  Practically, opponents have similarly appealed to the public’s sense of national pride 
around national parks in campaign materials including posters and online media. Opponents con-
struct the parks as part of Canadians’ collective national heritage, belonging to the Canadian pub-
lic and not the private sector, and encourage public actors to fight to keep our national treasures 
safe for future generations of Canadians. Appeals to national pride were especially invoked in the 
campaign against development at Maligne Lake, as it and Spirit Island are such iconic places. Jill 
Seaton of the JEA told me that their opposition to Maligne was “more the fact that that lake is so 
special to Canada. It's probably one of the most photographed views in the world. It's just so 
iconic. It's been on the back of a 5 dollar bill and everything,” she said. While appealing to na-
tionalism was effective in broadening awareness and public involvement in the campaigns, ulti-
mately Parks Canada’s appeal to discourses that receive public assent (such as accessibility and 
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inclusivity for all Canadians) lent inadvertent support for decisions to go ahead with develop-
ment in the face of opposition.  
Political Economies of Conservation 
 At the core of both controversies are diverging beliefs about whether social services or 
public goods should be managed publicly or privately. Opponents took serious issue with the ne-
oliberal ideology they saw driving these changes, calling this the ‘race to the bottom’ of conser-
vation:  
 “The net effect of the cut in funding is that more funding has to come from the private   
 sector, which then produces another cut in funding. We're chasing the system to the   
 bottom of the barrel. The basic right wing philosophy is if you don't pay for services, they 
 won't happen unless the private sector does it. Rich people can always afford those   
 services, and they don't care about the poor.” -Ben Gadd, former Parks Canada    
 interpreter  
 “That's ideologically driven. You know? You cut the budgets, and then you say, well we   
 need these P3 partnerships or whatever they call them. We need to build these    
 structures or else we don't have any money. Well, that's ideologically-driven. That's a   
 political decision to not invest in the national parks!” -Monika Schaefer, former park   
 warden  
Opponents feel that all of the PR around visitor experience and connecting people to nature is 
just a dog and pony show to detract from the underlying politics of austerity driving these 
changes. 
  Because of this, opponents of these development projects feel that business interests are 
driving the management process, not the other way around. Former CEO of Parks Canada, Alan 
Latourelle, denied that budget cuts significantly challenged Parks Canada’s ecological capacity. 
However former Jasper Superintendent, Greg Fenton, said that at the field level:  
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“It is extremely difficult to get increases in appropriations. If you look at the govern-
ments,  irrespective if its Conservative or Liberal or anybody else, there are always 
deficits to manage. When you're in a deficit situation there isn't money to go out to de-
partments and agencies. That's why it becomes so important for us to increase visitation 
and revenues.”  
It is clear that austerity-driven restructuring of conservation in Canada has increased the pressure 
felt by park managers in Banff-Jasper to partner with private interests and increase tourism and 
visitation. The following sections will examine the public countermovement as well as the public 
consultation processes to reveal the ways in which this austerity-driven pressure has contributed 
to the post-politicization of conservation governance. 
Strategies to Enroll Allies 
  The bulk of both campaigns involved writing letters to decision-makers and politicians, 
along with having pieces published in local and national media outlets, organizing petitions, and 
holding public rallies and protests. The protests organized for the Skywalk were in very good 
humour. On May 12, 2011, about 20 opponents organized a Monty-python style “Silly Walk” (as 
the Skywalk was cheekily dubbed) through the town of Jasper (see video at https://youtu.be/Ps-
BUAHFbPww). They put on costumes and paraded through town, and others began to join them. 
They described it as being good fun, something to help them laugh a bit about the situation. 
  On September 7, 2012, protesters held a peaceful demonstration at the Columbia Icefields 
Centre, where Brewster operates its glacier stage coach service. About 70 people came from 
Jasper, Banff, and the surrounding area, with representatives from different local environmental 
organizations coming to pass on the information to their networks. People dressed up as goats 
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wearing “evicted” signs to signify their opposition to animals and nature being disturbed for 
commercial gain. Protesters then paraded through the info centre and answered questions. 
 
Figure 6.0 - Skywalk Protest at the Columbia Icefields Centre, Sept 2012  
 Both rallies were well-received, and were also strategies to brighten opponents’ spirits as 
trying to scale up interest and movement around the projects was taxing work. “Finding the time  
and resources was really tricky. Finding the resources to make us loud enough, present enough. 
The businesses have that, the multinational corporations have that,” said Kim Wallace. Feeling as 
though all of your time and efforts are for naught is emotionally, mentally and physically drain-
ing for opponents, and many have become bitter, jaded and quite pessimistic about the public’s 
role in decision-making as a result. 
  “We just exhaust ourselves caring about processes that are fixed in advance,” said Ben 
Gadd. “If you're really going to oppose this stuff, you have a lot of work to do. You have to read 
the briefs, you have to get up on the issues, and then you have to be willing to take the kind of 
punishment that comes from it. In the end it wears you out, because the system is too hard to 
fight.” Many respondents felt that parks actually hopes for this, that opponents will exhaust 
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themselves, become jaded, and stop showing up to fight. Indeed, Swyngedouw explains that in a 
post-political regime, “the growing apathy of ordinary people with respect to the democratic po-
litical process is noted but banalized as not central to the ‘proper’ functioning of democratic in-
stitutions” (2011: 372).  
  Perhaps because of this, the level of engagement dropped slightly with the Maligne Tours 
proposal. But even though there were fewer letters sent or signatures on the Avaaz petition, most 
locals were far more upset about the Maligne Tours hotel than the Glacier Skywalk because the 
implications for ecological integrity were far more severe. The endangered caribou herd and 
threatened bears and harlequin ducks were grave concerns for most Jasperites. These non-human 
actants were critically important for opponents’ strategy. The woodland caribou were actually 
‘upgraded’ from threatened to endangered during the height of the controversy. “It's critical cari-
bou habitat and there should be no development in a critical habitat of an endangered species,” 
said Volker, co-owner of Maligne Canyon Hostel, an OCA in Jasper. “In the end these are the 
arguments that shot [the hotel] down, because parks realized that in the federal courts this would 
not go through, not under the Species At Risk legislation,” he said. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
opponents also held a protest along Maligne Road on June 29, 2014 (Nichols, 2014). 
  Policy itself became the second major point of strategy for opponents against Maligne. 
The fact that parks was considering breaking the 2007 OCA guidelines that prohibit new 
overnight commercial accommodations outside of the townsites of Banff and Jasper was held up 
as proof that Parks Canada cares more about enhancing visitor experience than ecological in-
tegrity. Terry Winkler was the one who brought this to parks attention at an open house meeting.  
Amber Stewart, a park land use manager who was fielding questions at the meeting was caught a 
!84
bit offguard with the question, and answered that parks would consider changing it. It appeared 
that parks had not been aware that the proposal contravened the OCA guidelines or the manage-
ment plan at the outset, as they told General Manager of Maligne Tours, Pat Crowley, that they 
had no policy problem initially. Pat was livid with parks, and felt strongly that they are complete-
ly disorganized:  
 “I have a letter from December of 2012 which said they had no policy problems and no   
 realty problems with the proposal. Now they say they have a policy problem. Their letter   
 said the initial policy screening found no problems. Well what is so in depth and    
 complicated about that policy? I've done all this work, taken up the time of his    
 department, my time, and NOW you're deciding that maybe you have a problem with   
 policy?”  
 Kevin Van Tighem, Steven Woodley, and Nik Lopoukhine, three former Parks Canada 
managers, made headlines across the country with their open letter to then Minister of the Envi-
ronment Leona Aglukkak, which stressed the danger of breaking these guidelines (Appendix C). 
Very plainly, all of the OCA owners who had negotiated their caps on development could argue 
for more if Maligne Tours is able to break the guidelines to put a hotel in critical caribou habitat. 
When Parks Canada turned down the hotel portion of the proposal but greenlighted the tent cab-
ins for further review and environmental assessment, opponents were not the least bit appeased:  
 “I feel that commercial forces still got what they could out of the minister. The draft   
 decision permits 13 of 14 elements, violates the OCA guidelines and requires the    
 changing of a management plan for more development. Note that the decision was not   
 to open the management plan for caribou conservation! The tent cabins are the    
 equivalent of a small hotel in terms of staff, traffic and laundry,” said Former Chief   
 Ecosystem Scientist, Steven Woodley.  
 “There is no such thing as being half-pregnant. They greenlighted a new commercial  
  accommodation operation in spite of all the policy work over three decades to put a lid   
 on that. It's a complete disaster, and shameful to witness,” said Former Superintendent   
 of Banff, Kevin Van Tighem.  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  Parks Canada asserted that since the tent cabins are not fixed roof structures, they do not 
count as OCAs. Yes, they are outlying overnight accommodations run by a commercial operator, 
but if they have a fixed bottom with no fixed roof, technically they are exempted from the OCA 
guidelines. However, they cannot be exempted from the 2010 management plan which states that 
no new land will be released for commercial accommodation.  
  The JEA and CPAWS partnered with EcoJustice and attempted to make use of the law to 
stop development, or at the very least to make a point about the responsibility of the park super-
intendent as a decision-maker. They argued in court that it was unlawful for Parks Canada to 
agree to consider a project that would contravene the management plan at the request of industry. 
Gerry Levaseur, former owner of Maligne Tours before the Brewster buy out, was very openly 
chasing the opportunity to develop accommodations at the lake for the past decade. He had actu-
ally sued Parks Canada twice before because they refused this request. While it is obvious that 
conservation practice involves intense pressure from several stakeholders, some for and some 
against development, opponents found it egregious that Parks Canada should have to give in to 
private interests in their decision-making at all. “The [private sector] has a role to play within the 
parks and they should be allowed to offer services and accommodation and so on within national 
parks, so long as their operations and the need for them to make a profit in order to stay in busi-
ness doesn't become the driver of policy. To my mind, that was exactly what was happening,” 
said Dr. Ian Urquhart of the University of Alberta.  
  The law, generally, upholds the authority of Parks Canada Agency to make decisions re-
garding ecological integrity. In this case, the Judge upheld the superintendent’s authority to con-
sider projects that contravene park policy, but ruled that no project that does contravene the man-
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agement plan could be approved (Veerman, 2016). The case may therefore have been quite an 
effective strategy for opponents, since it would be difficult to re-open the management planning 
process and remove the line that prohibits the release of ne w land for accommodations in the 
face of such strong public disapproval.  
Environmental Assessment and Public Consultation 
 Consultation for the Skywalk was structured through the environmental assessment (EA) 
process, conducted in 2011 by Golder Associates, a private consulting company hired by Brew-
ster . While it may have followed the letter of the law, the assessment was critiqued on method7 -
ological and ethical grounds. Opponents have largely critiqued the merit of the report, arguing 
that the 4-month assessment based largely on camera studies was not thorough enough to ade-
quately assess impacts on mountain goats. Several stakeholders also felt that public consultation 
was not meaningfully sought, as there were only 4 open houses held in Jasper, Banff, Calgary 
and Edmonton, which respondents likened to information sessions rather than forums for open 
debate. These were held on consecutive days just a few weeks after the 169-page environmental 
assessment was made available in Jasper. In a letter to the Superintendent, Dr. Ian Urquhart of 
the University of Alberta critiqued Brewster Travel for using a marketing survey to demonstrate 
the potential strength of the Glacier Walkway as an attraction, polling only people who had pre-
viously supplied their e-mail addresses to Brewster for leisure purposes. 
  What was worrying to most local residents was that much of the EA read like a commer-
cial for Brewster and the Skywalk itself. They got the feeling that the attraction had already been 
 The Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992) that held until changes in 2012 states that responsible author7 -
ities may delegate the assessment to proponents. 
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approved, and that Golder was promoting the attraction instead of conducting an objective as-
sessment of its potential impacts. Here is but one example from the EA:  
 “Guests will be brought into the experience through the interpretive story telling    
 combined with the spectacular vantage points stimulating their senses. Design will   
 integrate the built infrastructure seamlessly, harmoniously, and with stunning effect into   
 the rugged environment sculpted by glaciers, providing a sense of harmony mixed with   
 awe. The experience will be emotive, with impressions of the landscape forever burned   
 into memory, making this unique experience one that guests will speak about for years   
 afterwards.” (Golder, 2011: 15) 
Opponents questioned why an objective third party hired to assess the project’s environmental 
implications would use such flowery language promising visitor satisfaction. 
 In contrast to the Skywalk proposal, consultation for the Maligne developments was 
sought during the conceptual proposal phase, before the EA phase. Maligne Tours released a 106 
page Conceptual Proposal in 2013, which was opened for public comment, however there was 
much initial outrage over the fact that Parks Canada had instructed people to send comments di-
rectly to Maligne Tours, which residents felt was a grave conflict of interest. Park staff then clari-
fied that comments should be sent to both Parks Canada and Maligne Tours.  
  Notably, the company repeatedly highlighted the role it could play in filling the gaps cre-
ated by funding cuts. Here are two examples from the Conceptual Proposal: 
 “MTL’s role has become more and more significant over time as diminishing resources   
 within Parks Canada have impacted the degree to which JNP (Jasper) can fulfill some of   
 its customer aspirations.” (p. 28) 
 “If MTL is going to continue in its role as Parks Canada’s partner and the caretaker of   
 Maligne Lake - together with all of the responsibilities the company has assumed or  
  inherited over the years due to changes in Parks Canada’s priorities or budget cutbacks at   
 Parks Canada - then there will need to be incremental sources of revenue by way of more  
 customers purchasing more products or fewer customers spending more for higher  
  quality experiences.” (p. 32) 
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These kinds of statements reify the post-political ‘there is no alternative’ discourse and not-so-
subtly suggest to opponents as well as to park staff that an increasing role for private interests 
and incremental increases in tourism offerings are inevitable (or else!). In the final sections I de-
tail the post-political strategies employed to suture the space for political dissensus and debate in 
response to these structural pressures imposed by austerity politics. 
Post-political Strategies 
 Proponents and opponents employed several strategies and tools to enroll allies, but I ar-
gue that there is an increasingly narrow window of opportunity for public and Indigenous actors 
(see Youdelis, 2016) who oppose such projects. Parks Canada, under the oversight of a federal 
government enacting politics of austerity, employed a series of post-political strategies to remove 
political debate from the public sphere and construct the appearance of consensual decision-mak-
ing. In post-political fashion, neoliberalisation and austerity politics themselves were elevated 
beyond critique or open debate and several measures were taken to contain and disavow dissent. 
I identify five strategies that rendered decision-making post-political: disciplining dissent, prede-
termining outcomes, black-box decision-making, co-opting dissent, and the ‘rule of experts’. 
Disciplining Dissent 
 The first blatant and heavy-handed strategy to render this controversy post-political was 
the strongly worded dictat sent by the Superintendent to all park staff prohibiting them from 
speaking out against any development proposal or against any Agency policy or practice . At the 8
 Contacts shared the Superintendent’s email to all park staff with me. This was not published information but I was able to ac8 -
cess it. I also have testimony from former wardens and park staff discussing the gag order. 
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time, the Harper government had similarly been silencing federal scientists and civil servants in 
the media (Turner, 2013), and the Parks Canada Agency required all correspondence between 
park staff and the media, or people like myself asking questions, to be approved in Ottawa.  
  Terry Winkler, a warden who was laid off in the 2012 cuts, was severely reprimanded for 
asking about the OCA guidelines at the open house meeting for the Maligne hotel. Because Parks 
Canada laid him off close to retirement age, he had the option of taking an educational leave for 
two years to minimize the number of years he would be penalized. According to Parks Canada, 
although he had been dismissed, while he was on educational leave he was still subject to the 
employee code of conduct, which meant he could not attend public meetings and ask questions 
as a member of the public. He grieved the disciplinary letter that was put on his file, which said 
that if he did not cease and desist immediately further action could be taken including being fired 
outright. “I was asking a question about a policy that they had on file that is part of their man-
agement plan. I wasn't criticizing, I wasn't doing anything! I just said 'Do you have this policy?' 
Yes you do. ‘Okay, how does that affect what we're discussing today?’” he said. “It's not some-
thing they should be pretending doesn't exist. It's in a public document.” 
 Residents of Jasper were also shocked and dismayed by the unexpected dismissal without 
cause of the former senior scientist, John Wilmshurst. John held this position for 15 years and 
was extremely well-respected within the agency and with the townspeople of Jasper. More than 
100 former Parks Canada employees and scientists have come out against his firing, which many 
feel is another politically motivated dismissal of an esteemed scientist who would not give the 
agency his endorsement on various tourism development plans. In an open letter to the leaders of 
the three opposition parties at the time, these 100+ signatories accused the government of taking 
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such measures to instil fear among those still working for the agency (Pratt, 2015). Wilmshurst 
left Jasper and has not issued a statement regarding his puzzling dismissal, but residents and 
former park staff feel strongly that this fits firmly with the government’s silencing of evidence or 
information that may impede development plans.   
  Silencing public servants from bringing forth information that may hamper development 
is an overt strategy to remove important points of debate from the public sphere and to centralize 
and control public discourse. This stifles public knowledge and consequently the potency of pub-
lic critique as information that could be politicized is kept under wraps.   
Predetermining Outcomes 
 The Skywalk proposal had already passed through most of Parks Canada’s channels be-
fore they brought it to the public for comment, and unbeknownst to the public, Parks had already 
determined that they had no policy problem with the proposal. They had been working back and 
forth with Brewster to refine the proposal into something both parties found acceptable before 
proceeding to the environmental assessment. The EA process would include an opportunity for 
public and Indigenous engagement, however by the time the assessment was being done, there 
was a palpable sense that the decision had already been made. Even Loni Klettl, one of the lone 
supporters of the project, felt that parks had really “screwed up” the consultation process. “Well 
they screwed it up, a lot of it was done before it actually went to the public. They screwed up so 
bad on that one, because they just didn't expect the explosive reaction, so their pants were way 
down,” she said. 
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  Likely because of the extreme resentment around the Brewster process, Parks Canada 
brought the Maligne proposal to the public at the conceptual level. This helped the public to in-
form parks early on that the proposal would contravene policy, which helped to shelve the hotel 
portion of the proposal. However most opponents, including former Parks Canada managers, felt 
that due to the pressures created by the budget cuts, the political decision to approve overnight 
accommodation, whether via hotel or the tent cabins, had already been made. 
  Because of this, opponents and even proponents of development feel that seeking public 
input is simply a formality. “The public consultation process to me seems strictly proforma. 
Everything has the indications of getting decided in advance,” said Ben Gadd, a former park in-
terpreter. Sensing that the political decisions have been made in advance, many felt that consulta-
tion has become a perfunctory ritual completed to meet regulations and create the appearance of 
including all stakeholders in decision-making, inviting public comment for the sake of participa-
tion but not opening political decisions for debate.  
Black box decision-making 
  Submission of written comments is the preferred method of consultation over open de-
bate or public hearing, and thus the final decisions on any project are often completely opaque. 
Opponents’ feel as though their letters go into a black void, and there is little effort to address 
these points or convince the public that they should be discarded: 
 “They come back and say okay, here's what we heard, it's a bunch of opposition. And   
 they start going ahead anyway. So we'll say, ‘Wait a second, all these people said, and   
 now you're doing this... how do you reconcile those two opposing things?' And often we   
 don't, or often we get chain letters, frankly. 'Thank you for your feedback, we appreciate   
 that you took the time to communicate your thoughts to us..'. Mostly it's just copy and   
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 paste, we get the same letter we got from them 5 times before with a slightly different   
 intro paragraph.”  Sean Nichols, Alberta Wilderness Association  
 “I think it was mostly disappointing. I didn't really... I couldn't see the public comments   
 being taken into account, considering how strong the sentiment that I was gauging was. I   
 would say that no, I didn't get a sense that Parks Canada was saying 'We thought about   
 what you were saying, and you made some valid points, but these are the reasons that   
 it's going to be wonderful for the national park'. It sort of seemed like 'It's done, let's   
 move on'. It's hard because I don't really have a good sense of why, and I don't think   
 anyone really does.” -Bob Covey, editor of The Jasper Local  
When Parks Canada receives volumes of correspondence, they divide comments into categories 
and summarize these in “What we heard” reports. However, the number of concerns in any given 
category is not revealed. There could have been 1,000 comments regarding inappropriateness or 
commercialization, 950 comments expressing concern over habitat loss, and 3 comments ex-
pressing support for enhancing visitor experience, but the reports will list all of the categories as 
though they were equally represented. The “What we heard” reports for the Skywalk and Ma-
ligne proposal followed this format. The Brewster report went further and provided official re-
sponses that disavowed concerns raised through consultation or provided justification for pro-
ceeding anyway (Parks Canada, 2012). The report noted: 
 “Although the majority of comments reflected a lack of support for the proposal, numbers 
 for or against were not the only factor that Parks Canada considered when evaluating   
 public response… In the end, the consultation process is not a plebiscite.”  
Producing such reports is one way in which consensus is staged through official documentation. 
Concerns are neutralized or disavowed, and information regarding the number of responses in 
any category is kept from public actors. This contributes to misunderstanding around the nature 
of public sentiment, as well as how concerns are weighted and addressed and to what extent the 
final decision reflects public input.
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Co-opting Dissent 
 In addition to feeling frazzled by sending comments into a black hole, opponents are ex-
asperated by the fact that their feedback is often turned into a reason for construction:  
 “They had used what people had said negatively and twisted it around to make it into a   
 positive reason why this project should go forward. For instance, people were saying that  
 Maligne Lake is so much more than this like 9-5 destination, it's a place where people go   
 in the evening and they just sit by the lake, and they enjoy the peace of quiet of it because 
 there's nobody there, or there might be 5 other people there, but you don't even see them   
 because they're on the other side of the lake. You know? So they used that as a reason   
 why it should be opened up to people staying there, so they can see it in the evening. It’s   
 just crap. And they're really good, too, at taking that opposition and being like 'this is   
 what we heard, but this is the truth'. You know? They counter everything so that it shines   
 brightly on them.” -Nicole Veerman, editor of the Fitzhugh  
Many respondents have stopped engaging in park issues for this reason, because they feel that 
the current channels just co-opt their concerns and they are consequently disenfranchised. 
  Opponents feel that discursively concepts like ‘ecological integrity’ and ‘visitor experi-
ence’ have similarly been co-opted by business interests. Both are quite nebulous terms, but leav-
ing them vague with no specific criteria for evaluation leaves room for both to be employed in 
support of development. If no criteria for evaluation is required, Parks Canada can easily claim 
to be respecting ‘ecological integrity’ and increasing understanding, awareness and connection 
with nature via new private tourism offerings, presenting the appearance that there is consensus 
around both the importance of these things and how to achieve them. Co-opting dissent thus 
serves to neutralize and disavow public concerns in final decision-making, orchestrating the ap-
pearance of consensual problem resolution. 
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’Rule of Experts’ 
 In a post-political frame agonistic politics are evacuated from the sphere of policy-mak-
ing and replaced by expert and techno-managerial administration (Swyngedouw, 2011). Parks 
Canada had already been working with Brewster and had already determined that there was no 
policy problem with the Skywalk before coming to the public. Consultation was thus structured 
through the EA process where they were only looking for comments specific to the scientific 
merit of the EA itself. In short, the project could have only been shelved if opponents had 
brought forward new scientific evidence regarding ecological integrity. The important political 
and philosophical points raised by opponents about appropriateness, commercialization, access, 
and precedent setting were all but ignored as “personal values.” As discussed earlier, dissent 
from scientists within the organization was also overtly silenced and only federally approved ex-
pert opinions were permitted in official discourse.  
  Further, the EA itself was done by private contractors hired by Brewster, the majority of 
which read like promotional material. Opponents were extremely agitated by this conflict of in-
terest, which is common practice in Canada. As I mentioned, opponents had several qualms with 
the assessment in that it was a 4 month long camera study and otherwise relied on dated sec-
ondary data. Kevin Van Tighem (the former Superintendent of Banff) who was quoted in the EA 
saying that goat habitat would not be severely impacted said that his comments had been ex-
tremely ‘watered down’. “I didn't like what their consultants did with my input. I don't personally 
agree with the mitigations they put in place around mountain goats,” he said. Although it is ques-
tionable whether goats have been seriously impacted, there was a skillful art in the way the ex-
!95
pert interviews and data were presented to the public, once again staging consensus despite the 
ongoing boundary conflicts around whether this was ‘good science’. 
  Mitigation measures were also employed as means of assuaging and neutralizing public 
concerns in lieu of opening debate around the appropriateness of the project itself. Public com-
ment was sought primarily to gauge which mitigation measures are appropriate, not to give the 
public opportunity to alter the political decision on development itself. Several ‘mitigation mea-
sures’ promised by Brewster never did come to fruition. The public strongly opposed a public 
viewpoint becoming private, so Brewster was meant to leave one section free and open to the 
public, which did not occur. They were also meant to build a trail up from Tangle Ridge so that 
people could access the site and viewpoint on foot, which also did not transpire.  
 Structuring consultation for the Skywalk through the depoliticized EA process speaks to 
the degree to which fiscal pressures made development a foregone conclusion. However the 
power of public resistance was demonstrated by the fact that the Maligne process went different-
ly. But once again, Parks Canada was looking for information specific to ecological impacts that 
would sufficiently challenge Maligne Tours’ claims, not opening space for philosophical or polit-
ical objections to the P3 partnership itself. Although opponents were able to enrol Parks Cana-
da’s science on dwindling caribou numbers in their countermovement, ultimately Parks Canada 
authorities are the authorized ‘experts’ who have the power to deem whether or not ecological 
integrity will be impacted, and scientific research can be inaccessible or unfeasible to conduct for 
the average citizen/activist.  
  In these ways, science and the law are employed by proponents and Parks Canada to sta-
bilize claims around protecting ecological integrity and doing due diligence with public input. 
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Opponents have no legitimate channels through which to express outright disagreement with pri-
vate development in a public park. All philosophical and political concerns are disregarded or at 
best ‘mitigated’, but the political decisions are not open for debate. 
Discussion 
  Due to the palpable sense that Parks Canada needs P3 partnerships to recoup costs from 
successive rounds of austerity, and due to the frustration felt in the face of post-political maneu-
vering, public actors involved in these two cases feel strongly that the public has little to no role 
in decision-making in this political economic climate. As the interests of Parks Canada and prof-
itable private leaseholders in the park are aligning in terms of increasing visitation and the rev-
enue imperative, public actors feel increasingly disenfranchised. I argue that this is no coinci-
dence. Following scholars who argue the post-politicization of the public sphere converges with 
processes of neoliberalisation (Fletcher, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010; Zizek, 1999), I argue that the 
politics of austerity create the structural conditions for the post-politicization of public consulta-
tion, reducing democratic oversight of environmental governance more broadly. Austerity poli-
tics contribute to a post-political ‘there is no alternative’ discourse, where the notion of private 
development and management of park services is accepted as necessary to fulfill park mandates 
and is elevated beyond political debate. Strategies such as disciplining and co-opting dissent 
serve to condition people to this post-political discourse, while strategies to predetermine out-
comes, including black-box decision-making and deferring to technocrats, serve to suture space 
for dissensus and debate and orchestrate the appearance of consensual decision-making. Agonis-
tic politics are thus replaced by “technocratic questions of cost-benefit ratios from which politi-
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cal considerations are largely effaced” (Fletcher, 2014: 330). Austerity politics themselves are 
left unquestioned and, by structural necessity, private sector revenue generation is normalized as 
the main method to satisfy park mandates.  
  Although neoliberalisation is in theory concerned with decentralization and enrolling a 
wider network of actors into participation, certain actors are enrolled in the process in increasing-
ly depoliticized ways. Public actors are enrolled as contributors but within narrowly prescribed 
parameters —invited, for instance, to suggest changes that could improve the implementation of 
a given project rather than to open debate around the appropriateness of the project or of the ne-
oliberalisation of conservation itself. Many Jasper residents no longer wish to engage in the 
process as they feel disempowered and cynical about the real purpose of consultation. This case 
thus has implications for our understanding of the role of consultation in neoliberal conservation. 
Lest we be lured into thinking that neoliberal modes of conservation governance lead to more 
participatory and effective public engagement, this case demonstrates that engagement within a 
neoliberal framework can be pernicious as it serves to disenfranchise public actors to lubricate 
‘painful-but-necessary’ private sector development, leading to a level of distrust among public 
actors that can deter them from future engagement. Should conservationists desire stronger pub-
lic participation they need to be attentive to the terms of that participation and the results of their 
engagement strategies.  
  Further, the post-political acceptance of austerity politics and private development as an 
integral part of conservation has tremendous implications for park management and ecology go-
ing forward, in Canada and abroad. By strategically controlling public participation in certain 
ways, we are ensuring that certain logics gain prominence over others; that only certain kinds of 
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knowledges are recognized while others are disallowed. In effect we’re seeing a recentralization 
of whose knowledge counts, with private sector voices becoming indispensable for park func-
tioning and the rule of particular experts becoming reinforced as a means of discounting dissent. 
I note that it is particular expert voices becoming elevated since those who break from or chal-
lenge neoliberal restructuring are at best marginalized and at worst terminated from their posi-
tions in overt strategies to discipline dissent. These disciplinary tactics forcibly police the bound-
aries of ‘acceptable’ logics.  
  Such strategies make it more likely for business interests to take precedence over ecolog-
ical ones. The case discussed here lays bare the claim that increasing revenue will lead to better 
ecological conservation since, as conservation increasingly takes on values associated with the 
private sector, the ecological gets backgrounded. In this case an increase in revenues from visitor 
activities will go back into visitor offerings and does not necessarily translate into more money 
being available for ecological conservation. Managing new mass tourism attractions will also 
come with unique ecological challenges, made clear by the issues brought up in this case, partic-
ularly at Maligne Lake with respect to the effects of changing patterns of human traffic on sensi-
tive species. 
Conclusion 
  Forsyth and Walker (2014) and Matthews (2011) argue that the production of official 
knowledge that informs bureaucratic and/or political order is never solely top down but is an it-
erative performance that involves and requires assent from a multitude of actors. Bureaucratic 
authority and conservation policy in Jasper exemplify this, as local residents and environmental 
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groups challenge Parks Canada on a variety of truth claims and private proponents similarly 
strive to steer Agency discourse and practice. Some concessions were made with these two de-
velopments thanks to the tireless efforts of opponents, including the consideration of only the 
tent cabins and not the hotel at Maligne Lake. However certain underlying points of agreement -
that EI should be balanced with VE, that parks should be inclusive, that parks are facing serious 
budget issues- ultimately lent support for Parks Canada’s official decision to address these issues 
through private tourism offerings, “excluding other social perspectives and environmental man-
agement options” (Forsyth and Walker, 2014: 414). Silencing these alternative knowledges was 
accomplished primarily through post-political strategies that at once produced ignorance 
(Matthews, 2011), removing points of debate from the public sphere, and contained and dis-
avowed dissent through a post-political orchestration of consensus (Fletcher, 2014). I have ar-
gued that this was requisite under neoliberalisation at the state level, as pressure grew to increase 
visitation and revenues. Importantly, this is not to say that these outcomes were inevitable in any 
way —in fact, the Maligne Tours tent cabins and other attractions still may not be built, since 
environmental groups obtained the court ruling that will require an amendment to the manage-
ment plan for the tent cabins to be approved. Continual pressure from environmentally concerned 
citizens and the media advancing counterclaims may very well shift conservation practice in an-
other direction. As an iterative performance, conservation practice remains open for re-negotia-
tion, and certainly the passionate residents of the Jasper area will continue to press for change. 
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Chapter 4  
The Colonial Anti-politics of Indigenous Consultation in Jasper 
Introduction 
  Early conservation in Canada was a violent site of struggle between the invading settler-
colonizers and First peoples. While colonial ways of knowing nature clashed entirely with the 
collective natureculture ontologies and lifeways of First Nations, the knowledge wars here were 
distressingly one-sided. The settler-colonizers opened no space for debate and their use of sheer 
force and violence coerced Indigenous compliance despite protest. Racism and ‘Othering’ of first 
peoples encouraged public assent from the settler population for evicting/restricting First Nations 
from park space, their former traditional territories (Alfred, 2005; Coulthard, 2014; Sandlos, 
2014). Today, institutional racism maintains their alienation from their land bases and their sub-
jugation to state authorities.   
  This chapter explores the colonial anti-political strategies employed by park staff in 
Jasper attempting to secure and maintain their bureaucratic authority, territorial power and relat-
ed material benefits, and why this was successful despite sustained opposition from First Na-
tions. While Büscher (2010) analyzed how antipolitics operates in a neoliberal political economy, 
my work here analyzes how antipolitics operates in a neoliberal colonial political economy 
through an exploration of the lived experiences of local First Nations. Antipolitics is a useful 
concept to think through how park authorities carry out the consultation process within the con-
text of increasing pressures to approve private tourism projects that have the potential to generate 
much-needed revenue. Jasper’s approach not only gives the appearance of consent by various 
First Nations, but also obscures the ongoing colonial political and economic marginalization of 
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Indigenous peoples and consequently reinforces existing inequalities. Colonial power dynamics 
and bureaucratic knowledge remain unquestioned and are effectively reproduced and secured 
through consultation. 
Colonization through Conservation 
 Canada is a settler-colonial state, founded on the violent dispossession of original peoples 
from their lands in order to facilitate European settlement and capitalist expansion (Alfred, 2005; 
Loo, 2006). Importantly, colonialism is not an ‘event’ that occurred squarely in the past, but a 
structure of continual exploitation “because Settlers… have rewritten histories, have created a 
legal system that justifies their rule, and have normalized a racist and unjust socio-economic sys-
tem”(Alfred and Tomkins, 2010). Understanding colonialism as a structure and an ongoing 
process instead of an event is critical to understanding how the current politics of recognition and 
“reconciliation” in Canada ironically further normalize colonial appropriation of and control over 
Indigenous lands and structurally unequal socio-economic relations between settlers and Indige-
nous nations (Alfred, 2005; Coulthard, 2014). 
  Coulthard (2014) explains that First Nations’ struggles for self-determination have long 
employed the language and concept of “recognition” (recognition of the nation-to-nation rela-
tionship, the right to self-determination and self-government, the right for First Nations to benefit 
economically from the use of their lands, etc.).  However, he and others (see Alfred and 9
 The Government of Canada recognizes that First Nations have an ‘‘inherent right to self government’’ as an Abo9 -
riginal right under the Constitution of 1982, Section 35. This inherent right is explained as ‘‘the right to govern 
themselves in relation to matters that are internal to their communities, integral to their unique cultures, identities, 
traditions, languages and institutions, and with respect to their special relationship to their land and their 
resources’’ (Government of Canada, 2010). Federal, provincial, and First Nations jurisdictions thus overlap in many 
cases across Canada.
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Tomkins, 2010) argue that the very pursuit of recognition from a colonial oppressor is self-de-
feating, as First Nations have to implicitly concede that the Crown’s sovereign reign over all 
lands in Canada is just and legitimate, and thus the Crown has the power to either bestow or dis-
allow recognition. Since statutory authority rests with the federal state, First Nations are only 
able to govern themselves in ways deemed acceptable in the Canadian legislative system, not as 
truly self-determining people (ie. free to determine their own culturally-specific forms of politi-
cal governance and pursue their own social, cultural and economic development with authority 
over their lands). In a similar vein, gestures towards “reconciliation,” such as the public apology 
from former Prime Minister Stephen Harper for the atrocities Indigenous peoples suffered in 
Residential Schools, or creating space for Indigenous peoples on resource comanagement boards 
–although powerful forms of recognition and points of hope for many Indigenous people– run 
the risk of further legitimating colonial hegemony and relations of power (Sandlos, 2014; Water-
stone and de Leeuw, 2010). A reconciliatory politics that imagines colonial injustices as occur-
ring in the past does nothing to confront the ongoing alienation of indigenous peoples from their 
lands so that their territories remain available for neocolonial-capitalist gains (Alfred, 2005; 
Coulthard, 2014). Similarly, Cameron (2008) argues that recent settler acknowledgement of In-
digenous peoples’ past use of park lands often has a ghostly or spectral nature. Imagining Indige-
nous presence on park lands as ghosts of a time past permits disavowal of present-day Indige-
nous claims and the role of parks in ongoing dispossession. 
  National parks in Canada were, as they have been elsewhere, early tools that facilitated 
colonial injustices, and many today arguably help to maintain the neo-colonial present. Under-
stood as instruments of primitive accumulation (Carroll, 2014; Kelly, 2011) (or accumulation by 
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dispossession (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012)), national parks enclosed valuable natural terri-
tories and removed First Nations whose land-based lifeways were an impediment to the colonial-
capitalist project (Coulthard, 2014). State territorialization of protected areas was legitimized by 
the racist assumption that Indigenous peoples were too primitive to hold sovereign rights over 
their territories upon contact with Europeans, and thus that Canada was a terra nullius to be 
claimed (Baldwin, 2009; Braun, 2002). 
  The earliest national parks in Canada were developed in the Western provinces of Alberta 
and British Columbia, followed by the expansion of the system into eastern Canada and the 
northern Territories (Peepre and Dearden, 2002). Importantly, the experiences of First Nations 
with park establishment vary starkly between southern and northern parks (Sandlos, 2014). In the 
name of “conservation,” countless nations were forcefully evicted from the earlier southern parks 
(Binnema and Niemi, 2006; Sandlos, 2008). By contrast, more recent parks established in the 
northern Territories have been established in varying degrees of partnership with First Nations 
because Parks Canada has had to deal with comprehensive land claims. These comanagement 
arrangements have given Parks Canada international recognition as a “leader” in Aboriginal rela-
tions (Campbell, 2011). Some argue that these steps mark a significant improvement in a parks 
system historically based on the Yellowstone model of fortress-style wilderness conservation that 
precluded Aboriginal habitation (MacLaren, 2011). However, critics point out that ‘comanage-
ment’ is very loosely defined, “it can range from as little as receiving information from the gov-
ernment, to fulfilling an advisory role of the government, to being delegated legislative authority, 
and finally to assuming co-jurisdiction of resources with government”(Rodon, 1998: 120). Co-
management has also been roundly critiqued for reinforcing colonial power relations and con-
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straining First Nations in decision-making because most comanagement boards have advisory 
status only, while statutory power always rests with the Crown (Mabee and Hoberg, 2006; Sand-
los, 2014). Further, most comanagement boards aim only to integrate Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge (TEK) more effectively into existing science-based decision-making processes, not 
to reconfigure decision-making power (Devin and Doberstein, 2004). Often TEK can be cooptat-
ed or ‘scientized’ by non-indigenous decision-makers (Ellis, 2005), or is simply discarded if it 
conflicts with scientific evidence that is presumed to be superior (Spak, 2005). 
  Jasper, as one of the early southern parks, follows the southern history of exclusion. 
Jasper Forest Park was established in 1907 (and became Jasper Park in 1909), at which point the 
Metis families homesteading in the park were suddenly declared “squatters” on park land. In 
1909, John W. McLaggan, Jasper’s first acting superintendent, served eviction notices to these 
families: the Moberly’s, the Findlay’s/Finlay’s and the Joachim’s (Murphy, 2007; MacLaren, 
2007).  Some descendants of these original families moved to what is now the Grand Cache 10
area and form the Aseniwuche Winewak Nation, while others moved to nearby Hinton and Ed-
son, the most senior of which form the Upper Athabasca Elders Council. The area has a long and 
complex history of occupation, however. The Metis families along with seasonal inhabitants and 
travelers used the area for centuries as the fur trade developed and brought nations from across 
Canada into the Rockies. Many nations, “including Cree, Stoney, Shuswap, Ojibwe, several 
groups of Metis, Sekani, Carrier, Iroquois and white consider the valley a part of their abiding 
 Henry John Mobery (1835–1931) was born in Ontario. He moved to the Jasper area in 1855 working with the 10
Hudson’s Bay Company. He led a hunting team with Iroquois hunters and married Iroquois Suzanne Karaconti in 
1861. Suzanne and her ancestors pre-dated Henry John Moberly’s arrival there (Iroquois from theMontreal area 
worked for the NorthWest Company in the West since the late 18th century), and various other groups were known 
to use the area seasonally. Henry and Suzanne had two sons, Ewan and John. Ewan married Madeline Finley (10 
children) and John married Marie Joachim (8 children). These families built permanent habitation sites in the park 
and were the ones living in the park upon its establishment (Murphy, 2007).
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heritage”(MacLaren, 2011: 335). The complicated history of overlapping claims to the area is 
why we see about 2 dozen First Nations as members of the Jasper Aboriginal Forum. Many of 
these nations signed Treaties with the Crown that promised them the right to continue traditional 
hunting and trapping livelihoods. Despite this, they were barred from entering and using the park 
for livelihood purposes while non-native settlers were able to live and develop within the town-
site of Jasper and profit economically from the influx of tourists. In recent years, Jasper has been 
trying to ‘rectify’ these exclusions through their Aboriginal Engagement program, which centres 
around the Forum, a mechanism I will elaborate on later in this paper. I argue that although these 
are steps in a positive direction, the antipolitics of indigenous consultation in Jasper obscures the 
ongoing neocolonial and neoliberal capitalist exploitation of First Nations’ lands. 
  As I explained in Chapter 2, the notion of antipolitics was born from Ferguson’s (1994) 
critique of development discourse and practice and was re-operationalized by Büscher (2010) in 
relation to neoliberal conservation. Nadasdy (2005) also adapted and applied the concept of an-
tipolitics to co-management arrangements between First Nations and the government of Canada. 
He argues that comanagement discourse and practice has unintended political consequences sim-
ilar to those described by Ferguson (1994). He writes, 
  “The need to integrate co-management processes with existing institutional structures of  
  state management has led to a tendency to view co-management as a series of    
 technical problems (primarily associated with the question of how to gather “traditional   
 knowledge” and incorporate it into the management process), rather than as a real   
 alternative to existing structures and practices of state management” (Nadasdy, 2005:   
 216).  
Antipolitics in the context of comanagement, then, means that existing colonial relations of pow-
er and state-led management remain intact. 
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  Coulthard (2014) and Alfred (2005) also poignantly show how the politics of “recogni-
tion” and “reconciliation” ironically further the colonial project, entrenching unequal colonial-
capitalist relations and normalizing the Crown’s sovereign rule over stolen territories. The cri-
tiques of reconciliation contribute to our understanding of what the antipolitics of consultation 
models invisibilize: the denial of Indigenous sovereignty, the reification of colonial power dy-
namics (including ongoing land dispossession), and the facilitation of ‘business as usual’ devel-
opment projects that benefit government and industry and not First Nations. The spectral nature 
of past Indigenous land use (Cameron, 2008) is likewise a tool that helps to evade present-day 
Indigenous politics. The antipolitics of consultation is not just a discourse of settler colonial 
power but produces mechanisms which deny First Nations’ voice and political agency. 
Parks Canada and the Exclusion of First Nations 
  Displacement and/or exclusion has long been associated with protected area establish-
ment, and in the current era of neoliberal governance it is often associated with lucrative nature-
based business ventures (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). This has 
led many scholars to argue that conservation enclosures (and colonialism more broadly) are pro-
cesses of primitive accumulation and/or accumulation by dispossession (Benjaminsen and 
Bryceson, 2012; Kelly, 2011). National parks have long been critiqued as playgrounds for 
wealthy urban tourists (Loo, 2006; MacLaren, 2007), valued for their exchange value as places 
of recreation, whilst First peoples who rely on those areas’ use values were deemed antithetical 
to conservation. 
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  Recent controversies around the appropriateness of private tourism development propos-
als in Jasper reflect a system-wide trend, occurring in part due to shrinking budgets for Parks 
Canada and related ambitions to increase visitor numbers and enrich visitor experience. The 
Brewster Travel and Maligne Tours proposals trigger the Crown’s Duty to Consult with First Na-
tions whose traditional territories overlap with park boundaries. The Duty to Consult is not con-
fined to park management but applies to all territory in Canada where First Nations have land 
claims or may assert title. The Crown’s legal and constitutional obligations to First Nations are 
laid out in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, and have 
been further defined through various Supreme Court cases. The Haida (2004), Taku River (2004) 
and Mikisew Cree (2005) decisions are important in relation to the Duty to Consult. The 
Supreme Court of Canada determined that “the Crown has a duty to consult and, where appropri-
ate, accommodate when the Crown contemplates conduct that might adversely impact potential 
or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights” (Government of Canada, 2011). This means that the 
duty to consult still holds regardless of whether Aboriginal rights or title have been formally 
proven through litigation or treaty agreements. In the recent Tsilhqot’in (2014) decision, the 
Supreme Court ruled that development on Aboriginal title lands can only proceed if the Crown 
obtains consent from First Nations or demonstrates that it effectively discharged its duty to con-
sult and accommodate and justifies infringement as per R. v. Sparrow (1990) (Hansen and Bear 
Robe, 2014). 
  Critics point out, however, that the Duty to Consult itself remains colonial and paternalis-
tic, and is thus a flawed mechanism (Alfred, 2005). It is premised on the idea that the Crown 
holds the ultimate sovereign power to either bestow or disallow certain rights upon Indigenous 
!108
peoples within an unquestionably “just” state legal system. Although traditional livelihoods are 
meant to be protected as inherent rights, ‘justifiable infringement’ allows industry to infringe on 
these rights for a whole host of reasons, “ranging from conservation to settlement, to capitalist 
nonrenewable resource development, and even to protect white interests from the potential eco-
nomic fallout of recognizing Aboriginal rights to land and water-based economic 
pursuits” (Coulthard, 2014: loc 2677). If Aboriginal or Treaty rights conflict with the economic 
imperatives of the Canadian state or the broader settler public, they will be “justifiably” denied. 
  To date there is a fair amount of literature that covers the duty to consult in Canada 
(Land, 2014; Olynyk, 2005), but little to no work that explores Indigenous experiences with and 
perceptions of consultation processes, particularly within Canadian national parks. In light of this 
omission, my research asks what Jasper National Park is doing to meet its Duty to Consult and 
how this is being received by different First Nations.  
  The data used in this chapter comes primarily from interviews done with various mem-
bers of the Jasper Aboriginal Forum, Jasper park management, then CEO of Parks Canada Alan 
Latourelle, and leaders from Brewster Travel and Maligne Tours, supplemented by information 
gathered through document analysis of relevant policies, proposals and consultation protocols for 
various First Nations.  On July 3, 2014, I sent a letter to all members of the Forum asking them 
to participate in an interview regarding their perceptions of the consultation processes for the 
Glacier Skywalk, the Maligne Tours hotel, and their thoughts on the efficacy of the Forum in 
general and how Jasper’s moves towards reconciliation are being received. Several representa-
tives came forward at this time. I then sought out nations that were consulted directly on those 
two projects if they had not already responded to my initial letter. I was able to speak with 2 di-
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rect descendants of the original Metis families, one Elder from the Upper Athabasca Elders’ 
Council, and representatives from 8 different First Nations (Aseniwuche Winewak Nation, 
Stoney Nakoda Nation, Sucker Creek First Nation, Confederacy of Treaty Six Nations, Kelly 
Lake Cree First Nation, Samson Cree First Nation, Alexis Nakota Sioux First Nation, and Asini 
Wachi Cree Band). I recognize that the representatives that sought me out in response to my ini-
tial letter may be those who are generally dissatisfied with the process and thus welcomed the 
opportunity to discuss their frustrations. Several members were unresponsive after several at-
tempts, so the testimonies shared in this paper represent a good cross-section of members of the 
Forum but I do not assume consensus amongst or within communities.  
Reconciliation and the Jasper Aboriginal Forum 
  Jasper has been making strides towards “reconciliation” with Indigenous nations who 
were evicted from the park upon its establishment. There are three main components to the out-
reach program. The first is showcasing Indigenous culture and history throughout the park. One 
of the more well-received endeavours are the annual Aboriginal Days where nations are invited 
to perform traditional song and dance, sell arts, crafts and food, and teach about various points of 
interest like medicinal plants and Indigenous histories. In 2011, the park commissioned and 
raised a totem pole along the main street in Jasper to signify their commitment to improving rela-
tionships with First Nations. Some respondents felt that this could be viewed as a positive since 
Jasper was making a visible effort, however management took a grave misstep and erected a 
totem pole of the Haida Nation who reside on the West coast of British Columbia. Many respon-
dents were concerned that this would spread misinformation to tourists about which nations lived 
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in the Jasper area and felt slighted that the Alberta nations were not represented. “It’s sort of like 
having Scottish highland dancers in Paris. That could have been done better, but they were try-
ing,” said the respondent from Stoney Nakoda Nation. 
  The second component is negotiating terms of park access and use. Jasper offered to sign 
Memorandums of Access (MOAs) with each nation which would secure free access to the park 
along with negotiated rights to practice ceremonies and collect traditional medicines. They held a 
Friendship and Forgiveness Ceremony with interested members of the AWN and held formal 
reconciliation ceremonies with Alexis Nakota Sioux First Nation, which was the first nation to 
sign an MOA with the park. Despite these efforts, currently only 4 groups out of about 24 have 
signed MOAs with Jasper because there remain some concerns with the terms of the agreements 
and many feel they are paternalistic. The idea that First Nations need to negotiate for free access 
to their own territories is itself unjust. Some respondents also feel they are simply not ready to 
forgive the violence and emotional distress of being divided from their lands. “I would be the 
first one to say that that’s what needs to be done, but it needs to be done when people are ready. 
There is a lot of hurt there,” explained one Elder from the Elder’s Council.  
  It is also problematic to conceive of “reconciliation” as forgiveness for an event that oc-
curred in the past. The function of state apologies and other symbolic mechanisms of reconcilia-
tion is to construct egregious conduct as being bounded to a particular spatio-temporal setting in 
order to (re)produce and maintain the ‘common sense’ legitimacy of the state, so that hegemony 
is not overtly threatened (Waterstone and de Leeuw, 2010). Such reconciliatory gestures may be 
offered at the same time that comparable egregious conduct is taking place. The moral and affec-
tive work of state remorse is important for the buy-in of Canadians, and also importantly paints 
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those who do not accept the apology or gestures of reconciliation as unreasonable and beyond 
assistance (Coulthard, 2014; Waterstone and de Leeuw, 2010). But forgiving a past injustice does 
not question whether the current park-led authority over the Jasper territory is just, and it ignores 
the ways in which First Nations continue to be dispossessed from their lands in the name of 
colonial-capitalist growth. Likewise, conceiving of and celebrating Indigenous presence on the 
land as spectral, from a different time long past, downplays present-day Indigenous agency as 
political actors (Cameron, 2008). This should underscore the antipolitics of the third and central 
component of Jasper’s endeavour towards “reconciliation,” the Jasper Aboriginal Forum, formed 
in 2006 as a way to help re-integrate First Nations into the park and improve indigenous en-
gagement in park planning and decision-making. The Forum meets twice a year in Jasper to dis-
cuss various issues within the park including new development proposals. Each nation is allowed 
to send 2 representatives to the meetings, and JNP pays the costs associated with transportation, 
food and accommodation for attendees. 
  The Forum followed the creation of the Upper Athabasca Elders Council in 2004. The 
Elders Council is composed of Elders of the descendants of the Metis homesteaders who were 
evicted from Jasper upon its establishment. Despite the fact that they don’t identify as one uni-
fied nation, descendants are treated as one and are only allowed to send 2 representatives even 
though there are over 20 Elders. Representation is also an issue for the Stoney Nakoda Nation, 
which has three separate bands with three separate Chiefs. Two representative slots for three 
chiefs does not give equal representation to the bands, thus the respondent from Stoney Nakoda 
explained that he can not attend the Forum meetings until this issue is addressed.  
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 These issues speak to many respondents’ concerns that the Forum has not been designed 
in a way that makes sense for First Nations. All Indigenous peoples that claim to have ties to the 
park are welcome to the table as long as they can prove their relation to the park in some way. 
There is silent dispute amongst Forum members as to which nations should and should not be 
involved. Furthermore, people from different nations have created historical societies or other 
foundations, and any such society is also allotted two seats at the Forum table. Some feel that 
only recognized First Nations should be involved in the Forum, not other bodies. Some original 
descendants feel that only the Metis homesteading families should be at the table along with a 
handful of other nations who actually have physical homes in the park. In this politically thorny 
context, Jasper management will not make the judgement call as to who should or should not be 
there, but many feel that the looseness of the Forum compromises its efficiency and capacity to 
realize goals.  
   
Anti-political Strategies 
 Although the creation of the Jasper Aboriginal Forum has created space for First Nations 
to provide input on park management, Jasper’s current approach to consultation is not very well-
received by many respondents. I suggest that the dissatisfaction with the approach stems from 
the fact that it relies on several strategies to neutralize political challenges from First Nations and 
legitimate the reproduction of colonial-capitalist relations of power. I argue that these strategies 
exemplify an antipolitical approach because they forestall political debate about the justness of 
Crown sovereign authority and give the appearance of consent by First Nations. This approach 
obscures the political-economic reasons that First Nations have been marginalised in both park 
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decision-making as well as in terms of benefits received from development projects in their tradi-
tional territories. The ongoing alienation of First Nations from their territories to facilitate capital 
gains for the park and private business partners is normalized and sustained rather than consulta-
tion providing alternatives to current state-led science-based decision-making and management 
practices.
No Discussion of Treaty or Aboriginal Rights  
  Jasper calls their approach to consultation ‘interest-based’ (Interview with Senior Manag-
er, 2014), meaning they only engage with groups who show an explicit interest in any particular 
development proposal. One very telling condition of the interest-based Forum process is that 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights will not be discussed in regards to any given project. This is, I think, 
the clearest example of the colonial antipolitics of consultation. The managers of JNP position 
Aboriginal and Treaty rights as outside of their mandate and hold the assertion that First Nations’ 
rights to the land were extinguished when the park was established. The Crown’s assumed sover-
eignty over park territory (and over Canadian territory more generally) is based on blatant denial 
of Indigenous peoples’ ability to form systems of law (Borrows, 2010) and blatant denial that 
First Nations held sovereign power over their territories upon contact with European colonizers 
(Coulthard, 2014). By refusing to discuss Treaty or Aboriginal rights and title, park management 
effectively forces First Nations to unquestioningly accept that the Crown has full decision-mak-
ing power within their traditional territories, normalizing their continued alienation. Political de-
bate around active land claims and the role that First Nations should have governing their territo-
ries is precluded and consultation becomes part of a nice gesture, what park managers call being 
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a ‘good neighbour’ (Interview with AWN, 2014). This is a very clear strategy on the part of the 
Crown to depoliticize colonial management structures within the park and to render consultation 
a technical exercise of providing information and gathering traditional knowledge of the area to 
be developed. 
  This approach erases First Nations’ longstanding political and legal traditions that are tied 
to the land that is now called Jasper National Park. Each nation has their own governance (politi-
cal, cultural and legal) traditions that are central to their visions of land management, steward-
ship and consultation. These include protocols that must be done whenever land is broken for 
development, such as pipe ceremonies to ask Mother Nature for forgiveness. Several nations ex-
pressed concern that their protocols for land management and consultation were not being re-
spected:  
 “We talk to the Creator before we even penetrate Mother Earth, because that    
 relationship is paramount to anything we do. We smoke the pipe to honour that    
 relationship. That's our mandate when it comes to the environment, and we're not even   
 getting that respect to go and have a pipe ceremony.” (Samson Cree Nation)  
 “Our Nations also have protocols and ceremonies that we use to understand, maintain   
 and balance the intent of the Treaties. Our protocols and ceremonial traditions give us   
 the tools and legitimacy within our territories to make decisions on how we treat the land   
 and its resources. Our processes pass on critical teachings and a management system   
 based on generations of knowledge and information about our lands… However,    
 Alberta’s approach to consultation has not involved any significant attempt to incorporate 
 our protocols and ceremonies into a mutually-agreeable approach.” (Confederacy of   
 Treaty Six First Nations Position Paper on Consultation) 
By continuing to deny the rights of traditional use enshrined in Aboriginal and Treaty rights, park 
managers both contravene and invisibilize Indigenous laws, politics and systems of knowledge. 
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Using the Forum as ‘Consultation’ 
 Because the consultation process is ‘interest-based’, unless Indigenous representatives 
speak up during a Forum meeting and request further consultation, their nation is often not con-
sulted regardless if development could impact their Aboriginal or Treaty rights. If a representa-
tive happens to miss a Forum meeting where development proposals are discussed, their nation 
may miss the opportunity to engage in the decision-making process altogether. 
  Several nations expect that they will be consulted separately outside of the Forum but are 
dismayed when there is no follow up unless they proactively seek out park management: 
 “We had a few situations where… we were thinking we would obviously be also asked   
 outside the Forum, so we just didn’t say much, and then [Parks] would come back to the   
 table and say, ‘Well all of these decisions have been made, and none of you guys said   
 anything about it.’ We just felt it was really inappropriate that the Forum be used for  
  consultation. They've always been adamant that it's not, but it was starting to shake out   
 that way.” (AWN)  
 “They did a brief presentation on what they wanted to do with the Glacier Skywalk and   
 they asked for some feedback. The first thing that I remember one of the members   
 saying was, ‘This meeting is not consultation. It's not regarded as consultation.’ What   
 Jasper likes to do is have one or two meetings and say that’s consultation." (Stoney   
 Nakoda Nation)  
 “They try to use it as a consultation process and we have always indicated to whoever   
 comes to the table you can't do that, that's the first thing we have recorded. If they want   
 to do true consultation they have to go back to the communities individually.” (Sucker   
 Creek First Nation)  
There is clearly disagreement between JNP and Forum members as to what responsibility Parks 
Canada holds towards ensuring each nation receives individual consultation, and what that 
should entail. 
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  Two respondents (from Alexis Nakota Sioux Nation and Sucker Creek First Nation) had a 
more positive view of the process. They believe it is the responsibility of First Nations to be 
proactive and ensure that they are meaningfully consulted apart from the Forum: 
 “I guess if we didn't seek them out that's probably what would have happened with us as   
 well, them coming to the Forum and doing a presentation. That's the point where you   
 start going after things… If you're proactive with consultation, you can pounce on that   
 [opportunity] and get your own wheels rolling.” (Alexis Nakota Sioux Nation)  
Both respondents secured follow-up meetings with Brewster Travel and both spoke highly of the 
company and felt they were accommodating of their wants and concerns. I will explain why this 
proactive approach is difficult for many nations later in this section, but in addition to capacity 
issues (Mabee and Hoberg, 2006; Waterstone and de Leeuw, 2010), many respondents felt that 
Jasper’s use of the Forum to gauge interest in more formal consultation represents a deficiency in 
their legal duty to consult.   11
  Similarly, many respondents felt excluded from the Maligne Tours consultation process. 
When Brewster Travel proposed the Glacier Skywalk, company representatives came to a Forum 
meeting to present their idea and follow up with interested nations. For the Maligne Tours hotel, 
Parks Canada presented the proposal at a Forum meeting but told Maligne Tours not to engage 
with Forum members until later stages of the approval process. As a result, many nations were 
confused about the process and were not aware that they needed to seek out management to re-
 The respondent from Asini Wachi Cree Band explained his dissatisfaction with the consultation process for the 11
Glacier Skywalk in relation to his understanding of the duty to consult: ‘‘In no way can any of these informal dis-
cussions be considered as Consultation. Like other parties, we have a Consultation Protocol. Such protocols have 
been in existence for decades. In no case were these protocols followed by Brewster, nor was there a Consultation 
report prepared and/or signed off on by any of the aboriginal parties. . .Given the history of Brewster’s interaction 
with the aboriginal community, and the history of this project, we cannot accept the precept that Brewster ‘Consult-
ed’ with the aboriginal community.We consider that this constitutes a Deficiency in terms of the Supreme Court 
Duty To Consult requirements of the Federal Government. We also believe that Parks Canada was Deficient in ac-
cepting Brewster’s preliminary reports, given the lack of valid consultation.’’
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ceive further information and consultation, so only three out of two dozen were able to provide 
initial input.  
  The respondent from AWN explained that they received a letter inviting them to the open 
house with Maligne Tours in Edmonton after the event had taken place. She sent the date 
stamped letter to JNP to question them on this. “They were just kind of like ‘Oh, sorry, that's the 
way it shook out.’ So we said, ‘Well then how can we engage in this process?’ And if we hadn't 
asked, we never would have been asked,” she said. This illustrates one of the problems with us-
ing the Forum to gauge interest in more structured consultation, that of funding and capacity for 
First Nations. While Parks Canada pays for all travel, food and accommodation costs for Forum 
attendees, if a nation wants to engage in more meaningful individual consultation on a project 
they must bear those costs themselves unless the proponent steps up to cover them. To Brewster 
Travel’s credit, they did cover the costs associated with consultation for nations that had the 
chance to do site visits. Since Maligne Tours was instructed not to engage initially, nations who 
wanted to do site visits with Elders and do Traditional Land Use studies had to bear all of those 
costs themselves. Such costs can be substantial and can exclude groups from the opportunity to 
meaningfully engage.  
  In assuming nations will take it upon themselves to engage in consultation with the park, 
the current approach ignores the capacity issues and economic hardships facing many First Na-
tions that stem from dispossession from their lands. Only those nations with the capacity to stay 
on top of all park affairs are able to have their concerns heard, while the rest remain uninformed 
and uninvolved regardless if a project could impact their Aboriginal or Treaty rights. While in-
creased funding alone will not transcend colonial power dynamics, the antipolitics of consulta-
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tion invisibilizes structural racism and inequality as well as colonial decision-making power, 
shifting responsibility for consultation onto the nations themselves. If nations are not being con-
sulted individually regarding development in their traditional territories, the approach also ar-
guably eschews the park’s political and legal Duty to Consult potentially impacted First Nations. 
  
Integrating Consultation into Existing State-led Science-based Management Structures 
 Reconciliation and consultation processes should involve both parties in designing and 
agreeing upon what that process will entail (Land, 2014). If the terms of recognition and recon-
ciliation are dictated by the colonizers to the colonized, consultation will not “significantly modi-
fy, let alone transcend, the breadth of power at play in colonial relationships” (Coulthard, 2014: 
loc753). Many respondents explained that Jasper has dictated the entire process instead of gath-
ering input from First Nations on what a desirable and effective procedure would be. Further-
more, there is no one standard process that First Nations can expect Jasper management to fol-
low, rather each seems to change on a case by case basis. The result is confusion on how and 
when to engage, who is responsible for consultation, whether consultation costs will be covered 
fully or in part by the proponent, how disputes will be resolved, and, if a project is approved, 
what kind of follow up post-construction can be expected. For some this can create a situation 
where pursuing consultation seems like too much work with uncertain results. 
  Several respondents felt that their input is downplayed due to the fact that they have to 
engage on Parks Canada’s terms or not at all. The respondent from Confederacy of Treaty Six 
Nations explained, “We were there for appearances, we weren't there with a legitimate voice to 
be considered, because everything was prescribed. The discussion is framed by them, the issues 
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are chosen by them, the agenda is set by them, so we have to speak on their terms or we don't 
speak at all.” When asked if she felt meaningfully consulted on the Glacier Skywalk project, the 
respondent from Samson Cree explained that she did not because she did not agree to the process 
to begin with. “Consultation is by their definition. They didn't even take the time to find out what 
is Samson's definition of consultation,” she said. 
  As park managers direct consultation, park managers decide at what point they will in-
form First Nations about a given project, which most respondents feel is far too late in the ap-
proval process to allow for meaningful consultation. At times many feel that projects are brought 
forward seemingly after decisions have been made. There was a palpable sense that the Glacier 
Skywalk was already going to go ahead by the time it was brought to Forum: 
 “By the time that was brought to the Elders, it was basically approved. It's really just   
 about kind of mitigating if we knew of any graves in the area or if it was sacred to   
 us.” (Descendent of Moberly Family A)  
  “With the Skywalk, when we did start getting involved and once we realized they were   
 going to go ahead with it anyway... We went in there frustrated and we left even more   
 frustrated. It's really sad when you know that all that's happening is they're going to ask   
 us for the sake of asking. Just so they can give the appearance of "Yeah, we asked   
 them." (Confederation of Treaty Six Nations)  
 “Brewster's plans had been made, and that was that. Brewster's interest in "consultation"   
 seems to have been only in obtaining aboriginal approval and/or obtaining aboriginal   
 information that could enhance their tour objectives. There was no interest in modifying   
 the plans.” (Asini Wachi Cree Band)  
In stark contrast, the respondents from Alexis Sioux Nakota Nation and Sucker Creek First Na-
tion had very positive experiences with the Skywalk consultation. Both nations received one on 
one consultation with Brewster and negotiated terms that would allow each nation to support the 
project. Most respondents, however, felt cut out of the process. 
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  When nations are only involved in the late stages of the approval process, management is 
largely interested in relevant Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) or knowledge of sites of 
cultural importance in the area that either need to be avoided or could be incorporated into the 
tourist attraction. Similar to the totem pole gesture, First Nations’ cultural symbols and practices 
continue to be coopted into the tourist imaginary of Jasper National Park whilst their political 
and physical presence on the land is erased. This is a very particular kind of inclusionary politics, 
where non-threatening aspects of First Nations’ cultures are celebrated to give Jasper the appear-
ance of doing due diligence. However, Parks Canada tends to prioritize expert driven science in 
decision-making, so often important Indigenous input regarding spiritual significance of place or 
even TEK that calls into question scientific evidence is discarded (Ellis, 2005; Nadasdy, 1999; 
Sandlos, 2014). Since the early colonial erasure of First Nations from parks, the worldview treat-
ing nature as a playground managed separately from humans through science-based calculation 
has displaced alternative understandings of human/non-human interrelationships (Loo, 2006; 
MacLaren, 2007). Science has long been and continues to be a tool of colonial antipolitics. Inte-
grating indigenous input into existing state-led science-based management and decision-making 
structures thus functions to downplay indigenous concerns, allowing nations only a narrow win-
dow of opportunity to participate in decision-making with the park, on Parks’ terms. 
  There is also a lack of transparency around how the decision itself is made on any given 
project. It is unclear how many nations out of all those that participate in the Forum have to be 
consulted with individually and support a project for management to report that indeed First Na-
tions were meaningfully consulted. Several respondents felt that this is purposely left unclear and 
consultation is simply a formality used to convey the appearance of consent to managers in Ot-
!121
tawa. “It's all formality, is what it is,” said Descendant of Moberly Family B. “Most of Canada 
believes that yes, we were consulted, but they don't know the reality.” The respondent from Con-
federation of Treaty 6 Nations similarly explained, “They manufacture consent. They give the 
illusion that they've consulted with us and everything is okay.” 
  These selectively inclusionary politics allow Parks Canada to appear benevolent without 
giving up any decision-making power over contested territories. Indigenous input is coopted to 
facilitate their ongoing alienation from their lands and further capitalist accumulation through 
corporate-government partnerships. Management tries to satisfy the duty to consult through 
mechanisms designed to work within existing management structures, not to question those 
structures themselves. As management can use Indigenous input to report that First Nations have 
been consulted, sadly consultation often works to legitimize decisions made in the centre.  
Incentivization and Favouritism 
  Büscher (2010) argues that one aspect of antipolitics within a neoliberal political econo-
my is that debate around the equitable distribution of power and benefits is replaced by the quan-
tification and trading of interests in order to circumvent ideological conflicts. In JNP debates 
around more equitable power sharing, ideological conflicts around what makes the park signifi-
cant (spiritual and cultural values versus science-based valuation), and debates around unequal 
distributions of rights and benefits between First Nations and park authorities are obscured by the 
colonial antipolitics of consultation and are often replaced by the trading of interests between 
groups who have the capacity to engage in consultation and Parks Canada/the proponents. The 
respondent from Sucker Creek First Nation explained that Elders of the community had many 
!122
concerns about the Glacier Skywalk’s potential impacts on wildlife and vegetation in the area, 
among other things. He explained that although Brewster could not sufficiently mitigate many of 
the concerns raised by Elders, the community negotiated terms that would allow them to support 
the project. Alexis Nakota Sioux Nation negotiated terms of their own, including a promise for 
employment opportunities for a few of their members. Currently there are no indigenous people 
working at the Glacier Skywalk, and it is unknown whether this will transpire in the near future. 
Similarly, the respondent from AWN explained that potential opportunities to sell crafts at Ma-
ligne Lake were offered to members of the Forum, which she saw as a way to incentivize support 
from various nations. Many respondents explained that employment or economic opportunities 
are often suggested as potential opportunities but are rarely if ever followed up on.  
  “Subsequent to the stating of our position Brewster no longer contacted us. However, 
they did continue discussion with some of the other Forum members who had been more accept-
ing,” said the respondent from Asini Wachi Cree Band. “[For] these they offered to finance an 
Elders Tour to the site, financed a blessing ceremony by these groups, offered wall display space 
at the site, and offered to finance a few other of their undertakings.” Many respondents feel that 
often Parks Canada or proponents will offer incentives to those that appear open to supporting 
development, particularly Elders of different groups. Respondents felt that Parks Canada tries to 
“pull the wool over Elders’ eyes” (Descendant of Moberly Family A) by taking them up in heli-
copter rides, offering them gifts or privileges, etc. 
  Most respondents felt that JNP chooses to deal more closely with certain groups and con-
tacts that are generally more receptive to park initiatives and exclude those that present chal-
lenges. Some respondents like those from Alexis Sioux and Sucker Creek felt that they are al-
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ways kept in the loop and are able to provide input on park initiatives, while the majority feel 
that they are often in the dark on important projects and don’t feel included in the decision-mak-
ing process. Many respondents felt that this favouritism and incentivization culminates in a ‘di-
vide and conquer’ approach, where Parks Canada and the private proponents try to isolate those 
that will be more receptive to development plans and negotiate terms to gain their support. This 
can cause rifts between groups or between members of a community. These kinds of monetary 
incentives to accept plans designed by government and industry detract from and reify unequal 
colonial-capitalist relations. First Nations may gain some potential economic returns if they ac-
cept and support park-made commercial development plans, but the park’s unquestioned authori-
ty to make those plans on First Nations’ lands remains intact. 
Discussion 
  JNP’s antipolitical approach to Indigenous consultation employs several measures to con-
tain challenges to the (neo)colonial status quo and to legitimize decisions made on private devel-
opment projects. Placing the onus on First Nations to come forward and request individual con-
sultation removes accountability from JNP and represents a loose interpretation of the Crown’s 
Duty to Consult. It also obscures the historical colonial dispossession and political-economic 
marginalization of First Nations associated with the establishment of the park and assumes that 
First Nations have the same capacity as park management to engage in consultation work. This 
approach excludes nations that lack the capacity to be proactive on park issues as consultation 
offices are overworked and underfunded. This consequently reinforces existing inequalities both 
between nations and between Indigenous peoples and park management, particularly since the 
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economic benefits of development projects accrue to JNP and private industry and not to First 
Nations. Furthermore, by positioning Aboriginal or Treaty rights as outside of their mandate, 
Jasper’s approach leaves no room for political discussions around to what extent First Nations 
with traditional territories that overlap with the park should have sovereign decision-making au-
thority. 
  Further, the consultation process itself remains colonial as final decision-making authori-
ty always rests with park authorities. It is designed to work within existing structures and thus 
consultation is often ‘rendered technical’(Li, 2007); managers gather input and TEK to meet 
consultation report requirements, but existing state decision-making authority and the assumed 
superiority of scientific knowledge is presupposed. For those nations that appear more receptive 
to park initiatives, trading of interests within existing relations of power again helps to sway sen-
timent in favour of development. Dealing more closely with more agreeable contacts and exclud-
ing those that present significant challenges to park management likewise serves to maintain the 
status quo and minimize the significance of Indigenous concerns. 
  Several respondents called Jasper’s approach ‘colonial’ and question why other parks in 
Canada have effective co-management arrangements whilst in Jasper Indigenous input is merely 
sought in the spirit of being a ‘good neighbour.’ “I absolutely couldn't imagine this happening on 
Gwaii Haanas. You couldn't do anything without going to the Haida, so why is it different here? 
Shouldn't all parks have to have the same standard in their relationship with Aboriginal people? 
Why does Jasper get to act in a way that's very colonial when other parks absolutely can't?,” 
questioned Descendant from Moberly Family A. The respondent from Kelly Creek First Nation 
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similarly expressed, “Not much has changed since the first white settlers came to Jasper, the 
same colonial attitude continues to exist with the JNP officials.” 
  Ultimately the current approach facilitates development projects that benefit industry and 
government but have little benefit for First Nations. Many respondents are appalled at the fact 
that there are no Indigenous people working within Parks Canada in Jasper and few if any work-
ing within the Jasper townsite. Most respondents feel that the Aboriginal Liaison position with 
the park should be filled by an Indigenous person. “Until they get people to actually work in 
parks as liaison officers that are Aboriginal, they will never understand. They will never, ever 
understand. And I mean that with great respect,” said Descendant from Moberly Family B. “If 
you had a person that was Aboriginal in there, they would know certain questions to ask, they 
would know when to pursue certain questions and things like that.” 
  Respondents felt that hiring Indigenous people in prominent positions in Parks Canada 
should be a top priority. Furthermore, all respondents question why industry is able to profit eco-
nomically from development projects within First Nations’ traditional territories while they can-
not:  
 “The community has always questioned why there are not more opportunities for    
 Aboriginal groups among the private sector in the park. I know there has been    
 discussions along these lines of tourism opportunities, visitor centres and partnerships,   
 but nothing has ever really come to fruition.” (AWN)  
 “If more of the nations were taking part or had more of the benefits that are going on with 
 private industry then we'd probably have a different view, but by and large we're left out.   
 If you go to Banff or Jasper, show me a First Nation shop or someone who is benefiting   
 from the tourism industry. If you can't show me anybody, then you know where all of the   
 benefits are going.” (Stoney Nakoda Nation)  
 “The private sector... I think their presence needs to be minimized if not completely shut   
 down. I don't believe development should happen.. But any further development that   
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 happens I believe it should be in partnership with the First Nations to give them some of   
 the opportunities that they've never had in those parks. The private sector should be in   
 partnership with the nations, otherwise they shouldn't be allowed to do any further   
 development.” (Alexis Nakota Sioux First Nation)  
This case mirrors other studies on market-based conservation where inequality results as the ma-
jority of the benefits associated with ventures within parks are captured by elites, government 
and industry (Fletcher, 2012; West, 2004; Young, 2003). Jasper’s antipolical approach to consul-
tation thus reinforces (neo)colonial neoliberal political economic relations where the Crown’s 
sovereignty is fortified and capital generated on Indigenous territories is captured by private in-
terests and Parks Canada. While hiring Indigenous people as Aboriginal Liaisons and providing 
more economic opportunities in the park are important first steps towards a more equitable and 
respectful relationship, these changes alone will not transcend the colonial power dynamics at 
play, and may even detract from or serve to invisibilize the further entrenchment of unequal 
colonial relations. Without the transfer of land and decision-making authority, the colonial an-
tipolitics of consultation will continue to minimize First Nations’ roles in decision-making to fa-
cilitate their continued dispossession in the name of industry-led development.  
Conclusion  
  Uniting the theoretical lines of thinking about antipolitics and colonial-capitalist exploita-
tion, this chapter provides a grounded example of the interrelationships between antipolitics, po-
litical economy and coloniality; how they operate in tandem and are mutually reinforcing. Al-
though First Nations in Jasper have not given assent to the claims to territorial authority ad-
vanced by Parks Canada, nor have they given assent to the way in which consultation is sought, 
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their physical alienation from the park makes their present day political agency largely invisible 
to the settler population of Jasper and surrounding areas, who unknowingly give assent to these 
practices through their activism around ‘wilderness’ preservation and their ignorance around In-
digenous consultation mechanisms. Brewster Travel did not relay Indigenous concerns to public 
actors in Jasper in their report synthesizing comments received during public and Indigenous 
consultation. Maligne Tours did include some Indigenous feedback in their report synthesizing 
public comment, although respondents felt that it was ‘watered down’. With little to no public 
visibility of Indigenous concerns and claims to their traditional territories, public actors in the 
Jasper area aren’t actually given the opportunity to refute the colonial antipolitics of Indigenous 
consultation. Since most nations in the area are overworked and underfunded, they often can not 
stay on top of park affairs and certainly do not have the capacity to take Parks to court over im-
proper consultation on many of these private proposals. There therefore seems to be little conse-
quence for Parks Canada in not meeting the Duty to Consult, and Indigenous concerns and com-
plaints can be quietly swept under the rug. While the Forum was established in theory as a way 
to enroll previously excluded First Nations into the decision-making process, they’ve been 
brought into the process in completely depoliticized and largely invisibilized ways. The original 
colonial power dynamics remain at play, replicated and stabilized through consultation. 
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Chapter 5 
The Practice of Politics in Doi Suthep-Pui National Park 
Introduction 
 Like in Canada, conservation in Thailand is an always changing achievement produced 
through perpetual contestation. Imported ‘wilderness’ ideology here clashed with local realities 
as forests, particularly the northern upland forests like those in Chiang Mai province, are largely 
inhabited by ethnic minorities with alternative understandings of nature and human’s place with-
in broader ecosystems. Although park authorities in Thailand have historically taken a heavy 
hand (Chusak, 2008; Leblond, 2010; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995), imposing fortress conserva-
tion has not been a uniform or frictionless process, particularly in the northern region. Counter-
measures have been taken by those groups who faced livelihood restrictions or even eviction 
from parks (Anan, 1998; Pinkaew, 2002), and alliances between academics, NGOs and rural 
communities have been working to change perceptions of forest-dwelling communities from 
‘forest destroyers’ to ‘forest protectors’ (Forsyth and Walker, 2008). This struggle continues to-
day as urban deep green environmentalists continue to either blame environmental degradation 
on minorities or simply believe humans have no place in ‘nature’ (Forsyth, 2003b; 2007). Impor-
tantly, discourses like ““hill tribes”, “nature” and “conservation” in Thailand are not only con-
structions but are constantly “under construction””(Pinkaew, 2002: i), and thus the authority of 
officials to enact particular conservation measures is similarly malleable and contingent. 
 This contingent authority is well illustrated in the way that the Chiang Mai cable car con-
troversy has unfolded since the 1980s. Civil society groups and environmentalist monks have 
been challenging the idea on environmental, religious, and socio-economic grounds for decades, 
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and each time —including the most recent push in 2013— networks of opponents have been 
successful in shelving the project (Darlington, 1999; Pholpoke, 1998). Like in Jasper, proponents 
employed several anti-political strategies to fashion the appearance of consensus, attempting to 
reduce and control public debate and authorize development. However, in this case there were no 
compelling budgetary pressures that would compel approval —in fact, by most estimations the 
cable car would have cost the Thai government more than it would have made. This important 
factor combined with the nuances of Thai politics and civil society in Chiang Mai have led this 
project to be shelved yet again.  
 This chapter will explore 1) the ways in which proponents and opponents mobilize and 
attempt to stabilize truth claims in their contestations, and 2) the strategies employed and the po-
litical economic circumstances that shape the degree to which public and Indigenous actors are 
able to participate in decision-making. I argue that ultimately the unique political economy of 
conservation here proves unfavourable to development, and thus opponents in Chiang Mai have 
had greater success in shelving the cable car project and feel that they have considerable power 
in decision-making. Steady federal funding to the national parks reduces pressure to streamline 
the approval process, thus despite having relatively weaker consultation mechanisms and living 
under a repressive military government, local and Indigenous peoples here feel relatively em-
powered. 
Conservation and Neoliberalisation as Sites of Struggle in Thailand 
 Political and economic trends and popular discourses have shifted the terrain of conserva-
tion and development in Thailand. The state decided to adopt the British-influenced Burmese/
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Indian forestry model and began appropriating forest lands for commercial forestry in the late 
1800s, largely for teak production and export (Vandergeest and Peluso, 2006). Through a process 
of ‘territorialization’ the Thai state identified forest lands of national interest, drew borders 
around them, and prescribed appropriate behaviours and economic activities within them (Van-
dergeest and Peluso, 1995). In the northern highlands, the production and dissemination of dis-
courses that ‘racialized’ forest-dwelling ethnic minorities as non-Thai, as susceptible to potential 
communist indoctrination, and as illegal opium producers legitimated their expulsion from these 
areas via state-led displacement projects (Leblond, 2010; Lohmann, 1999; Vandergeest, 2003). In 
the late 1980s, the priorities of the Royal Forestry Department shifted from extraction to conser-
vation. The rise in environmentalism in the 1980s prompted the official logging ban in 1989, the 
same year the Thai cabinet passed a strict watershed conservation policy (Anan, 1998). ‘Conser-
vation’, influenced both by transnational science-centred discourses and notions of what it means 
to be ‘civilised’ in Thai society, then became a legitimizing factor in the expulsion of ethnic mi-
norities or the strict restrictions placed on how they could make their livelihoods within protected 
forests (Chusak, 2008). As explained in Chapter 2, this particular understanding of nature and the 
Thai national park regulatory framework have colonial roots, despite the fact that Thailand was 
never formerly colonized. Thai forest laws were modelled after British systems in Burma and 
India, and protected area regulations were influenced by colonial wildlife regulations and the 
American national park ideal (Vandergeest, 1996; Vandergeest and Peluso, 2006). The eviction 
and/or restriction of ethnic minorities’ activities in conservation zones also has parallels with the 
treatment of Indigenous nations in conservation zones in other former colonies (in the Americas, 
Australia, and parts of Africa). 
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  The ability of ethnic minorities to remain living in protected areas was a hard-won battle. 
Networks of rural farmers, academics and NGOs worked to dismantle the dualistic understand-
ing of nature/culture undergirding Thai conservation practice, and to change the perception of 
ethnic minorities from ‘forest destroyers’ to ‘forest guardians’ (Forsyth and Walker, 2008). While 
this helped to shift the discourse around people in forests, at times this locked communities in the 
‘traditional’ past, or privileged certain ethnic groups over others (Walker and Farrelly, 2008). In 
order for communities to remain in protected areas, swidden cultivation and hunting or gathering 
forest resources were banned in favour of paddy rice cultivation on smaller plots of land, and in-
creasingly market engagement became the ‘solution’ to park-people conflict, most commonly in 
terms of cash cropping or ecotourism (Dressler and Roth, 2011; Youdelis, 2013). Ethnic minori-
ties continue to be scapegoats for environmental degradation, but the preferred ‘solution’ has 
shifted from expulsion to market integration. Although critiqued by social scientists for repro-
ducing inequality, degrading environments and contributing to global climate change, tourism 
has become commonly accepted as a low-impact alternative to other land uses such as agricul-
ture (Youdelis, 2013). 
 Conservation was influenced somewhat by neoliberalisation since the 1980s, being par-
tially rescaled to include local communities, or at least to grant them the ability to start their own 
entrepreneurial business ventures within certain parks. However the state is still central to the 
operation of parks, and this rescaling has largely excluded the private sector. Private guides can 
bring tour groups into parks for either day trips or overnight excursions, but private sector devel-
opment of accommodations or other attractions within parks is officially prohibited. Funding to 
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the national parks has been modestly but continually increasing, thus looking to private operators 
to recoup costs has thus far not been a major concern or a very viable option.  
  Neoliberalisation at the state level has also unfolded quite uniquely in Thailand, as it has 
in many Southeast Asian states where neoliberalisation has awkwardly mingled with develop-
mentalism (Hill et al., 2011). Some argue that the implementation of neoliberal policies has been 
patchy at best and quite openly opposed (Glassman et al., 2008; Thongchai, 2008). LaRocco 
(2011) argues that the Thai experience showcases the Polanyian double movement in action as a 
result of the failure of neoliberal policies to provide socioeconomic rights and safety nets to 
those most vulnerable. Others argue that certain ‘neoliberal’ ideals have advanced significantly in 
the post-fordist era, including “flexibilization of labour, the application of the logic of manage-
ment to public administration, and a redefining of citizens as entrepreneurs” (Sopranzetti, 2017: 
80; see also Dressler and Roth, 2011; Duffy and Moore, 2010).  
  Much of Thai environmentalism in the 1980s was anti-capitalist or anti-modernity, with 
people reacting to changes brought on by rapid economic growth. Thai citizens blamed the crisis 
that ensued after Asian financial collapse of 1997 on the IMF’s pro-market structural adjustment 
programs, an over reliance on Foreign Direct Investment and the domination of transnational 
corporations (Khoo Boo Teik, 2010). Thanks to the IMF’s imposition of austerity measures, the 
GDP fell 7.9% in 1997, 12.3% in 1998, and 7% the first half of 1999, making the crisis known 
nationally as wikrit IMF (IMF crisis) (Sopranzetti, 2017). This made social movements and civil 
society more candidly antagonistic to neoliberal forms of governance, provoking backlash from 
civil society, unions, intellectuals, NGOs and the rural poor (Thongchai, 2008).  
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 Post-crisis, the Thai Rak Party led by billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra (associated with the 
Red Shirts, see below) rose to tremendous popularity by providing a series of Keynesian mea-
sures such as debt forgiveness for rural farmers, national health care, and subsidized electricity 
(Khoo Boo Teik, 2010; Glassman et al., 2008). Although the TRT took a protectionist approach 
in some regards, the party also “made considerable concessions to transnational capital, includ-
ing moving toward a number of FTAs and reopening the case for privatization of various state 
enterprises” (Glassman et al., 2008: 342). Thaksin was also pro-market in many ways, noted for 
projects like the One Tambon, One Product scheme and the Million Baht program where credit 
was much more readily available to rural residents. “Overall, this system was aimed at fostering 
universal participation in capitalism by making small business and low income people into free 
entrepreneurs —a classic neoliberal project— but it did so by expanding welfare provisions to 
protect these entrepreneurs from unexpected difficulties” (Sopranzetti, 2017: 81). In other words, 
the post-fordist era in Thailand espoused both neoliberal and developmental ideals, promoting 
individual ‘freedom’ and entrepreneurship while simultaneously expanding the state’s role in 
regulating the national economy and providing social welfare. 
 While some have argued that the tense and at times violent divisions in Thai society be-
tween Red Shirts (associated with Thaksin’s parties, broadly encompassing rural peoples, certain 
social and environmental NGOs, and left-leaning academics) and Yellow Shirts (associated with 
the monarchy, broadly encompassing the urban middle class, military, and NGOs) follow anti-
neoliberal and neoliberal lines, respectively (Glassman et al., 2008), the picture is far more com-
plex. Yellow Shirts are broadly aligned with NGOs, which are understood as ‘flanking organiza-
tions’ under neoliberalism (Castree, 2008), however as explained above, Red Shirts aligned with 
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Thaksin espouse many openly pro-market reforms. Although Thaksin did champion redistribu-
tive schemes as well, it’s not possible to characterize either Red or Yellow as decidedly ‘neolib-
eral’. The point is that neolbieralisation in Thailand has unfolded in inconsistent and quite con-
tradictory ways.  
  But Thaksin’s focus on (some degree of) redistribution and the rural masses made him 
considerable enemies in the elite forces, including the military and the monarchy, and he was 
ousted by a military coup in 2006, with new leaders seeking to dismantle many of the TRT re-
forms. While Thaksin was in exile, his allies formed the People’s Power Party (PPP) led by 
Thaksin’s sister, Yingluck Shinawatra. Promising more aid to the rural countryside, she was 
elected by popular vote in 2011, only to be ousted yet again by a military coup in 2014 (Khoo 
Boo Teik, 2010). Led by Prayuth Chan-ocha, this new regime (The National Council for Peace 
and Order (NCPO)) is flagrantly oppressive, silencing dissent through arrests and threats and 
making social movement mobilization illegal. They dissolved the 2007 Constitution, and their 
revised Constitution that passed by referendum in 2016 has faced widespread critique for con-
centrating power in the hands of the military and impoverishing Thai democracy (Baird et al., 
2016; Kornkritch, 2016). 
 With so much back and forth between protectionism and neoliberalisation, and so much 
animosity between different social classes, it’s clear to see that ‘actually existing’ neoliberalisa-
tion here was not imported unabridged but arose from “selective and pragmatic adaptations of 
policies and measures conducive to neoliberal agendas and favourable to domestic 
capital” (Khoo Boo Teik, 2010: 6). The poorer classes in Thailand have not been afraid to voice 
their discontent with policies that favour the upward accumulation of capital, and to this day 
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Western capitalism and big business are met with suspicion and derision by a sizeable portion of 
Thai society (Thongchai, 2008).  
  This is certainly a political economic history that is distinct from the Canadian experi-
ence. The responsibilities around public and Indigenous consultation and participation in parks 
also differ greatly between both field sites. As mentioned in the introduction, the Department of 
National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNPWPC) is not required to consult with the 
public or with Indigenous groups on the majority of undertakings within parks. “By law, any-
thing done in a national park, we don't have to ask anybody. By law. Because the national parks 
belong to the central government, to the country, not the Chiang Mai province. Otherwise we 
wouldn't call it a national park!”, said Plodprasop Suraswadi, the ‘father of the DNPWPC’, as he 
calls himself. But he admitted that “if we want to see a project last long, no one can look after it 
better than those that live nearby, so that's why we often do ask them.” In practice, consultation 
or some kind of public engagement happens on a sort of ad hoc basis, depending on the nature of 
the project and the likelihood of public push-back. For sizeable projects that require an Environ-
mental Impact Assessment (EIA), public engagement is mandatory and often structured in the 
form of public hearings (Manowong and Ogunlala, 2006; Swangjang et al., 2004). 
  In order to understand public participation in Thailand we must understand how decen-
tralization has unfolded and consequently how Thai political life is structured. Although decen-
tralization is theoretically linked with “democratization processes, participatory politics, local 
empowerment, and social and environmental justice” (Vandergeest and Chusak, 2002), in prac-
tice these promises are not often realized. The 1994 Tambon Administration Act (TAO) decen-
tralized forest management authority to local governments, and this was further supported by the 
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Thai Constitution of 1997 which states that local peoples and organizations should participate in 
managing their natural resources. The economic crisis of 1997-1998 led to decentralization plan-
ning being open to collaboration with the private sector. The government began a Public Sector 
Adjustment Policy, reviewing the role of public agencies, and decided that all work that can be 
carried out by the private sector should be privatized, and all work that can be done by local peo-
ple and organizations should also be transferred (Pragtong, 2000). The Government Decentral-
ization Act of 1999 defined responsibilities for different administrative levels from the central 
government down to the smallest administrative level, the tambon (Fisher, 2010).  
  Administration for urban and rural districts differ slightly. Thai rural society is now bro-
ken down as follows: Every village has an elected Headman (phuyaiban), who stays in office 
until he or she is 60 years old. Ten to twenty villages together form a Tambon, with a Head of the 
Headmen (kamnan) elected from among all phuyaiban within the Tambon. The Tambon Admin-
istrative Organization (TAO) is comprised of a legislative branch, which is a council assembly 
made up of 2 councillors from each village, and an executive branch, led by the TAO Clerk. The 
kamman used to be the main authority at the Tambon level, however in recent decades the au-
thority and wealth of the TAO and the TAO Clerk have grown dramatically, and now the Clerk 
and the kamnan often have overlapping authority. About ten Tambons make up a District, run by 
the Nai Amphoe, and about ten Districts make up a Province, led by a governor who is not elect-
ed but appointed by the central government. The four Tambons involved in the cable car contro-
versy and consultations are Suthep, Nong Khwai, Ban Pong, and Mae Hia. Ban Pong and Nong 
Khwai are part of Hang Dong District, and thus fall under this rural system of admin. Suthep and 
Mae Hia both belong to Mueang Chiang Mai District, and thus fall under urban admin. Urban 
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administration is organized similarly to rural administration, however there are 16 Tambons that 
make up Mueang Chiang Mai District, and the district contains one city-municipality (Chiang 
Mai) which encompasses Si Phum, Phra Sing, Haiya, Chang Moi, Chang Khlan, Wat Ket, and Pa 
Tan subdistricts as well as portions of Chang Phueak, Suthep, Pa Daet, Nong Hoi, Tha Sala, 
Nong Pa Khrang, and Fa Ham subdistricts. The city of Chiang Mai has greater authority to self-
govern than do other districts or subdistricts in Chiang Mai province (Various interviews, 2015). 
Because the cable car would begin in Hang Dong district and would cut through portions of 
Mueang Chiang Mai district, the governor of the province, the nai amphoe, and kamnan of the 
four affected subdistricts would be involved in decision-making. The national park authority 
would be involved in public consultation but would not be involved in final decision-making.  
  Vandergeest and Chusak (2010) write “If power is devolved to actors who are not ac-
countable to their constituents, or accountable only to themselves or superior authorities within 
the government, then it is unlikely that decentralization will achieve its stated goal or be democ-
ratic”(5). In other words, decentralization is not necessarily democratizing. The phuyaiban, kam-
nan, and nai amphoe all have downward accountability to varying extents in that they are elect-
ed, although once elected a phuyaiban will retain office until retirement. However the Governor 
is appointed and thus has upward accountability, and he or she has greater decision-making au-
thority with regards to mega-projects within the province. Additionally, agencies dealing with 
contentious natural resource issues often utilize cabinet resolutions to “facilitate or force cooper-
ation across ministries” (Garden et al., 2010: 154). Cabinet decrees are top-down mechanisms 
often absent of much public deliberation, and thus can be rather undemocratic. The cable car 
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project was slated to be a Cabinet decision, likely due to the intensity of the controversy sur-
rounding it.  
Co-evolution of Social Activism and Conservation Practice in Chiang Mai 
  Despite repressive military rule, civil society is quite lively and organized, particularly in 
Chiang Mai, with many NGOs dedicated to either deep green (protecting forests from people) or 
red-green (championing the rights of rural ethnic communities to both live in and care for 
forests) objectives (Forsyth, 2003b). Although these two strands of environmental activists dis-
agree fundamentally on the place of humans in non-human worlds, they find uneasy alliances 
around certain issues, such as the cable car proposal advanced by the semi-private Pinkanakorn 
Development Agency (PDA).  
  Plodprasop Suraswadi, former Director General of the Royal Forestry Department (and 
First Director General of the reformed Parks Department), takes credit for the cable car idea. He 
also spearheaded the controversial Night Safari in Chiang Mai, opened in 2006, which had to 
receive special allowance from her Majesty the Queen as it was originally built within the na-
tional park. The area covered by the Night Safari was declared a ‘special economic zone’, ex-
empted from the park and from paying tax. The Night Safari caused a great deal of upset with 
surrounding communities, due to noise, pollution and broken promises of economic opportuni-
ties, and with the people of Chiang Mai concerned with how the animals were being treated. At 
the time of research, the PDA ran the Night Safari, the adjacent Botanical Gardens, and the Chi-
ang Mai International Exhibition and Convention Centre, and would have added the cable car to 
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its roster if approved. If approved, the area taken up by the cable car would similarly be declared 
a ‘special economic zone’ exempt from the park . 12
 As I explained in Chapter 2, there’s been a tug of war over the cable car idea over the last 
3 decades. At the heart of the struggle are contested meanings of national parks and conservation, 
which include a confluence of truth claims about nature, nationalism, accessibility, religion, 
progress, and political economic imperatives. While proponents here similarly employed antipo-
litical strategies to reduce public influence in decision-making, there was no high-priority politi-
cal economic pressure to approve development, which contributed to the success of the move-
ment. In the rest of this chapter, I will outline the strategies of proponents and opponents to en-
roll allies and some of the factors that led the project to be shelved. I’ll begin by teasing apart the 
conflicts around the series of truth claims pertaining to conservation and the role of national 
parks, starting once again with ‘wilderness’ thinking.  
Wilderness Thinking 
 According to the Director of the Tourism Authority of Thailand in Chiang Mai, both the 
city and province of Chiang Mai rely mainly on natural and cultural capital to attract tourists. 
Cultural tourism and ecotourism are the main draws to the region and national parks play a major 
role in providing both, promising intact forests alongside controlled spaces where tourists can 
experience ‘hill tribe’ cultures. Much like in Canada, wilderness here was produced in part as 
playground for the broader Thai society and foreign tourists, done so through the expulsion or 
strict restriction of local ethnic minorities within parks. Civil society groups and prominent acad-
 In June of 2016, the Cabinet declared that the Pingkanakorn Development Agency was to collapse and its assets 12
transferred to different departments. It is unclear why or how this decision was reached. 
!140
emics in Chiang Mai advocate for the rights for community members to remain in place. Some 
advocate for their rights to practice traditional livelihoods (Yos, 2003), but for many, remaining 
in parks comes with the caveat that ethnic minorities must live in certain circumscribed ways 
(paddy rice vs. swidden cultivation, no hunting or gathering forest resources, small scale eco-
tourism rather than intensive agriculture, etc.) (Dressler and Roth, 2011; Youdelis, 2013). Thus 
the ‘wilderness’ ethic here is a bit complex - with varying views on what kind of ‘nature’ parks 
are meant to protect and to what extent (and in which ways) local communities fit in with broad-
er ecosystems.  
  As I mentioned, the opposition to the cable car was shared between deep green and red-
green actors. Civil society groups in Chiang Mai formed a network of opposition to the cable car 
despite differences in values. The majority of the groups and actors involved would be classified 
as more red-green, however a couple of actors were proudly deep green, believing there should 
be no communities living within parks whatsoever and that tourism should be strictly controlled 
without built infrastructure. “We have an alliance sometimes, and we’re enemies other times,” 
said Dr. Attachak Sattayanurak of Chiang Mai University, a red-green proponent. All of the 
groups were against needless destruction of the forest, particularly since the route would cut 
through class 1A watershed forest, which is the most strictly protected classification in Thailand, 
however different actors had different understandings of the role of parks in relation to pristine 
‘wilderness’. Regardless, opponents found an uneasy alliance campaigning against the cable car, 
and arguments that the watershed forest should be preserved in protected areas featured promi-
nently in opponents’ media outreach, including social media, television and news spots, in Q&A 
sessions at public hearings, and on signs held up at different protest events. One such sign read 
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(in Thai, but translated to English here) “We oppose the cable car. Don’t invade the home of the 
wildlife.” In an open letter to the Governor of Chiang Mai, several civil society groups argued 
that deforestation is a central concern and that the cable car is inappropriate in a natural setting, 
that it is “alien to nature’. They argue that forests in Chiang Mai have been continually degraded 
to the point that certain districts are like ‘mountain desserts’. Dr. Anuchat Thananchai of the Fac-
ulty of Education at Chiang Mai University, and the head of the Rak (Love) Doi Suthep group. 
said, “Suthep-Pui National Park is one of the few remaining large intact forest areas which we 
need to conserve for future generations. Most others in the area have been destroyed so we need 
many parties to come together to conserve this forest.”  
  Arguments that the cable car would destroy the aesthetic character of Chiang Mai were 
also prevalent with opponents running the campaign as well as with headmen and villagers 
throughout the four subdistricts. People felt that such a large, modern, built mega-structure was 
‘unnatural’ and would destroy the beauty of the landscape and take away from the history and 
culture of the city fundamental to residents’ feelings of place: 
 “The cable car is out of place with the cultural and environmental capital of Chiang Mai.  
  Chiang Mai is about slow living, about having a calm, peaceful life, therefore we should   
 be developing ecotourism and community tourism. The cable car doesn't fit with the  
  Chiang Mai lifestyle.” Tatthaya Anusorrakit, Chiang Mai Link  
Opponents want to preserve the somewhat nostalgic, idyllic image of the moral, rural thai coun-
tryside and the non-commercial values this represents (Haberkorn, 2011; Thongchai, 2008). Al-
though the production of this aesthetic nature and traditional culture is partly meant to attract 
tourists, opponents are critical and suspicious of big business ventures, and only small scale eco-
tourism and cultural tourism is considered an appropriate fit for the province. This is both be-
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cause of the perceived unsustainability of mass tourism projects and because locals feel that all 
of the benefits in those kinds of ventures accrue to wealthy elites and not to local people who are 
in need of sustainable development options.  
  While some degree of ‘wilderness’ thinking came out in arguments against construction, 
opponents also face a frustrating double standard that allows government to develop within parks 
but severely punishes civilians for cutting a single tree. “People cutting the trees in the park are 
criminals, but the government can do it without any guilt,” said Duangtip, headman of Nong 
Khwai village 5. The government has free reign to allow mega-projects within parks despite 
strict regulations against construction in class 1 watershed forests, while local communities have 
no access rights to any forest products and must bear the greatest burden in the production of 
wilderness for tourism. Opponents argue that if national parks are truly places that the govern-
ment has been charged to defend against encroachment, then they should follow their own direc-
tives and reject the cable car. Many felt that it was ludicrous and hypocritical for the military 
government to be demolishing private resorts or structures encroaching on parks throughout the 
country while considering this proposal by Pinkgkanakorn in Doi Suthep-Pui.  
  Responding to public pushback against disturbing the watershed forest, proponents of-
fered mitigation measures and assurances that construction of the cable car would cut the fewest 
trees possible. Opponents were concerned about the need for access roads to bring in equipment 
and construction workers, along with the areas of forest that would need to be felled for the poles 
and the stations, so proponents announced that they would use helicopters to deliver all of the 
construction materials and workers instead. While this was admittedly an exceedingly costly and 
untested option, in the EIA, brochures, media spots, and during presentations in public meetings, 
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Tesco and the PDA boasted that minimal harm will be done to the forest - that poles are not too 
sizeable and disturbance will be kept to a minimum through advanced technology. Some local 
leaders and villagers dismissed the opponents worried about environmental impact as ‘back-
wards’ ‘conservatives’ who ‘want to make Thailand go backwards, not forwards’ (Various inter-
views 2014-2015). Proponents also dismissed the opposition saying the only people that oppose 
this are academics and NGOs, “and the NGO people oppose everything,” said Plodprasop. Pro-
ponents also drew on public sentiment that Chiang Mai’s destination brand revolves around nat-
ural and cultural attractions to promote the cable car. For example, in a promotional video about 
the cable car, proponents advertise that it allows for an intimate experience with nature, especial-
ly areas that are inaccessible by car, and that having a bird’s eye view of the forest is a unique 
way for passengers to connect with wilderness.  
  The possibility of producing wilderness for commercial tourism relies upon the continued 
restriction of indigenous communities activities’ within parks (which, as I explained in Chapter 
3, does not depart starkly from the ‘wilderness’ ethic), but the Hmong community in Doi Pui will 
actually benefit economically from the project as they have been permitted to remain living in-
side the park, unlike First Nations in Jasper. However the other Hmong village within the park, 
Ban Khun Chiang Kian, is more remote and will not likely benefit. Villagers there remain barred 
from practicing traditional livelihoods and have few development options, so most feel ignored 
and abandoned by the park.  
  Although the EIA presented the appearance of collective agreement on the importance (or 
lack thereof) of deforestation and environmental disturbance, deforestation was one of the key 
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issues unifying otherwise disparate parties in the struggle against the cable car in the movement 
being built outside of official channels.  
National Nature 
 Nationalism, specifically national development and national identity, featured prominent-
ly in arguments for and against. Despite the likelihood that the cable car would not make back 
the investment and would likely need to be subsidized by the government for decades, much like 
the Night Safari and the Chiang Mai Convention Centre, proponents and many local respondents 
felt that the cable car was absolutely necessary for ‘national development’. Proponents adver-
tised the cable car as something that would bring Thailand up to ‘international standards’, a 
phrase that became a serious fixation for many interview respondents. The idea that Thailand 
needs to catch up and boast technology to rival nations in the Global North was a common ar-
gument in favour of development: 
 “We have to lift up the standards of development in Thailand. Other countries have cable   
 cars, Vietnam has cable cars, but Thailand? We have none. We have to match the other   
 developed countries.” Pani, Headman in Mae Hia Subdistrict  
 “It helps us to reach international standards, other countries have cable cars so we   
 should also have this technology.” Panapai, Head of Welfare Office, Suthep Subdistrict  
 “It's a modern form of transportation so it will make our country look good. We'll look   
 better than Ethiopia, for example, which doesn’t offer much choice in terms of    
 transportation.” Thawatchai, Headman in Mae Hia Subdistrict  
Proponents did an excellent job tapping into the public’s sense of anxiety around falling short of 
international expectations. Many agreed and felt very deeply that Thailand needed the cable car 
to enhance its national image, to appear more ‘developed’. 
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  On the other hand, opponents argued that Doi Suthep temple is such a well-known and 
sacred place that it belongs to the Thai nation, not just to people in Chiang Mai. They argued as 
well that national parks belong to the nation, and anything that that would defile these national 
treasures (both parks and the temple) is an affront to the people of Thailand who collectively 
own these spaces. Like in Jasper, opponents and local people also took issue with the fact that 
likely only wealthy travelers would be able to enjoy the cable car, it’s not for the majority of Thai 
people:  
 “Poor people will never have a chance to experience the cable car, it'll only be rich   
 people that can go up and see everything from a bird’s-eye view. It's a rich person's toy,   
 because the cost of going up there won't work for most people.” Duangtip, Headman in   
 Nong Khwai Subdistrict 
Opponents felt that benefits would accrue mainly to Pingkanakorn and people in their network 
and that development opportunities for the majority of Thai people would be limited, challenging 
the idea that this would truly bring ‘national development’. 
   Additionally, opponents argued that Chiang Mai’s identity revolved around natural at-
tractions and northern Lanna culture, and that these were the things that brought northern Thais 
pride; these were the things that attracted international attention. In this way some opponents un-
derstood the national identity of northern Thais, and at times of Thailand in general, as set apart 
from other nations because of the lack of garish modern technology. Northern slow living and 
natural/cultural marvels were considered threatened by ostentatious mechanization and thus so 
was national pride. Opponents created noise around the notion that the cable car was antithetical 
to Chiang Mai’s identity, which helped to broaden their movement and enroll allies in the affect-
ed villages. 
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Sacred Site 
 When the cable car idea was proposed in the 1980s and again in the early 2000s, religious 
concerns were at the forefront of protest movements alongside environmental concerns and con-
cerns around privatization. The original route for the cable car would have gone up directly 
above the road leading to Doi Suthep temple, starting from the statue of the venerated monk 
Kuba Siwichai at the base of the mountain. This was considered blasphemy on two counts. First-
ly it would disrespect Kuba Siwichai and take away from people’s feelings of place, and most 
importantly the fact that any structure would be spatially higher than the temple itself was con-
sidered sacrilege. Because of the persistent backlash against bringing the cable car directly above 
Kuba Siwichai’s statue and Doi Suthep Temple, the PDA decided this time to plan a route around 
the other side of the mountain that brought tourists to Doi Pui and one other lookout location. 
While these stations are still higher in elevation than Doi Suthep temple, deliberately going 
around and away from Doi Suthep temple seems to have neutralized much of the public resis-
tance to the cable car on religious grounds, however opposition based on the sacredness of the 
site still remains: 
 “Doi Suthep is also sacred ground, the cable car might slowly change the way of life   
 here and the spiritual beliefs of people in the area. The road up to Doi Suthep was a   
 sacred route taken by Kuba Siwichai, it’s like a pilgrimage road, if we build the cable car   
 up there it could reduce the value of the idea of this road.” Daycha Niamkun, elder in   
 Suthep Subdistrict 
 “I don’t know much about the project, but I don’t support it, mainly for spiritual and   
 cultural reasons. The Doi Suthep temple is sacred and the forest around the area should   
 be protected. Chiang Mai is listed to become a World Heritage area, and building a cable   
 car up that sacred place would totally contradict this.” Villager in Suthep Subdistrict  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For many, the sacredness of the space ties into the importance of Doi Suthep in the popular imag-
inary of Chiang Mai and feeds into national pride. Opponents tapped into this in their organizing, 
for example holding up signs at events that read (in Thai, translated into English here) “The cable 
car is soulless, it destroys our spiritual path” and “Doi Suthep is not just a mountain to us.” 
  One of the biggest differences between previous protests and the controversy of 2014 is 
that in the past environmentalist monks made up a significant part of the opposition while more 
recently they’ve been all but absent. I asked members of the opposition why this might be, and 
people felt that the times and local values are changing, and that now the monks and temple ad-
ministration are in support of (or neutral to) the project because of the potential for increased 
tourism profits: 
 “It'll be more business and more benefits from tourists. Now you can see Doi Suthep has   
 become all about business.” Dr. Somikat Chaipiboon, Maejo University  
Interestingly, the head of the Doi Suthep temple administration began in opposition to the 
project, but when I contacted him for an interview he was extremely uncomfortable talking about 
the issue. He told my research assistant on the phone that he would only talk in general terms and 
present both sides but would not like to share his personal opinion. He wanted to meet near the 
national park office, so we suggested a coffee shop across the street, but on arrival he wanted us 
to meet inside the park office itself, which we felt was a sort of power move to make us feel as 
though we should watch what we ask and what we say. He arrived with an assistant who did 
nothing but discretely take photographs of myself and Pim on his camera phone and then 
promptly left and stood outside of the meeting room. It was a truly bizarre experience and we 
could only surmise that he had been pressured to temper his public opinion on the matter. 
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  Like with environmental arguments, the religious one was used by proponents as merely 
another reason why opponents were ‘backwards’ ‘conservatives’, holding on to silly traditions 
and blocking ‘national progress’. Plodprasop Suraswadi said: 
 “They said if we built the cable car, or we built some structure above the temple, above   
 the Buddha relics, that would disrespect it. When the planes fly over-- every plane, every   
 flight, flies over Doi Suthep. Is that something against the Buddha relics? If you go above 
 Doi Suthep, to Paris. Every building in Paris including the toilets are also above Doi   
 Suthep. If we go even further up, a lot of hill tribe people, ten thousand of them, their   
 bedrooms, their toilets, their gardens, whatever, are all above Doi Suthep. These people   
 disrespect Doi Suthep? No! No. This is why I don't like [NGOs/opponents]. They're   
 foolish people.”  
Although Paris is not higher in elevation than Doi Suthep, the idea that the religious argument 
was largely invalid or less important than the potential for economic development gained traction 
with local people in Chiang Mai, particularly since the route was deliberately changed and there 
would be no station directly by Doi Suthep temple. By taking this approach, proponents can 
claim that they’ve resolved the issue, and that they too care about sacredness of the temple. This 
underlying point of ‘agreement’ allowed for the dismissal of the argument as irrational within 
official channels, however opponents continued to make noise around the issue in their move-
ment building.  
Political Economies of Conservation  
 The Thai case is interesting because unlike in Canada, the private sector is officially pro-
hibited from developing in parks, and in fact private resorts that encroach on park space have 
been fined and demolished by the Thai government over the years, particularly by the new mili-
tary government trying to demonstrate the value of their reign (Chanathit and Tumnukasetchai, 
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2015). However, newly formed quasi-private agencies like the Pingkanakorn Development 
Agency can be granted permission to build any number of attractions within parks.  
 “I think that the invasion of the private sector in national parks is coming in the form of   
 newly established organizations. This kind of organization, created under special laws,   
 allows government bodies and the private sector to cooperate, like the Pingnakorn   
 Development Agency. The private sector's involvement in these organizations is kind of   
 hidden.” -Prayat, Community Rights Advocacy Network  
The PDA receives a yearly budget from the government to support their business ventures, but 
they retain all of the revenues from their projects, none goes back to the Finance Ministry. Ac-
cording to Plodprasop Suraswadi, there is a push from the central government to have the PDA 
be more self-sustaining, though at the moment they still rely heavily on government funds to 
subsidize their enterprise. 
  Although the PDA is not a fully private company, most respondents in Chiang Mai per-
ceive it to be. Because of this, the debate around whether national parks or other social services 
and public goods should be managed publicly or privately is also salient here: 
 “National parks are common goods, belonging to the people and they're to be governed   
 by the government, not the private sector.” Singkham Nunti, Chairman of Nakhon Lanna   
 Transportation  
 “They try to take advantage of the national parks everywhere in Thailand. The cable car   
 is a case of the private sector trying to take advantage.”Dr. Attachak Sattayanurak,   
 Chiang Mai University  
 “I feel like the private sector is a small group with a lot of money, they're a powerful   
 minority that could control these resources, which is not good.” Phisit Kasi, Vice-   
 Mayor of Mae Hia Subdistrict  
The majority of people also understood the role of parks themselves as places where authorities 
are charged to enforce laws against any private person or company ‘invading’ the area and using 
it for personal or commercial gain.  
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  Those that are clearer on the fact that the PDA is a government agency still resent the fact 
that they could be granted approval to break park rules. As well, aside from thoughts on 
Pingkanakorn itself, many remain suspicious of mega projects in Thailand and of big business in 
general, understanding these as mostly exploitative endeavours where the majority of benefits do 
not accrue to local people and yet local people face the greatest environmental costs of develop-
ment:  
 “At the village scale the benefits will be very few. I doubt that people will get benefits   
 here because it's just like the Night Safari. They used to promise that there would be   
 careers and this and that for local villages, but actually there's been none.” Surached   
 Thakumma, Headman in Suthep Subdistrict  
 “If small projects are implemented then communities in general will benefit, but if it's a   
 mega-project, mega millions, then it's the big corporations who will benefit.” Wakana   
 Seehom, Northern Development Foundation  
This anti-(neoliberal)capitalist feature of Thai nationalism (Thongchai, 2008) and environmental-
ism (Forsyth, 2003a) differs from Jasper, where hegemony is more closely aligned with neoliber-
alism. Because the private sector has less involvement in parks by law, the private tourism lobby 
also isn’t nearly as strong and is less publicly accepted than in Jasper. 
  In fact, not only is there less of a push from the private sector to protect their revenue 
streams, but Thai conservation laws that prohibit private development mean that the national 
park itself would not receive any monetary benefits from the construction of the cable car:  
 “It's against the National Parks Act to build this structure in a conserved area, so the   
 cable car would have to be withdrawn from the national park. So if that moment comes,   
 it won't be the responsibility or under the authority of the national park anymore, so none  
 of the income will go to the park. The national park will not receive any benefits because   
 the money from the cable car will go back to the Pingkanakorn Development Agency.”   
 Amporn Panmongkol, Head of Doi Suthep-Pui National Park  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Doi Suthep-Pui National Park is one of the few parks that do not collect entrance fees, as it is so 
close to Chiang Mai and so many people enter and leave each day visiting Doi Suthep temple. If 
the cable car were built and exempted from the park and declared a special economic zone, then 
the PDA would be exempt from paying any tax on the land as well. From the park’s perspective 
in this case, the cable car would bring no benefits, only challenges related to managing increased 
tourism and ecological integrity. Doi Suthep-Pui is not mandated to increase visitation each year, 
as there is no pressure (or possibility) to recoup costs through tourism here.  
  As the cable car would link the Night Safari with other points of interest and tourist at-
tractions in Doi Suthep-Pui, many consider the proposal a ploy to make more money for the PDA 
and for networks of people close to Plodprasop himself. The PDA paid 10 million baht to Tesco 
Ltd. to conduct the environmental assessment. Tesco receives 100% of the PDA’s work, and 
some have charged Plodprasop of corruption, claiming that his close friends and family members 
and people close to Thaksin are/were Tesco shareholders, which Plodprasop vehemently denied. 
Unfortunately I wasn’t able to access this information so the links between Tesco and the PDA 
remain obscure:  
 “I think that this cable car might not really be happening. It might just be a monkey play,   
 just so they can ask for the budget to do the study, the EIA report and the public hearing.   
 It's just another way to ask for money from the government but they don't really aim to   
 actually build it. Just so they could give money to Tesco and to themselves. Because   
 they did this in 2005 too, they spent over 40 million baht already in this kind of process.   
 So they'll do the same performance now.” Prayat, Community Rights Advocacy Network  
 Plodprasop admitted to me that the cable car would not make back the investment for a 
very long time. He said that the point was for local development, increasing opportunities for 
local communities to sell goods and services to tourists, and ‘national development’ in terms of 
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‘international standards’. He expected that the government would subsidize this just like the oth-
er ventures run by the PDA. Publicly, the PDA framed the cable car as important for local eco-
nomic and national development, and did not admit or discuss much of anything relating to the 
budget. People in Chiang Mai felt that there was not enough transparency around the budget, 
how much would the cable car cost, and how benefits would be shared. Despite this opacity, 
many felt that the cable car would lose money just like the Night Safari, and that this would like-
ly be the ultimate reason why the cable car would be scrapped: 
 “First of all, I don't think the cable car will have any benefits. The money they receive   
 every day as the daily income will go back to PDA. They will deduct money for    
 management, upkeep, etc., and the balance will be negative.” Tatthaya Anusorakit,   
 Chiang Mai Link  
 “I think the chance of this cable car being built is small, because I think this project can't   
 break even in terms of budget. This project needs a lot of money to run. The Night Safari   
 is losing profits for sure, so building this would increase the PDA’s negative profits. ”   
 Teeramon Bua-ngam, Prachatham News  
In this way the cable car departs starkly from the development proposals in Jasper, where bud-
getary pressures could actually be redressed, not exacerbated, by private development.  
  Critics also thought perhaps the military government would not look favourably on a 
project started by people in Thaksin’s network. However, the PDA was well connected to the 
budget committee:  
 “First we request it from the office of the Prime Minister, and if that office approves, then 
 it goes to the office of the national budget. But one of the people on Pingkanakorn's   
 Board is also on the national budget board, so there's a high chance that our requests   
 will be successful.” Tritsadee Chutiwong, Vice Director of Pingkanakorn  
This information, which could clearly be construed as a major conflict of interest, was withheld 
from the public. Overall, however, conservation law, politics and budgetary issues were allies of 
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the opposition. The general distaste and distrust of mega-projects and big business also operated 
as a sort of anti-neoliberal governmentality mobilized from below. Mixed with a relative lack of 
austerity politics at the state level in terms of cuts to conservation spending, the conditions here 
appeared relatively less favourable to development.  
Strategies to Enroll Allies 
 As this issue has come up periodically since the 1980s, some of the opponents have been 
fighting the cable car idea for decades and have been developing and fine-tuning various argu-
ments in an attempt to enroll more allies. While the religious aspect to the opposition has lost 
some steam and environmentalist monks are no longer on the front lines, new arguments about 
budget issues, national identity and the lack of transparency around public-private partnerships in 
the PDA and public consultation have gained traction with local people in Chiang Mai: 
 “We've been developing our argument over time. It started with a focus on environmental 
 impacts, then grew to include more specific points about things like safety, for example   
 Doi Suthep mountain and temple couldn't bear the weight of so many tourists up there. It   
 then developed to include the argument that it won't be worth it economically to invest   
 this kind of money, there won't be a good return, and ultimately to discussions around   
 transparency around the decision to build this cable car.” Tatthaya Anusorrakit, Chiang   
 Mai Link  
Opponents have been flexible and attentive to which issues resonate most with a broad audience.  
  The main actors involved in the opposition movement are various civil society groups, 
each with their own focus, that form an informal alliance: 
 “It's more of an informal group. It's a loose organization, we don't have a structure really.   
 Sometimes we get together and discuss things but it's not formal, based around certain   
 issues.” Anuchat Thananchai, Chiang May University and Rak Doi Suthep  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According to Prayat from the Community Rights Advocacy Network, each group has their own 
function or role in public education. Prayat, for example, shares information on why he’s against 
organizations like the PDA, where there is corporate-government co-operation but very little 
transparency. Others share why the EIA was not holistic, why local people will likely not benefit 
much, etc. This kind of ‘public education’ is central to the strategy of the opposition. Opponents 
hope that after hearing these various arguments, people will be inspired to join public meetings 
and speak up against the project, stressing the importance of having boots on the ground and not 
simply writing letters or participating in the movement via online petitions or social media. 
  The very first public meeting was held on November 26th, 2013, with foreign cable car 
companies also in attendance. At that time, some representatives from civil society spoke up 
against the project, as well as the head of the Doi Suthep Temple Administration, who later 
changed his tune. On February 4th, 2014, the Rak Doi Suthep group along with various allies in 
civil society submitted an open letter to the former Governor denouncing the project, and held a 
press conference to publicize their concerns. On July 18th 2014 the network of civil society 
groups came together outside of city hall in Chiang Mai to protest the cable car.  They delivered 
a petition and two more open letters to the newly appointed Governor of Chiang Mai, one written 
by the Rak Doi Suthep group in alliance with the rest of the network and one by the Community 
Rights Advocacy Network. They also sent copies to the NCPO. The Community Rights Advoca-
cy Network letter started by implying foul play with the EIA, since Dr. Sammakkeee Boonyawat 
of Kasetsart University who conducted the EIA was a ‘protege’ of Plodprasop, studying in the 
same faculty where Plodprasop was senior. It went on to outline the supposed links between 
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Tesco, the PDA, Plodprasop and Thaksin. The letter by the Rak Doi Suthep group outlines all of 
the arguments discussed previously. 
  The network of opponents also put up posters around town, and held them up at public 
events and press releases like the one outside of city hall: 
Figure 7.0 - Cable Car Protest, July 2014 
The posters decry the cable car as a threat to the spiritual and wilderness value of Doi Suthep, the 
official group logo saying “The people of Chiang Mai don’t want the cable car.” Opponents also 
produced flyers and stickers to be handed out and appended in visible places around the city to 
raise awareness. 
  Some of the challenges facing opponents were similar to those faced by opponents in 
Jasper, such as the fact that everyone has full-time jobs and thus organizing or meeting together 
in person is difficult and can be quite taxing in addition to a full work week. However there were 
additional challenges here with respect to the repressive military government and the deep divi-
sion between red and yellow shirts:  
 “The political transformation has made it hard to build a movement. Even though there   
 was a plan to increase local participation, this has been postponed because of the    
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 military coup.” Prayat, Community Rights Advocacy Network  
 “Compared to in the 1980s and 2005, it’s harder to get people out to protest now. This   
 time the conflict between red and yellow is really deep, so it's difficult to mobilize   
 people.“ Dr. Attachak Sattayanurak, Chiang Mai University  
The military government shut down the Facebook page for Chiang Mai Link, because they were 
discussing politics and the coup as well as the cable car: 
 “Chiang Mai Link's page was also talking about the transformation of our political  
 system, so the page was taken out of the system. Now I don't really have a channel to   
 speak out. But I allowed that page to be taken down because I think the media isn't  
 playing a big role in decision-making in this country. The real power of the people is   
 shown when they actually appear, they should be there at the public meetings to make the 
 movement strong, not just going about it online” Tatthaya Anusorrakit, Chiang Mai Link  
Others felt that they had to tread carefully with what they were sharing, and consciously tried to 
position Doi Suthep Temple as a unifier, a point of local pride that could bring together red and 
yellow shirts despite political divisions. 
  Despite the challenges, opponents were largely steadfast and not overly intimidated by 
the junta. The Rak Doi Suthep and Rak Mae Ping groups in particular have made connections 
with local and national media. They’ve been interviewed and produced a TV spot on The Nation, 
and see media outreach as a productive place to focus their attention: 
 “From social media it extends to the media in Bangkok as well, national media. This   
 movement has made it to all the TV channels and newspapers and now we have close   
 contacts in the media. If something happens instead of using social media only we go   
 right to the media.” Sakda Darawan, Rak Mae Ping  
The opposition also receives contributions from supporters, including skills and services such as 
design work for the banners and stickers they’ve used to publicize the issue around Chiang Mai. 
Donations of money, time and skills have allowed the movement to gain as much publicity and 
traction as it has.  
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Environmental Assessment and Public Consultation  
 Because the cable car would cut through class 1 watershed forest, which is strictly pro-
hibited, the project is considered high-impact and thus an EIA is necessary. The study was con-
ducted by Tesco Ltd. in conjunction with researchers from Kasetsart University and spanned Au-
gust 2013 to June 2014, 360 days in total. Public engagement is mandated through the EIA 
process, and so in addition to the initial informational session held in November, 2013, there 
were four public hearings held in each of the four affected subdistricts (Ban Pong on Februrary 
8th, 2014, Mae Hia on February 9th, 2014, Suthep also on February 9th, 2014, and Nong Khwai 
on February 11th, 2014). There was a final public hearing open to everyone on October 16th, 
2014. Additionally, about 500 questionnaires were given out to people across Chiang Mai, al-
though how respondents were chosen remains unclear. 
  Opponents critiqued the fact that the EIA was not holistic enough, it largely presented the 
positives associated with the project and many felt that not all potential impacts were covered. 
There was a lot of general distrust for what was presented. The Mayor of Nong Khwai asserted, 
“It hasn’t presented all of the facts.” Similar to Jasper, opponents were alarmed by the way much 
of the report read like promotional material for the cable car and the PDA, and questioned the 
conflict of interest involved in the PDA hiring a private company in their network to conduct the 
study.  
Anti-political Strategies 
 Proponents here similarly employed strategies to contain dissent and reduce the public’s 
role in decision-making within official channels, although with less of an emphasis on orchestrat-
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ing consensus around neoliberal rationality. Opponents here were, however, far more effective in 
the practice of politics beyond consultation, which I will explore later in this chapter. 
Public Not Informed 
  A well-informed public is vital for meaningful public engagement and political debate 
(Ferree et al., 2002). A poll conducted by researchers at Maejo University found that the majority 
of people in Chiang Mai were completely uninformed about the proposal and even fewer had 
actually accessed the EIA report.  
 “70% of respondents didn't know about this, because the local government never    
 advertises what they want to do. They just held small meetings with people who live near 
 where the cable car will be. They only talked with people around there, but people who   
 live farther from the centre of the cable car don't know.” Dr. Somikat Chaipiboon, Maejo   
 University  
From my own experience interviewing people throughout the four subdistricts, mayors and 
headmen tended to know about the project, although many still had not seen the EIA, whereas 
most regular villagers knew very little about it: 
 “There needs to be more public outreach because whoever is in charge of public    
 relations so far has been really incompetent. There are still many people who don't know   
 anything about it. If people aren’t informed they can’t have power in decision-making.”   
 Surached Thakumma, Headman in Suthep Subdistrict  
 “I want to see the EIA. I’ve asked several times to see it but they say it’s not ready or   
 available for us to see yet. There are too many secrets. Even though there is a    
 regulation about providing information to the public and holding open public hearings, in  
 practice there’s no use.” Daycha Niamkun, elder in Suthep Subdistrict  
Most people in the Hmong village of Doi Pui were aware of the project, as one of the stops 
would bring tourists to their village, although most people had not seen the EIA. The headman of 
Doi Pui had seen it but agreed with the general consensus that it was not a holistic report and 
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many potential impacts were left out. It seems the majority of people did not know about the ca-
ble car in Khun Chang Kian. The headman knew about it and had seen the EIA but said that the 
language was too technical for him to comprehend, so he was unable to give an opinion on its 
merit. 
 When the public is not thoroughly informed about a project, public hearings become a 
rather meaningless exercise, particularly when so few had actually seen, read and understood the 
EIA report. The hearings were mainly populated by leaders and specific stakeholders and only 
sparsely by villagers. Many felt that the hearings weren’t well publicized:  
 “They've gotten smarter about holding public hearings, in a bad sense. For example this   
 kind of public hearing should be clear about what will be presented and what will be   
 expected from the participants. Last time, in 2005, they made it clear what the topic of   
 the public hearing would be, what would be discussed and what they wanted to hear   
 about from the public. This time they made a very unclear announcement so people   
 were kind of getting lost. What do they want? Did they come to inform us or did they   
 come to get feedback from the people? That kind of thing changed. They've gotten   
 smarter about navigating around the laws.” Prayat, Community Rights Advocacy    
 Network  
The potency of public critique, debate and general engagement in the decision-making process is 
diminished when public actors don’t have access to all necessary information. Without adequate 
and accessible project information, political debate is curtailed and usurped by technocratic man-
agement. Not adequately publicizing public hearings also reduces opportunity for public en-
gagement.  
Staged Public Consultations 
 Depoliticization often entails staging consensus as a means of glossing over or evacuating 
conflict from public space (Fletcher, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010). Villagers were excluded from 
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meaningful participation through the ‘staged’ nature of public hearings. The hearings were domi-
nated by selected speakers, with only a short time for open Q&A at the end: 
 “In my opinion the public hearing didn't invite everyone that should have been there.   
 They invited only specific groups who were pro this project.” Amporn Panmongkol,   
 Head of Doi Suthep-Pui Park  
 “There's corruption in the process because the one who organizes the meetings brings   
 in people who support it, maybe bribes people or threatens them... So the general    
 reaction during these kinds of meetings tends to be more supportive.” Surached    
 Thakumma, Headman in Suthep Subdistrict  
For example, transportation in Chiang Mai is done largely through red truck (taxi) drivers, and 
this is currently how most tourists travel up to Doi Suthep temple along the winding road leading 
from Kuba Siwichai’s statue. The red truck drivers, represented by Nakhon Lanna Transporta-
tion, were thus firmly in opposition to the cable car as they saw their livelihoods threatened. 
However, this important stakeholder group was not given an opportunity to speak up against the 
project at the public hearing: 
 “Around 10 taxi drivers were there, but we didn't speak. We didn't have a chance to   
 speak up, because the people who got to speak in that meeting were selected. It's    
 supposed to be open floor, but the people who were selected were those that had an   
 agenda, and they were scheduled to speak at certain times. So of course they say it's   
 open floor, but the people who went there already knew they had to say something to   
 support this project.” Singkham Nunti, Chairman of Nakhon Lanna Transportation  
The fact that public actors opposed to the project were unable to speak in a forum meant to en-
gage the public is troubling. Like in Jasper, many felt that the public hearings were not con-
ducive to true open debate but were more like ‘open houses’ that simply shared information. 
Tesco Ltd. was meant to be an impartial facilitator of the environmental study and public en-
gagement, but instead appeared to be acting as a proponent and designating which actors would 
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speak and which voices would be silenced. Thus a range of people were brought into the process 
but in acutely depoliticized ways. 
  Additionally, opponents claim that other tactics were used to reduce the number of public 
actors that could attend, and thus further remove political debate from the public sphere, such as 
changing the public hearing location at the last minute. “There are many people who are against 
this project that just give up because of these kind of tactics,” said Dr. Anuchat Thananchai of 
CMU and Rak Doi Suthep.  
  Speaking to villagers it was clear that they didn’t believe they had much of a role in deci-
sion-making, that only leaders were able to speak at these sorts of events: 
 “I think the Subdistrict head and maybe the headmen will be involved, only the selected   
 ones. Overall the villagers won't be very involved in the decision-making.” Villager in   
 Village 1, Suthep Subdistrict  
 “I want to be involved with the decision-making, but what really happens is.. the only   
 people actually involved are the heads of the villages.” Villager in Ban Too Pong Village  
Some leaders told me that this was just the “nature of the people”, to let leaders speak for them 
even if they aren’t representing their views, however several villagers lamented not being more 
involved in the process, and not feeling as though they were well informed. Many of the authori-
ties who were granted permission to speak had also been wooed with an all-expenses paid trip to 
Langkawi, Malaysia, where part of the trip involved taking a cable car up a mountain. 
  When only selected speakers are granted the majority of air time at public hearings, the 
public’s ability to influence decision-making is extremely limited. Selecting speakers controls the 
discourse in the public sphere and relegates political debate elsewhere, outside of official chan-
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nels. The reports submitted to the Governor regarding the tenor of the public hearings thus gave 
the impression of general public support whilst opposed public actors were silenced.  
‘Rule of Experts’ 
 Like in Jasper, public engagement was structured through the EIA process, and as the of-
ficial report produced by Tesco stated that the disturbance to the environment would only be an 
issue during construction, and would be offset by potential positive economic development, op-
ponents’ questions and philosophical/political objections were largely dismissed. Because oppo-
nents were able to create noise around the deforestation issue outside of consultation channels, 
proponents stressed in all correspondence that the route chosen (out of four possible routes) 
would involve the least harm to the class 1 watershed forest. Similar to Jasper, the EIA and hear-
ings framed discussion around how to reduce environmental harm as much as possible, not to 
open debate around whether the project should go forward in the first place: 
 “At first, the information they gave said that the cable car would only be 4 to 6km.   
 However it developed to now be 10 to 12 km to 'reduce the impact to the environment'.   
 My thought is that it shouldn't be there at all, and then there would be no impact to the   
 environment!” Tatthaya Anusorrakit, Chiang Mai Link  
Again, mitigation was suggested to acquiesce opponents rather than opening debate on whether 
the project should go forward within the national park.  
  There was also great concern around the fact that Tesco is such a close partner of the 
PDA and that the exact links between the two organizations aren’t transparent. Of course there 
could be a conflict of interest when any private company is hired by the proponents to conduct 
an EIA, but the close partnership between Tesco and the PDA was extremely concerning to pub-
!163
lic actors, particularly since the majority of respondents felt that the EIA omitted a great deal of 
potential impacts:  
 “The defects or flaws of a project aren't going to be presented in this kind of a process in   
 Thailand, because proponents keep hiring people in their networks to conduct the EIA   
 studies. In this report for example, Tesco, the people who have a stake in building the   
 cable car, are the same group who are doing the EIA.” Prayat, Community Rights    
 Advocacy Network  
Speaking in general terms about the conflict of interest, Anuchat Thananchai told me, “There is 
no transparency because the proponent pays for the EIA. I'm very ashamed of this, I'm ashamed 
to admit that this is the practice in Thailand but I have to speak up against it.” When I explained 
that it happened in Canada as well, he was shocked and further disheartened.  
  Although many felt that the report was not holistic and omitted important impacts, the 
onus was on local people to prove otherwise by bringing up new scientific evidence to refute the 
EIA’s claims or to add to the study, a very narrow window of opportunity. Further, with little op-
portunity to speak at public hearings, the EIA stood as the final word on the merits and draw-
backs of construction, containing dissent and presenting the appearance of collective agreement. 
Formalities and Foregone Conclusions 
 With such a narrow window of opportunity to influence decision-making via consultation 
mechanisms, many respondents felt as though proponents were simply going through with public 
hearings to satisfy their legal requirement, but that the public had very little power or visibility in 
these channels. As the company conducting the EIA was so closely associated with the propo-
nents, many felt as though the decision to go ahead had already been made: 
 “They just do it to satisfy the law, it's like a ritual.” Sakda Darawan, Rak Mae Ping Group 
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Certainly the staged nature of the consultations with selected attendees and speakers gives one 
the impression that Tesco was acting as a proponent and were interested in giving only the most 
minimal of air time to the general public.  
  Dr. Somikat Chaipiboon, who lead the team conducting the province-wide poll at Maejo 
University, said: 
 “I think the mistake they made with this project is they decided first, after they decided   
 everything already they showed the project to the people and held public hearings, so   
 when the people disagreed but the government still wants to do it.. they just fight each   
 other. A lot of problems are created in Thailand because of this, projects are decided on   
 first and then after that they talk to the people. They never start with the people.” Dr.   
 Somikat Chaipiboon, Maejo University  
As the poll demonstrated, the majority of respondents were completely uninformed about the 
project. Fewer had seen the EIA, and few were able to attend or speak at public hearings. Trans-
parency around the process and how the final decision would be made was thus a salient concern 
for opponents who did not feel as though meaningful, open public debate was being sought: 
 “There is no transparency of the whole process, normal people can't see how this whole   
 project is going to be working and who is paying for what. There's no transparency   
 around the public consultation process and who will make the decision.” Teeramon Bua-  
 ngam, Prachatham News  
Legally proponents had to host public hearings, but the degree to which public concerns would 
be weighted and influence the final decision was unclear to most respondents.  
  Through interviews with proponents I discovered that the final decision would be left to 
the Cabinet, a top-down and rather undemocratic approach. Having not been present at any of the 
public hearings, the Cabinet would base their decision on the EIA and reports produced by pro-
ponents on the nature of public comment at the hearings, which was reduced through various an-
tipolitical strategies. As many opposed stakeholders were unable to speak, the information shared 
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with the Cabinet would not reflect the full breadth of the opposition, erasing dissenting voices 
from the decision-making process. 
The Practice of Politics 
 Interestingly, despite these clear strategies to disenfranchise public actors, opponents in 
Chiang Mai felt that they had considerable influence over decision-making, but only outside of 
official consultation channels. While opponents were dismayed by antipolitical strategies reduc-
ing the potency of their critique, most felt that if a big enough social movement could be created 
around an issue, then the government would surely listen, even if only to protect their own image 
or deflect charges of corruption: 
 “It depends on how many people are involved in the movement. If there's a big    
 movement, the public can influence decisions.” Duangtip, Headman in Nong Khwai  
 Subdistrict 
 “Citizens can have a big influence on decision-making if there is a social movement   
 started up by the people who care about this issue, if they gather people.” Prayat,    
 Community Rights Advocacy Network  
 “I'm not sure about the military regime. But if we have many people the military will side 
 with us. Like many cases about the forest here, when we start to demonstrate, the    
 military joins us and says okay, we'll do what you want. But if we have 20 people the   
 military won't care... Most of us understand that if we want to win, we'll need many feet   
 to walk on the street.” Dr. Attachak Sattayanurak, Chiang Mai University  
Opponents stressed the need for boots on the ground rather than online work or even letters and 
petitions which can easily be ignored.  
  In this way, opponents bring political debate back into public space, working to undo the 
suturing of the political by la politique or the ‘police’ (Swyngedouw, 2010). Thus despite a more 
openly repressive government and weaker consultation mechanisms, public actors in Chiang Mai 
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feel relatively empowered. The practice of politics outside official channels here combats efforts 
made to narrow and contain political contestation and co-opt, marginalize or exclude social 
forces from institutionalized decision-making. 
The Role of Political Economy 
 In addition to the practice of politics outside consultation, the political economic circum-
stances of this case were clear allies of the opponents, in stark contrast with the situation in 
Jasper. The national park would gain zero benefits from the cable car, in fact the head of the park 
was concerned about the increased challenges it would pose for park management. The law bar-
ring private and/or mega-development in parks means that the cable car would need to be ex-
empted from the park and thus none of the revenue would belong to the park. Most importantly, 
the central government would not receive any percentage of gross revenue, and in fact would be 
asked to provide the budget of nearly a billion baht and potentially to continue subsidizing the 
operation for years to come. Further, as mentioned, some felt that perhaps the military govern-
ment wouldn’t be partial to a project started by Thaksin’s right hand man. Many opponents felt 
that consultation would not impact the final decision nearly as much as political and economic 
issues: 
 “The national park never listens, and they will not. The factors that will suspend,    
 postpone or eliminate this cable car are the budget, like the investment will not be worth   
 it, and the political issues behind it, because this project was proposed in the Thaksin   
 regime.” Tatthaya Anusorrakit, Chiang Mai Link  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The Governor of Chiang Mai was quoted saying, “The final decision will be made based on the 
budget and economic worth of building this project and also if it agrees with the government pol-
icy right now.”  
  Since federal funding to parks has been consistent or increasing, and since the private 
sector has not been granted much headway into parks, there is no pressing political economic 
incentive to develop. Unlike in Jasper where private development was a means to recoup costs 
under state-led neoliberalisation, development here would be costly with likely no return. Auster-
ity politics and neoliberal governmentality here have been incomplete and openly contested, and 
thus the political economic conditions proved largely unfavourable to development. 
Conclusion 
 Bureaucratic power/knowledge, although ostensibly top-down in a repressive and central-
ized government such as Thailand’s, still requires public assent to legitimate the authority to car-
ry out certain policy actions (Forsyth and Walker, 2014; Matthews, 2011). The PDA, in partner-
ship with Tesco Ltd, employed various antipolitical strategies aimed at controlling the discourse 
and containing and minimizing dissent as much as possible within official public channels, at-
tempting to produce the appearance of consensual decision-making. Although proponents en-
deavoured to ‘orchestrate’ consent (Fletcher, 2014) via institutionalized consultation mecha-
nisms, civil society worked to bring political debate visibly back into the public sphere through 
public organizing. While few had any real confidence in the consultation process, many still felt 
that the ‘voice of the majority’ would certainly triumph if a substantial enough social movement 
could be created around an issue, feeling that opponents have considerable power to force deci-
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sions in this way. This case demonstrates the power of the people to deny public assent to bu-
reaucratic knowledge, disrupting the roll-out of top-down projects. Additionally, I have argued 
that the political economy of conservation in Thailand did not incentivize development as it did 
in Jasper. Park law barring private development and/or mega-projects, particularly in class 1 wa-
tershed forest, combined with steady park funding and the fact that the cable car was not likely to 
produce a great return on investment for decades at least were all strong disincentives for con-
struction, as was the friction between the junta and Thaksin’s network. This case demonstrates 
that political economy and associated governmentalities combined with the relational agency of 
all actants involved collectively contribute to the ascendancy and stabilization of certain knowl-
edge claims, authorizing certain policy and management options at the expense of others. The 
way these elements coalesced in each case allowed movements to be successful in Chiang Mai 
while (perhaps surprisingly) unsuccessful in Jasper. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
 The aim of the comparative case study approach has been to explore how the neoliberali-
sation of conservation unfolds in context-specific ways, and examine the relationship between 
context-specific political economies of conservation and depoliticization. Bringing the two cases 
into conversation with one another can enhance our understandings of political economies of 
conservation, theories of settler-colonialism, anti- and post-politics, and consultation and protest. 
The diverging experiences bring up a number of questions, not all of which can be fully an-
swered within the scope of this project: what kinds of political, land and market governance 
arrangements (or political economies of conservation) open space for the practice of politics?; 
what difference does settler-colonialism make?; to what extent do new tourism attractions chal-
lenge the colonial human/nature dualism?; what difference does a country’s socioeconomic status 
make?; and why do we see such similar truth claims being advanced by opponents in both cases, 
and similar strategies advanced by proponents to contain dissent? 
 The first, regarding political economies of conservation, is a hefty one. The Jasper case 
demonstrates that austerity politics in particular are a major determinant of the relative success of 
strategies of depoliticization. A political economy of conservation that welcomes private land 
rents and business operation in parks can lead to a disproportionate augmentation of the private 
sector’s influence in conservation during times of austerity. The Agency Act, which turned the 
parks department into a ‘special agency’ —basically a company, headed by a CEO— tied the fi-
nancial sustainability of parks to their ability to increase revenues from tourism and private land 
rents in the face of austerity measures. Dwindling appropriations thus made visitation and rev-
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enue generation a pressing issue, leading to the recent mandate to increase visitation by 2% per 
year, in part by creating new and exciting tourism offerings in hopes of attracting different de-
mographics. In such a climate, public consultation increasingly takes the form of ‘open houses’ 
instead of public hearings, where information is absorbed by a passive audience who are invited 
to comment privately. Open political debate and dissensus are foreclosed and a series of post-po-
litical strategies conceal and contain challenges to the rationality of austerity and a privatized 
conservation governance. In short, a system that relies on parks self-financing through tourism 
revenue generation is vulnerable to austerity-related restructuring where the power exerted by 
private developers is augmented (see also Higgins-Desbioles, 2011). As demonstrated in Chap-
ters 3 and 4, austerity politics in such a situation renders controversies around how parks should 
be run, by whom and for whom, post-political.  
  The Doi Suthep-Pui case demonstrates that a lack of austerity measures/pressure to self-
fund through private partnerships may prove more conducive to social movement success. The 
neoliberalisation of conservation in Thailand has proceeded mainly in terms of the increasing 
encouragement of individualized entrepreneurship for people living within or near parks, not in 
terms of austerity-related restructuring where park funding is coming mainly from private rev-
enues. The illegality of private operators within parks and the nature of the Pingkanakorn Devel-
opment Agency meant that both the park and the central government would not receive many 
benefits from the cable car, only challenges and expenses. As parks are publicly funded, there is 
also no mandate for parks to increase visitation yearly. Speaking with authorities in Doi Suthep-
Pui and Doi Inthanon parks, advertising or devising new partnerships and avenues for revenue 
generation were not priorities for which they expended many resources. The financial stake in 
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private development and management of services is thus a major issue separating the two cases, 
and the main reason that the outcomes of the two struggles differed.  
  Why has Thailand not subjected the parks department to substantial rounds of budget 
cuts? Does this make their experience less ‘neoliberal’? These are both rather open-ended ques-
tions. I suggest that Thailand’s developmental past (Hill et al., 2011) and the confrontational po-
litical divisions in Thai society (Glassman et al., 2008) have contributed to the relative lack of 
austerity with respect to national parks. Neoliberalisation in Thailand has been contradictory and 
incomplete in general, where policies have encouraged participation in capitalism through indi-
vidual entrepreneurship while simultaneously expanding the state’s role in regulating the national 
economy and providing social welfare. The country’s developmental history placed a great deal 
of control with central authorities, and forests were spaces through which the Thai state has ex-
erted it’s sovereignty through strict fortress style conservation (Vandergeest, 1996). The Royal 
Forestry Department has been historically hostile to ceding territorial control (Chusak, 1994). It’s 
quite possible that the newly formed Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conserva-
tion and the central authorities have been hesitant to cede this control as well, and thus have not 
gone the route of austerity measures and an associated push for private revenue generation. This 
reluctance to cede centralized control has likely only been further cemented by the military coup.  
  Although depoliticization was disrupted in Thailand, the Thai case also cautions us 
against the pitfalls of overly centralized management. Although the Thai park system bars private 
operators from developing within parks, ‘big men’ at the top can always get around these rules, 
such as through semi-private government agencies. In this context, power rests at the top and 
there is little downward accountability for decision-makers. This is exaggerated by the fact that 
!172
Thailand is under military rule where democracy has been suspended more broadly. Because 
consultation is increasingly devolved to private proponents in this neoliberal era, proponents in 
Chiang Mai similarly employed strategies to depoliticize and push through development, but the 
unique political economy of conservation in Thailand proved to be an ally of the opponents. The 
military government’s authority, while oppressive and heavy-handed, is similarly tenuous and 
broadly contested, and they are continually behooved to legitimate their rule (Interview with Dr. 
Attachak Sattayanurak, Chiang Mai University). The complexities of the Thai system facilitated 
the practice of politics, but only outside of official consultation channels, with other political and 
economic factors (eg. the Thaksin connection, the budget, etc.) ultimately leading to the project’s 
abandonment. Without this unique political economic context, it is uncertain whether depoliti-
cization would have been successful.  
  Related to the question of emancipatory political economies of conservation, we can add: 
what kinds of political and market governance arrangements would enable a decolonized conser-
vation practice? And relatedly, to what extent is settler-colonialism relevant to the outcomes of 
these controversies? Given Jasper’s history of complete expulsion of Indigenous peoples for the 
benefit of white settlers and settler corporations, in many regards Canada’s settler-colonial past 
matters significantly. Settler-colonialism is first and foremost about the acquisition of land and 
territory (Coulthard, 2014; LeFevre, 2015). The newly formed Canadian government under Sir 
John A MacDonald was intent on expanding their territory westward with the help of the Canadi-
an Pacific Railway company (Bella, 1987). The early parks in Canada were established as 
tourism hubs for CPR passengers, where ‘wilderness’ was created through the eviction of In-
digenous nations to made space for commercial development (Binnema and Niemi, 2006; 
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Campbell, 2011). This act of colonial territorialization, arguably of ‘primitive accumulation’ and/
or ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Coulthard, 2014: Harvey, 2004), set the stage for the pres-
ence and power of private interests in the mountain parks who would be turned to in times of 
austerity. Canada's unique political economy of conservation, then, is very much tied up in set-
tler-colonialism. 
 Settler-colonialism is also clearly of utmost importance in relation to the anti-politics of 
Indigenous consultation. The politics of ‘recognition’ including the paternalistic framework for 
the Duty to Consult grew out of the settler-colonists racist denial of indigenous sovereignty and 
systems of law upon contact (Borrows, 2011; Coulthard, 2014). Although the Duty to Consult in 
some ways represents Canada’s understanding of responsibility towards Indigenous nations, 
“justifiable infringement” has too often than not made this a mechanism for legitimizing deci-
sions that serve Canada’s financial interests, which revolve mainly around control of natural re-
sources for extraction or tourism purposes. Chapter 4 outlined how financial interest (particularly 
in times of austerity) combined with colonial power dynamics rendered Indigenous consultation 
on the Glacier Skywalk and Maligne Tours developments anti-political. First Nations’ struggles 
are also invisibilized in the eyes of the settler population living in Jasper due to the continued 
alienation of First Nations from their land bases in the park and their lack of access rights. This 
invisibilization stems from the problematic Treaty processes that contained and invisibilized First 
Nations for European settlement and capital accumulation (Alfred, 2005; Youdelis, 2016). Jasper 
residents are not fully aware of Parks Canada’s responsibilities towards First Nations, nor are 
they privy to information on whether park authorities are meeting those requirements. Interest-
ingly, Jasper’s recent decision to allow the Simpcw First Nation to conduct a small, contained 
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traditional hunt in park boundaries has prompted some backlash and discomfort from settler resi-
dents of Jasper and surrounding areas (Proulx, 2017). While conservation groups in Jasper are 
happy to align themselves with Indigenous nations when they feel it’s strategic, the deeply colo-
nial notion that traditional livelihoods harm nature while modern capitalist townsites are benign 
is alive and well with the residents of Jasper as well as with park authorities. It would be very 
difficult to say that settler-colonialism did not matter here.  
  Theories of settler-colonial conservation argue that it warps our understandings of nature-
cultures (Braun, 2002), acts as a tool of primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession 
(Alfred, 2005; Coulthard, 2014), and secures territory for the national interest at the expense of 
first peoples (MacLaren, 2007). What difference does it make that Thailand is not a settler-
colony? As I’ve explained, the Thai system has colonial roots despite Thailand never being for-
mally colonized. The Thai forest system was heavily influenced by British ways of knowing and 
managing forests, and the protected area system was based on British and U.S. models of 
wildlife and nature conservation (Vandergeest, 1996; Vandergeest and Peluso, 2006). The colo-
nial understanding of the human/nature dualism fed into Thailand’s heavy-handed and top-down 
‘fortress’ style conservation where traditional livelihoods (eg. swidden agriculture) were vilified 
and conservation became primarily about securing territory against encroachment (Vandergeest, 
1996; Roth, 2004; Youdelis, 2013). The treatment of ethnic minorities living in forests mirrors 
the treatment of First Nations in Canada, where many communities were expelled from parks, 
and those who were permitted to stay had to change their livelihoods significantly to be in line 
with what was considered “civilized” and compatible with colonial-style conservation (Leblond, 
2010; Thongchai, 2000). The Royal Forestry Department first expelled ethnic minorities from 
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forests to make way for commercial teak extraction, which again could loosely be understood as 
a mechanism for primitive accumulation. Thus the dynamics between the ruling Thai elite, land 
management and ethnic minorities has been similar to a settler-colonial experience without set-
tler-colonialism.  
  Since there was no settlement, however, the expulsion and restriction of ethnic minorities 
in protected areas had more to do controlling territory to protect nature (which was the RFD’s 
way to legitimize its existence and power). The Thai state also used these spaces to “civilize” 
forest dwelling communities and stave off threats of communist indoctrination (Roth, 2004), not 
to make way for colonial settlement or commercial tourism for settlers.  Thus many ethnic mi-
nority communities were in fact allowed to remain in place, so long as they adopted more ‘ac-
ceptable’ forms of agriculture and embraced state-sanctioned entrepreneurialism to meet liveli-
hood needs (Youdelis, 2013). By contrast, Indigenous nations have never been permitted to take 
up residence in the mountain parks in Canada despite growing settler populations in the Banff 
and Jasper townsites. The Thai system is therefore interesting in that on the one hand they have 
recognized that people living in forests can be compatible with conservation, however they’ve 
strictly laid out exactly how one must live in order to be considered environmentally benign. The 
park department’s focus on territorial control and reform of local minorities has given strength to 
the fortress-style system, which developed largely absent of private tourism operators. Protecting 
the parks from ‘encroachment’, be that from private persons living within or surrounding forests 
or from private businesses, is now the raison d’être of the Thai park system. One might say that 
the centrality of the central government and the relative lack of austerity politics in conservation 
thus stems from this unique history of conservation, where settlement and associated settler-fo-
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cused businesses were absent.  
 The lack of settler-colonialism in Thailand also means that the state has no particular re-
sponsibility for ethnic minorities; no duty to consult or accommodate. Despite this, many Hmong 
residents of Doi Pui feel considerably connected to park authorities and that they have influence 
in decision-making that directly impacts their community, something not observed in Indigenous 
communities in Jasper. Doi Pui is a highly visible community, however, as one of the main 
tourist attractions in the area. Tourists often visit Doi Suthep Temple and then make a stop in Doi 
Pui for shopping (the entire village is set up as as an array of shops selling local handicrafts, 
food, etc.). The other Hmong village within the park, Khun Chiang Kian, is far less visible. 
Tourism is nearly absent there as the village is more remote. Community members in Khun Chi-
ang Kian feel completely left out of decision-making with the park and complain that it’s very 
difficult to meet livelihood needs under strict park rules and supervision. Despite Canada having 
a Duty to Consult, First Nations in the Jasper and Banff area are not faring much better than eth-
nic minorities in Khun Chiang Kian. Many face economic hardships and are not benefitting from 
any of the tourism activity in the park, and they are similarly not properly consulted unless they 
explicitly seek out park authorities. Thus in terms of understandings of nature, land management 
and treatment of local peoples, there are many similarities in both sites despite different histories 
with colonialism. The main difference is the financial stake of the parks departments, which can 
be said to have been influenced to some extent by each country’s history with/without settler-
colonialism. 
 Related to colonial histories of park management is the human/nature dualism inherent in 
systems based around ‘wilderness’ thinking (Cronon, 1996). Although proponents in Canada ar-
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gued that their new attractions would help us move us beyond ‘wilderness’-style management, 
I’ve argued (in Chapters 3 and 5) that in many ways such attractions replicate and reinforce 
colonial management. Wilderness in Canada was produced for commercial tourism for well-off 
settlers through violence to Indigenous peoples and their land-based lifeways, and the new mass 
tourism offerings proposed in Jasper do little to change this. What is perhaps changing is the 
white, male associations with wilderness adventurers historically typified in the Canadian parks 
system (Sandilands et al., 2005). Although there has been no social science data to suggest or 
confirm whether new attractions are bringing in new Canadians and urban youth —or how this 
private strategy compares to public programs like Learn to Camp— Parks Canada’s awareness of 
the importance of making parks inclusive to different demographics is a welcomed departure 
from earlier practice. However, the political economy of conservation and austerity politics in 
Canada have also contributed to this push to reach new demographics. As mentioned, the Agency 
Act combined with the fact that private operators have been grandfathered into the mountain 
parks augments the importance of tourism revenues in times of austerity. Dwindling visitation 
combined with dwindling appropriations is thus a serious problem for parks needing to make up 
their yearly budget. Parks Canada’s big push for inclusion of new Canadians and urban youth 
was (and remains) tied to their anxiety around their need to increase visitation and revenues more 
generally. As well, although the whiteness of the Canadian wilderness may be being targeted for 
change, the racist production of wilderness through the continued alienation of First Nations 
from their land bases continues to benefit middle-class (although perhaps not white, male) set-
tlers and visitors from abroad. Traditional livelihoods remain vilified while commercial tourism 
for those with the money to access it is deemed a departure from ‘wilderness’ thinking. 
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 In Thailand, the situation is similar, although it is actually the ethnic minorities who pop-
ulate the park. Traditional livelihoods are similarly vilified and ethnic minorities must meet 
livelihood needs in strict state-circumscribed ways to produce a very particular image of nature 
and wilderness. One main difference is that while wilderness here is similarly produced for 
tourism to some extent, the political economy of Thai conservation is not such that would be 
susceptible to crises of visitation, and there is no similar push to increase visitation yearly or to 
reach different demographics. The parks department here is not explicitly seeking to advance 
commercial tourism through public-private partnerships, but rather another semi-private gov-
ernment agency is seeking to take advantage of the production of this picturesque image of 
wilderness for their own gain under the guise of ‘national development’.  
  Consistent with Thai-style neoliberalisation, ’development’ according to the Pingkanako-
rn Development Agency (PDA) means that local people might have increased opportunities to 
sell handicrafts or engage in other forms of individualized entrepreneurship near the the cable car 
stations. Opponents argue that the cable car would be out of reach for the average Thai person, 
and would be marketed mainly to wealthy and foreign visitors, likely from China as Chinese 
tourism in Chiang Mai has been exploding in recent years (Jarusupawat, 2013). Thus there are 
many similarities between the two cases in terms of the production of wilderness through the 
racialization of local peoples and the restriction of their traditional livelihoods, and that new at-
tractions would largely allow well-off travellers to experience ‘wilderness’ in a particular state-
sanctioned way. The motivations for each proposal differ, however. Private proponents in Canada 
were motivated by dwindling revenues and Parks Canada’s openness to such proposals was born 
out of structural necessity. The PDA in Thailand was motivated by the prospect of fame and for-
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tune (subsidized by the central government), and purportedly by the prospect of bringing eco-
nomic development to the tambons around Chiang Mai. Doi Suthep-Pui park had little to no mo-
tivation to support the project. 
 The issue of development in Thailand, related to the country’s socioeconomic standing as 
a low-income and ‘developing’ state, is one of the reasons why I felt anti-politics was an appro-
priate frame. The theory of anti-politics was developed in relation to development discourse and 
practice (Ferguson, 1994), whereas post-politics developed out of French political philosophers’ 
inquiries into the nature of society and ‘the political’/‘the police’ (Marchart, 2007; Rancière, 
1998). While the strategies and political aims of both can be analogous, the post-politicization of 
conservation involves elevating neoliberal rationality beyond critique (Fletcher, 2015; Swynge-
douw, 2011), which was rather absent in the Thai case. Whereas anti-politics is well-suited for 
neoliberal political economies (Buscher, 2010), anti-political strategies do not necessarily in-
volve the post-political orchestration of consensus around neoliberal rationality. Rather, anti-poli-
tics contains challenges to the status quo and obscures the political and economic causes of a 
given conservation/development problem, and consequently can prescribe solutions that exag-
gerate instead of remedy the problem (see Nadasdy, 2005).  
  In the Doi Suthep-Pui case, the cable car was presented to local residents as an opportuni-
ty for development, but, in true anti-political fashion, this ‘solution’ worked to obscure the struc-
tural causes of underdevelopment and thus proposed a project where the PDA would amass the 
majority of the benefits and individualized entrepreneurs would be responsible for their own de-
velopment by potentially seizing opportunities to sell local handicrafts. The key word here is 
“potentially”. Most opponents felt strongly that the cable car would not change the material reali-
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ties of local people, and thus the anti-politics of consultation here sought to reinforce existing 
hierarchies. One could argue that perhaps there was an attempt to orchestrate a kind of neoliberal 
consensus through promoting an understanding of ‘development’ as individualized entrepreneur-
ship, and through shaming opponents for being too ‘backwards’ to understand that economic de-
velopment means progress. However such discourses aimed at conditioning individuals to see 
themselves as entrepreneurs, rather than at orchestrating consensus around the neoliberal restruc-
turing of Thailand’s political economy of conservation itself. In other words, ‘there is no alterna-
tive’ thinking around park privatization did not factor whatsoever into proponents’ anti-political 
strategies. Absent austerity politics and with neoliberal rationality more openly contested 
(Thongchai, 2008), these strategies proved unsuccessful. I have therefore suggested that austerity 
politics, as a specific mechanism of neoliberalisation, influences the degree to which post-politi-
cization is successful. Or, in other words, neoliberalisation and moves towards privatization lend 
themselves to depoliticization and streamlining of the approval process.  
  I therefore felt that post-politics was the most relevant frame for the case of public con-
sultation in Jasper. The structural pressure to devolve tourism management to the private sector 
and the associated elevation of that structural pressure beyond public debate is emblematic of 
post-politicization. Post-political strategies explicitly discounted political objections to neoliber-
alisation, opening space only for comments that would enhance mitigation measures or the quali-
ty of visitor experience. Although Indigenous consultation in Jasper was also impacted by the 
same structural pressure, I feel as though anti-politics is an appropriate frame for that chapter. 
The chapter builds off of Nadasdy’s (2005) and Buscher’s (2010) work looking at anti-politics in 
a colonial and neoliberal political economy, respectively, and demonstrates how anti-politics op-
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erates in a colonial neoliberal political economy. While Parks Canada’s strategies to depoliticize 
development were influenced by austerity politics and neoliberal rationality, the anti-politics of 
Indigenous consultation was organized around creating the appearance of consent from First Na-
tions and did not focus on orchestrating consensus around neoliberalisation per se. In some re-
spects one might say that consensus was orchestrated through the omission of any discussion 
around budget issues or visitation, but predominantly anti-political strategies elevated colonial 
management structures beyond critique. This was of course influenced by neoliberalisation, but 
because First Nations in Jasper were essentially cut off from residents in the townsite the dis-
courses around development between public and Indigenous consultation were quite different. As 
well, proponents and Parks Canada encouraged buy-in from Indigenous nations by offering the 
possibility of economic development through potential opportunities to sell crafts or perform tra-
ditional dances etc. These meagre offerings (which never did come to fruition in the case of the 
Skywalk) do not acknowledge the structural reasons for First Nations’ alienation and underde-
velopment, and thus the anti-politics of Indigenous consultation in Jasper reinforces and en-
trenches colonial-(neoliberal) capitalist inequalities and power dynamics. We can therefore con-
sider post-politics a more specific and targeted form of anti-politics, which at once constructs and 
depoliticizes the ‘free’ market as the natural and preferred institution of resource allocation and 
social provisioning.   
 Lastly, despite differences in political economy, why is it that we see such similar contro-
versies emerging in both the Global North and the Global South? The truth claims advanced by 
opponents in both cases were starkly similar, stemming from ‘wilderness’ ideology, modernist 
conceptions of nationalism, and an understanding of parks as sacred, common goods. This com-
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monality may stem from the fact that opponents in both cases were largely middle class and ur-
ban/suburban environmentalists. The exception, of course, would be Indigenous opponents in 
Jasper, who also had some differing motivations for opposing the projects. But for middle-class 
environmentalists, appeals to protect a Romantic, untouched vision of nature in the forest largely 
rang true, as did the understanding of parks as belonging to the public at large (not, for example, 
to either the private sector or to Indigenous nations or ethnic minorities). The idea that humanity/
development/capitalism “encroaches” into and disturbs nature was prevalent in both cases, 
stemming from each site’s experience with colonial fortress-style forest management. But a con-
cern for keeping the parks accessible to all and an aversion to the profiteering for a select few 
were also prominent themes in both cases. These disparate experiences demonstrate that pres-
sures on parks departments due to neoliberalisation and/or the impetus to capitalize on conserva-
tion are global phenomena, and that middle-class environmentalisms are, for better or for worse, 
starkly similar around the globe.  
  Perhaps an even more interesting question is why do we observe proponents in both cases 
employing correlative depoliticizing strategies in consultation? I would argue that both sites’ de-
volution of much of the consultation processes to the private proponents themselves contributes 
to this. This devolution can also be understood as ‘neoliberal’ to some extent. Environmental as-
sessments and consultation are expensive, and public departments are considered less efficient 
(particularly in the Canadian case where the cash-strapped parks are looking for any and all ways 
to cut expenditures), so it is expected that if a private proponent wishes to submit an application, 
then they should be responsible for funding and conducting the assessment and any other aspects 
of consultation that the parks department deems appropriate. As mentioned, respondents in 
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Jasper described the Skywalk consultations more so as ‘open houses’ where Brewster and Parks 
Canada officials were presenting project information and fielding questions. Brewster and Ma-
ligne Tours were also in charge of producing their own assessment reports to share with the pub-
lic. Although Parks Canada oversaw this process, former staff argued that Jasper simply lacks the 
capacity and resources to ensure that all of the information presented is accurate and up-to-date, 
once again thanks to successive rounds of austerity. In Chiang Mai, the PDA and Tesco ran the 
assessment and consultation process entirely, including public hearings and one major survey. 
Should the parks department, which has no particular stake in development, have run consulta-
tion, perhaps strategies such as selecting speakers and excluding opponents would not have been 
as prevalent.  
 There are no doubt other compelling questions that arise from looking at these cases to-
gether. Why and how has Thailand maintained public funding for parks whereas Canada has not? 
What are the longterm implications of austerity politics for the viability of the parks system? 
These questions have far-reaching implications, and, although beyond the scope of this project, 
could help inform political praxis that moves away from localized single-issue campaigns and 
starts to take aim at the broader processes that are shaping the post-politicization of conservation 
governance. In the next short concluding chapter, I’ll outline in more detail some of the implica-
tions of this study and summarize the answers to my two main research questions: 1) How do 
social activism and conservation policy co-evolve?, and 2) How does the increasing inclusion of 
private stakeholders shape public and Indigenous participation in conservation governance?  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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
 This dissertation explored the co-evolution of social activism and conservation practice in 
the context of neoliberal rescaling in two distinct socio-economic and geographical settings. 
Given that critical scholarship is increasingly drawing connections between neoliberalisation and 
the emergence of “a post-political or post-democratic socio-spatial configuration” (Swyngedouw, 
2011: 370) —and given that there is a broad but concerted trend towards the neoliberalisation of 
conservation globally— this research sought to enunciate the implications of the connections be-
tween neoliberalisation and depoliticization in conservation zones. Specifically, I explored the 
degree to which local citizens and Indigenous nations could participate democratically in deci-
sion-making around the privatization of national park tourism services (and around how parks 
are managed and funded more generally).  
  Looking at two different controversies around private development and management of 
park services in two different political economic settings, we can draw several conclusions about 
the relationship between neoliberalisation and depoliticization. Devolving public consultation 
and engagement to private proponents of development can elicit the use of anti-political strate-
gies to contain and disavow dissent and streamline the approval process. In both cases, the profit 
motive drove proponents to utilize strategies such as keeping pertinent information from citizens 
and Indigenous actors, co-opting and disciplining dissent, black-box decision-making, and defer-
ring to state-sanctioned ‘experts’ to minimize the opportunity for public engagement and to rele-
gate political debate beyond the public sphere. The devolution of consultation to private propo-
nents resonates with a ‘neoliberal’ rhetoric that sees governments as inefficient entities that 
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should limit public spending. In both cases this led proponents to attempt to orchestrate consent 
by limiting the space for political dissensus.  
  However, as neoliberalisation is a multi-faceted and path-dependent process, the diver-
gences in the political economies of conservation in each case produced diverging outcomes. The 
Glacier Skywalk and the overnight tent cabins and other attractions at Maligne Lake were ap-
proved in Jasper despite overwhelming discontent and pushback, while the cable car project was 
shelved for the third time in Chiang Mai despite the power and notoriety of the private propo-
nents. Ultimately I argue that the stark differences in each site’s histories and experiences with 
neoliberalisation account for this discrepancy. In Canada, the neoliberalisation of conservation 
has proceeded at the federal level, growing out of Canada’s history as a settler-colony where 
conservation was a mechanism of territorialization and primitive accumulation (Braun, 2002; 
Coulthard, 2014). Parks were (and continue to be) tourism destinations for wealthy settlers, and 
private operators have been conducting business in the mountain parks since their inception.  
  In Thailand, I see the neoliberalisation of conservation operating largely at local scales 
and not as evidently at the federal level. Neoliberal conservation interventions vary from park to 
park, and even from village to village within parks (Roth, 2008; Youdelis, 2013). The majority 
are aimed at creating markets for environmental services or at providing increased opportunity 
for entrepreneurship for ethnic minorities living within conservation zones. The localized and 
park-specific neoliberal projects thus do not produce the kind of system-wide structural pressure 
to devolve conservation services to the private sector.  
  Additionally, the discourses around neoliberalisation were distinct between the two cases. 
In Jasper, ‘there is no alternative' thinking both stemmed from and was reinforced by federal aus-
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terity politics that cut funding for protected areas over several years from the 1990s onwards. 
This narrative factored prominently into the truth claims advanced by proponents in Jasper. In 
Maligne Tours’ conceptual proposal, the company was especially bold in their assertion that the 
proposed attractions could generate revenue for Jasper Park to make up for funding lost in suc-
cessive rounds of budget cuts. Opponents would also lament that it appeared there really was no 
alternative. During public consultation, park managers employed several strategies to elevate the 
politics of austerity and the issue of park funding beyond debate, effectively taking private fund-
ing and management of park services for granted. This was not the case in Thailand, where the 
country’s developmental and populist past combined with local citizens’ mistrust of big business 
did not inspire the same kind of 'there is no alternative' thinking. The lack of structural pressure 
in terms of austerity politics similarly did not inspire similar discourses or associated post-politi-
cal strategies. Thus the ways in which, and the scales at which, neoliberalisation has played out 
in relation to each site’s specific histories, institutions, and on-the-ground engagements with con-
servation have been markedly distinct, and have contributed to the diverging outcomes explored 
in this dissertation.  
   As one particular component of neoliberalisation, I have argued that austerity politics 
play a pivotal role in depoliticizing public and Indigenous participation and engagement with 
conservation governance. Following scholars who argue the post-politicization of the public 
sphere converges with processes of neoliberalisation (Fletcher, 2014; Swyngedouw, 2010; Zizek, 
1999), I argue that the politics of austerity create the structural conditions for the post-politiciza-
tion of consultation, reducing democratic oversight of environmental governance more broadly. 
Austerity politics contribute to the orchestration of a post-political ‘there is no alternative’ dis-
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course that accepts private development and management of park services as the best and only 
viable option. Strategies to discipline and co-opt dissent and predetermine outcomes serve to su-
ture space for dissensus and debate and orchestrate (the appearance of) this post-political “con-
sensus”. Agonistic politics are thus replaced by “technocratic questions of cost-benefit ratios 
from which political considerations are largely effaced” (Fletcher, 2014: 330). As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, this may hold ecological implications, as certain environmental knowledges are privi-
leged above others. That is, as ecological concerns are backgrounded while budgetary issues and 
revenue generation are foregrounded. 
 Additionally, much of the literature on post-politics is theoretical with scant grounded 
studies (Beveridge, 2016), and there is little work that explores the relationship between austerity 
politics and post-politicization. As austerity politics are becoming normalized around the globe, 
it is vital that conservation scholars and practitioners explore these connections empirically and 
not just theoretically. By revealing the empirical details of how strategies of depoliticization are 
enacted and confronted in both cases, it allows concerned citizens or scholar-activists to be alert 
to the strategies employed to orchestrate consensus and thus to shape their resistance strategies 
accordingly. While participation in institutionalized consultation processes may not be empower-
ing, drawing attention to the broader political economic processes themselves and the suite of 
practices that stem from them might offer new ways to organize resistance outside of official 
channels, taking aim at the system driving these changes and not the localized changes them-
selves. An empirical understanding of the ways in which austerity politics and the post-political 
orchestration of consensus are intimately linked is thus important analytically, to improve our 
understanding of how certain logics gain currency and stabilize over others in conservation poli-
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cy, but also practically and politically in our quest for alternative and emancipatory political 
economies of conservation. 
 These cases demonstrate that such alternatives are imperative. Neoliberalisation, in theo-
ry, endeavours to decentralize management and enrol a wider network of actors into participa-
tion. Although it may be the case that a greater number of stakeholders can participate, different 
participants are enrolled in the process in uneven ways. Those with the ability to generate capital 
(or those that support capital generation) are prioritized, while those without are enrolled as con-
tributors but within narrowly prescribed parameters (see also Ong, 2006). As demonstrated, this 
becomes exaggerated in times of austerity. Public actors in both cases were invited to comment 
—for instance, to suggest changes that could improve the implementation of a given project— 
but were not given space to bring political or philosophical debate into the public sphere, and 
were certainly not given space to debate the appropriateness of the neoliberalisation of conserva-
tion itself. Several respondents in both cases indicated that they no longer wished to participate 
in such consultation processes, which felt to many to be completely pro forma. Nurturing this 
growing apathy is post-political in itself, further minimizing the role that local and Indigenous 
actors are expected to have in democratic environmental governance. As explained in Chapter 3, 
this case thus has implications for our understanding of the role of consultation in neoliberal con-
servation. Lest we be lured into thinking that neoliberal modes of conservation governance lead 
to more participatory and effective public engagement, this case demonstrates that engagement 
within a neoliberal framework can be pernicious as it serves to disenfranchise public actors to 
lubricate ‘painful-but-necessary’ private sector development, leading to a level of distrust among 
public actors that can deter them from future engagement. Should conservationists desire 
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stronger public participation and engagement, they need to be attentive to the terms of that par-
ticipation and the results of their engagement strategies. 
 Despite the growing cynicism of opponents, their successes (big or small) in both cases 
underscore that depoliticization and neoliberalisation are neither inevitable nor absolute. The 
tenacity of civil society and the unique political economy of conservation in Thailand disrupted 
the success of the privatization/anti-political project. Similarly, although austerity contributed to 
the post-politicization of conservation governance in Canada, public protest was able to frustrate 
the rollout of the neoliberal project. Although overnight accommodations were green-lighted at 
Maligne Lake, Maligne Tours was not able to build their luxury hotel, which was the cornerstone 
of their proposal. These two cases thus demonstrate that conservation practice is a continuous 
site of struggle around the production, circulation and application of various intersecting knowl-
edge claims which give authority to certain policy options while foreclosing alternatives (Forsyth 
& Walker, 2014; Jasanoff, 2004; Matthews, 2011). Conservation authority is not absolute but is 
performatively reproduced through struggle, and arrived at through the relational agency of all 
actants involved, including non-human animals, laws, planning documents, media, political eco-
nomic policies, etc. Despite the power and pressure exerted by private interests in a neoliberal 
political economy, conservation authority is halting and and always open to be taken in a differ-
ent direction. Conservation policy as a struggle for the ascendancy of particular truth claims is 
shaped through interaction with environmental activism, and vice versa.  
 This study has demonstrated that political economy (tied to colonialism) and the politics 
of participatory environmental governance are intimately intertwined and contribute to our un-
derstanding of how and why certain claims gain currency over others and stabilize into policy. 
!190
Austerity politics can augment the power exerted by private interests over public and Indigenous 
actors, neutralizing the import of public and Indigenous participation. This is especially so in a 
colonial neoliberal political economy where the continued alienation of Indigenous peoples from 
their lands is what facilitates ongoing colonial-capitalist accumulation. Where the interests of 
parks departments and private operators align, local and Indigenous participation weakens. It is 
important to understand how political economy and anti- and post-politics coalesce in this way if 
our aim is to challenge and politicize neoliberal ideology in conservation practice. The unsteady 
nature of conservation authority should empower us to see neoliberal conservation as a precari-
ous achievement, and inspire emancipatory political action with an understanding that there are 
always prospects for alternative sustainabilities. 
!191
Bibliography 
Alfred, Taiaiake, 2005. Wasasé: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom. Toronto: Universi-
ty of Toronto Press. 
Alfred, Taiaiake and Tomkins, Erin, 2010. The Politics of Recognition: A Colonial Groundhog. 
Discussion Paper Prepared for Chiefs of Ontario. Toronto: Chiefs of Ontario. 
Anan Ganjanapan, 1998. The Politics of Conservation and the Complexity of Local Control of 
Forests in the Northern Thai Highlands. Mountain Research and Development 18(1): 71-82 
Arnstein, S. 1969. A ladder of citizen participation. Journal of the American Institute of Planners 
35(4): 216-224 
Arsel, M., and Buscher, B., 2012. NatureTM Inc.: Changes and continueties in neoliberal conser-
vation and market-based environmental policy. Development and Change 43(1): 53-78 
Avaaz.org, 2014. Prime Minister Stephen Harper and Environment Minister Leona Aglukkaq: 
Act now to stop the exploitation of Jasper National Park. Online Petition, Available at  
<https://secure.avaaz.org/en/petition/Prime_Minister_Stephen_Harper_and_Environment_Minis-
ter_Leona_Aglukkaq_Act_now_to_stop_the_exploitation_of_Jasper_Nationa/> 
Avaaz.org., 2011. Save Jasper National Park. Online Petition, Available at                           
<http://www.avaaz.org/en/jasper_development/> 
Baird, I., Leepreecha, P. and Yangcheepsutjarit, U., 2016. Who should be considered ‘Indige-
nous’? A survey of ethnic groups in northern Thailand. Asian Ethnicity 18(4): 543-562 
Bajula, T., 2012. Controversial glacier project in Jasper National Park wins approval. The Globe 
and Mail 09/02/2012 
Bakker, K., 2010. Debating green neoliberalism: the limits of ‘neoliberal natures’. Progress in 
Human Geography 34(6): 715-735 
Baldwin, A., 2009a. Ethnoscaping Canada’s Boreal Forest: liberal whiteness and the disaffilia-
tion from colonial space. The Canadian Geographer, 53(2). 
Baldwin, A., 2009b. Carbon nullius and racial rule: race, nature and the cultural politics of forest 
carbon in Canada. Antipode 41(2). 
Bangkok Post, 2013. Public offers mixed views on cable cars. News 27/11/2013. 
Bangkok Post, 2014. Night Safari Boss Sarawut Srisakuna has proven to be a revelation. News 
18/01/2014 
Bangkok Post, 2015. 3 resorts face encroachment charges in parks. News 10/14/2015 
Bella, Leslie, 1987. Parks for Profit. Harvest House Limited Pub. 
!192
Benjaminsen, T.A, Bryceson I, 2012. Conservation, green/blue grabbing and accumulation by 
dispossession in Tanzania. Journal of Peasant Studies 39:335-355 
Beveridge, R. 2016. The (Ontological) Politics in Depoliticization Debates: Three Lenses on the 
Decline of the Political. Political Studies Review 1-12 
Binnema, Theodore and Niemi, Melanie, 2006. ‘Let the Line be Drawn Now’: Wilderness, Con-
servation, and the Exclusion of Aboriginal People from Banff National Park in Canada. Envi-
ronmental History 11(4): 724-750 
Blaikie, P and H Brookfield, 1987. Land Degradation and Society. London: Methuen. 
Borrows J., 2010. Canada’s Indigenous Constitution. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press. 
Boutilier, A., 2014. Parks Canada infrastructure worse than thought, report finds. The Toronto 
Star 05/9/2015 
Boyd, S. and Butler, R., 2009. Tourism and the Canadian national park system: protection, use 
and balance. In Frost, W. and Hall, C.M. [eds.] Tourism and National Parks: International Per-
spectives on Development, Histories and Change. pp. 102-113 
Braun, B., 2002. The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, Culture and Power on Canada’s West 
Coast. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Braun, B. (2003). On the raggedy edge of risk: articulations of race and nature after biology. In 
D. Moore, J. Kosek, & A. Pandian (Eds.), Race, Nature, and the Politics of Difference (pp. 175-
203). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Brenner, N. and Theodore, N., 2002. Cities and geographies of “actually existing neoliberalism”. 
Antipode 34(3): 349-379 
Brockington, D., Duffy, R., and Igoe, J., 2008. Nature Unbound: Conservation, Capitalism and 
the Future of Protected Areas. Routledge. 
Brockington, D. and Duffy, R., 2010. Conservation and Capitalism: An Introduction. Antipode 
42(3): 469-484 
Brown, W. 2003. Neoliberalism and the end of liberal democracy. Theory and Event 7(1): 
Buscher, B., 2010. Anti-Politics as a Political Strategy: Neoliberalism and Transfrontier Conser-
vation in South Africa. Development and Change 4(1): 29-51 
Buscher, B. and Dressler, W., 2010. Commodity Conservation. The restructuring of community 
conservation in South Africa and the Philippines. Geoforum, 43(3), 367-376. 
Büscher, B. and Igoe, J., 2013. ‘Prosuming’ Conservation? Web 2.0, Nature and the Intensifica-
tion of Value-Producing Labour in Late Capitalism. Journal of Consumer Culture 13, 3 
!193
Buscher, B., Sullivan, S., Neves, K., Igoe, J., and Brockington, D., 2012. Towards a Synthesized 
Critique of Neoliberal Biodiversity Conservation. Capitalism Nature Socialism 23(2): 4-30 
Buscher, B., W. Dressler, and R. Fletcher [Eds]. 2014. Nature Inc.: Environmental Conservation 
in a Neoliberal Age. Tucson: The University of Arizona Press. 
Butler, J., 1990. Gender Trouble. Routledge. 
Cameron, Emilie, 2008. Indigenous spectrality and the politics of postcolonial ghost stories. Cul-
tural Geographies 15: 383-393 
Campbell, Claire [Ed.], 2011. A Century of Parks Canada 1911-2011. Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press. 
Carroll, C, 2014. Native enclosures: Tribal national parks and the progressive politics of envi-
ronmental stewardship in Indian Country. Geoforum 53: 31-40 
Castree, N., 2008. Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and reregulation. Environ-
ment and Planning A 40(1): 131-152 
Catree, N., 2010. Neoliberalism and the Biophysical Environment 1: What ‘Neoliberalism’ is, 
and What Difference Nature Makes to it. Geography Compass 4(12): 1725-1733 
Castree, N and T. MacMillan, 2001. Dissolving Dualisms: Actor-Networks and the Reimagina-
tion of Nature. In Castree and Braun (eds.) Social Nature: Theory, Practice and Politics. Black-
well Publishers. 
Cavanagh, C., and Benjaminsen, T., 2014. Viatual nature, violent accumulation: the 'spectacular 
failure’ of carbon offsetting at a Ugandan National Park. Geoforum 56: 55-65 
CBC News, 2012. Jasper glacier walk targeted by online petition. Edmonton, 01/12/12 
Chanathit, K, and Tumnukasetchai, P., 2015. D-Day in war against forest encroachers. The Na-
tion 05/20/2015 
Chiang Mai Mail, 2013. Government proposes controversial cable car to Doi Pui again. Vol XII, 
No. 24, 14/12/2013. 
Chomsky, N. 1999. Profit over people: Neoliberalism and global order. New York: Seven Stories 
Press. 
Chusak, W. 1994. Local institutions in common property resource. Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Victoria,Victoria, Canada. 
Chusak Wittayapak, 2008. History and geography of identifications related to resource conflicts 
and ethnic violence in Northern Thailand. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 49(1): 111-127 
!194
Collins, J., 2012. Parks Canada moving ahead with plans to privatize Cape Breton properties. 
Cape Breton Post, 12/09/2012 
Coulthard, Glen, 2014. Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. 
University of Minnesota Press. 
CPAWS (Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society), 2011. Theme park-like attraction doesn’t be-
long in Jasper National Park. CPAWS News, 12/15/2011  
CPAWS (Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society), 2012. The State of Canada’s Parks, 2012 Re-
port. CPAWS Yearly Report, Alberta. 
Cronon, W., 1996. The Trouble With Wilderness. In Uncommon Ground: rethinking the human 
place in nature. New York: WW Norton. 
Darlington, S., 2009. Buddhist Responses to the Thai Environmental Crisis. In Bhushan, N., 
Garfield, J. and Zablocki, A. [Eds.] TransBuddhism: Transmission, Translation, Transformation. 
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 
Derworiz, C., 2015. Plan to nearly double capacity of Lake Louise ski hill sparks debate over 
environmental impact. Calgary Herald 05/20/2015 
Dressler, W. and Roth, R., 2011. The Good, the Bad, and the Contradictory: Neoliberal Conser-
vation Governance in Rural Southeast Asia. World Development 39(5): 851-862 
Doberstein, B and Devin, S, 2004. Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Parks Management: A 
Canadian Perspective. Environments 32(1): 47-61 
Duffy, R., and Moore, L., 2010. Neolbieralising Nature? Elephant-back tourism in Thailand and 
Botswana. Antipode 42(3): 742-766 
Elliot, S.D., Maxwell, J.F. and Beaver, O.P., 1989. A transect survey of monsoon forest in Doi 
Suthep-Doi Pui National Park. Natural History Bulletin Siam Society 37(2): 137-171 
Ellis, S, 2005. Meaningful Consideration? A Review of Traditional Knowledge in Environmental 
Decision Making. Arctic 58(1): 66-77 
Erickson, B., 2011. "A Fantasy in White in a World that is Dead’: Grey Owl and the Whiteness 
of Surrogacy” in Laura Cameron, Audrey Kobayashi and Andrew Baldwin, Rethinking the Great 
White North: Race, Nature and the Historical Geographies of Whiteness in Canada, Vancouver: 
UBC  
Fairhead, J. and Leach, M., 1996. Misreading the African Landscape: Society and Ecology in a 
Forest-Savana Mosaic. Routledge: London.  
Ferree, M., Gamson, W., Gerhards, J., and Rucht, D., 2002. Four models of the public sphere in 
modern democracies. Theory and Society (31)3): 289-324 
!195
Ferguson, J., 1994. The anti-politics machine: Development, depoliticization, and bureaucratic 
power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.  
Fisher, R., 2010. Devolution or Persistence of State Control? In Vandergeest, P., and Chusak Wit-
tayapak [Eds.], 2002. The Politics of Decentralization: Natural Resource Management in Asia. 
Silkworm Books. pp. 21-38 
Fitzhugh, 2012. Jasper to celebrate aboriginal culture. Archive 21/06/2012 
Fitzhugh, 2013a. Film features newcomers in Jasper. Archive 04/05/2013 
Fitzhugh, 2013b. Maligne Lake consultations begin. Featured News 20/11/2013 
Fletcher, R., 2010. Neoliberal Environmentality: Towards and Poststructuralist Political Ecology 
of the Conservation Debate. Conservation and Society 8(3): 171-181 
Fletcher, R., 2011. Sustaining tourism, sustaining capitalism? The tourism industry’s role in 
global capitalist expansion. Tourism Geographies 13(3): 443-461 
Fletcher, R., 2012. Using the Master’s Tools? Neoliberal Conservation and the Evasion of In-
equality. Development and Change 43(1): 295-317 
Fletcher, R., 2013. Bodies Do Matter: The Peculiar Persistence of Neoliberalism in Environmen-
tal Governance. Human Geography 6(1) 
Fletcher, R. 2014. Orchestrating consent: Post-politics and Intensification of NatureTM Inc. at the 
2012 World Conservation Congress. Conservation and Society 12(3): 329-342 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 1998. Country Report: Thailand. Thailand: Forestry 
Sector Outlook Studies. 
Forrest, M, 2014. National Conservation Plan ignores national parks, wilderness. CBC News 
06/02/2014 
Forsyth, T., 2003a. Critical Political Ecology. The politics of environmental science. New York: 
Routedge.  
Forsyth, T., 2003b. Shaping public understandings of environmental degradation: measuring 
public participation in environmental narratives about Thailand’s forests, 1968-2000. Conference 
paper: Politics of the Commons: Articulating Development and Strengthening Local Practices, 
Chiang Mai, Thailand. 
Forsyth, T., 2007. Are environmental social movements socially exclusive? An historical study 
from Thailand. World Development, 35(12): 2110-2130 
Forsyth, T and Walker, A., 2008. Forest guardians, Forest destoyers: The politics of environmen-
tal knowledge in Northern Thailand. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 
!196
Forsyth, T., and Walker, A., 2014. Hidden Alliances: Rethinking Environmentally and the Poli-
tics of Knowledge in Thailand’s Campaign for Community Forestry. Conservation and Society 
12(4): 408-417 
Foucault, M., 2008. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France. New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan. 
Friesen, J., 2015. CPAWS: Canada’s national parks in ‘crisis’. Metro News 09/10/2015 
Frost, W. and Hall, C.M., 2009. National parks, national identity and tourism. In Frost, W. and 
Hall, C.M. [eds.] Tourism and National Parks: International Perspectives on Development, His-
tories and Change. pp. 63-78  
Gadd, B., 2013. Ben Gadd’s letter to “the enemy”. Jasper Environmental Association, 
12/12/2013. Available at < http://www.jasperenvironmental.org/ben-gadds-letter-to-the-enemy/> 
Gibson-Graham, JK, 2006. A Postcapitalist Politics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Glassman, Jim, Park, Bae-Gyoon, and Choi, Young-Jin, 2008. Failed Internationalism and Social 
Movement Decline: The Cases of South Korea and Thailand. Critical Asian Studies 40(3): 
339-372 
Global News, 2013. Could Jasper’s Maligne Lake be in jeopardy? 12/08/2013, Available at < 
http://globalnews.ca/news/776867/could-jaspers-maligne-lake-be-in-jeopardy/> 
Golder Associates Ltd. 2011. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act Screening: Glacier Dis-
covery Walk. 
Goldman, M., Nadasdy, P. and Turner, M., 2011. Knowing Nature. University of Chicago Press. 
The Gondola Project, 2014. Weekly Roundup. 24/01/2014, Available at    
<http://gondolaproject.com/category/weekly-roundup/page/2/> 
Government of Canada, 2010. The Government of Canada's Approach to Implementation of the 
Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal Self-Government. Available at < http://
www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1100100031844> 
Government of Canada, 2011. Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guidelines 
for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult. March, 2011 
Green Party of Canada, 2012. National Parks should be Wildlife Sanctuaries, not Cash Cows. 
Ottawa, 01/09/12. Available at <http://www.greenparty.ca/media-release/2012-01-09/national-
parks-should-be-wildlife-sanctuaries-not-cash-cows> 
Haberkorn, T., 2011. Revolution Interrupted. The University of Wisconsin Press. 
!197
Haida Nation v. British Columbia, 2004. Supreme Court Case 29419, British Columbia 
Hansen, Sarah and Bear Robe, Kennedy, 2014. SCC Ruling on Aboriginal Title: Tsilhqot’in Na-
tion v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 and Significant Changes to the Legal Landscape. Aborig-
inal Law Update, Miller Thompson Lawyers. Available at <http://www.millerthomson.com/en/
publications/communiques-and-updates/aboriginal-law-update/july-2014/scc-ruling-on-aborigi-
nal-title-tsilhqotin> 
Haraway, D., 1992. The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Oth-
ers. in Grossberg, Lawrence, Nelson, Cary and Treichler, Pauls (eds.) Cultural Studies. New 
York: Routledge. 
Hardt, M., and Negri, A., 2000. Empire. Harvard University Press. 
Harvey, D., 2004. The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, D. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hawkes, S., 1996. Gwaii Haanas Agreement: from conflict to cooperation. Environments 23(2): 
87-100 
Higgins-Desbiolles, Freya, 2011. Death by a thousand cuts: governance and environmental trade-
offs in ecotourism development at Kangaroo Island, South Australia. Journal of Sustainable 
Tourism 19(4-5): 553-570 
Hill, R. C., Park, B.-G. and Saito, A. (2011) Introduction: Locating Neoliberalism in East Asia, in 
Locating Neoliberalism in East Asia: Neoliberalizing Spaces in Developmental States (eds B.-G. 
Park, R. C. Hill and A. Saito),Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK. 
Hirsch, P., and Lohmann, L., 1989. Contemporary Politics of Environment in Thailand. Asian 
Survey, 29(4): 439-451 
Holmes, G. and C. Cavanagh. 2015. A review of the social impacts of neoliberal conservation: 
Formations, inequalities, contestations. Geoforum 75: 199-209 
Igoe, J, and Brockington, D., 2007. Neoliberal Conservation: A brief introduction. Conservation 
and Society 5(4): 432-449 
Jarusupawat, J., 2013. Film sparks Chinese tourist boom in Chiang Mai. The Nation  01/12/2013 
Jasanoff, S., 2004. States of Knowledge: The co-production of science and social order. Rout-
ledge.  
Jasper Environmental Association, 2012. Chronology of a campaign to stop a juggernaut in par-
adise. Blog Roll, 05/02/2012 
!198
Jasper Environmental Association, 2014. Biologists’ Letter Regarding Maligne Hotel Proposal. 
07/01/2014, Available at < http://www.jasperenvironmental.org/biologists-letter-regarding-ma-
ligne-hotel-proposal/> 
Keeling, P., 2008. Does the idea of wilderness need a defence? Environmental Values 17: 505–
519 
Keeling, P., 2013. Wilderness, People, and the False Charge of Misanthropy. Environmental 
Ethics 35(4): 387-405 
Kelly, A.B., 2011. Conservation practice as primitive accumulation. Journal of Peasant Studies 
38:683-701 
Keung, N., 2012. Nature’s Invitation: Wilderness explored through Canadian immigrants’ eyes in 
new doc. The Toronto Star, Entertainment 09/10/2012 
Khoo Boo Teik, 2010. Social movements and the crisis of neoliberalism in Malaysia and Thai-
land. Institute of Developing Economies, Discussion Paper No.238 
Kirchoff, D. and L. Tsuji, L. 2014. Reading between the lines of the ‘Responsible Resource De-
velopment’ rhetoric: the use of omnibus bills to ‘streamline’ Canadian environmental legislation. 
Impact assessment and Project Appraisal 32(2): 108-120 
Klein, N., 2008. The Shock Doctrine. Vintage Canada. 
Kopas, P. S. 2007. Taking the air: Ideas and change in Canada's national parks. Vancouver: 
UBC Press. 
Kornkritch Somjittranukit, 2016. Junta’s charter aims to weaken Thai democracy: academic. 
Pratchatai English News 16/03/2016 
Land, Lorraine, 2014. Creating the Perfect Storm for Conflicts over Aboriginal Rights: Critical 
New Developments in the Law of Aboriginal Consultation. The Commons Institute. 
Lansing, D., Collard, RC, Dempsey, J., Sundberg, J., Heynen, N., Buscher, B., Dressler, W., and 
Fletcher, R., 2015. Review symposium. Nature Inc.: environmental conservation in a neoliberal 
age. Environment and Planning A 47: 2389-2408 
LaRocco, Tim, 2011. Neoliberalism and Thailand’s Class Struggle. Foreign Policy Association, 
06/08/11, available at <foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/06/08/neoliberalism-and-thailands-class-
struggle/> 
Latour, B., 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.  
Latour, B., 1996. On actor-network theory. A few clarifications plus more than a few complica-
tions. Sociale Welt 47: 369-381 
!199
Latt, Sai, 2008. Examining the “success” of a northern Thai Royal Project. The New Mandala 
September 5th, 2008 
Leblond, Jean-Philippe, 2010. Population displacement and forest management in Thailand. 
Working Paper no. 8, ChATSEA Working Papers. 
LeFevre, T., 2015. Settler Colonialism. Oxford Bibliographies Online Available at < http://
www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780199766567/
obo-9780199766567-0125.xml> 
Li, T., 1999. Transforming the Indonesian Uplands: Marginality, Power and Production. Rout-
ledge 
Li, T., 2007. The Will to Improve. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Lohmann, Larry, 1999. Forest Cleansing: Racial Oppression in Scientific Nature Conservation. 
Corner House Briefing 13 
Lonely Planet, 2014. Introducing Doi Suthep-Doi Pui National Park. Available at < http://
www.lonelyplanet.com/thailand/chiang-mai-province/doi-suthep-pui-national-park> 
Loo, Tina, 2006. States of Nature: Conserving Canada’s Wildlife in the Twentieth Century. Van-
couver: UBC Press. 
Mabee and Hoberg. (2006). Equal Partners? Assessing Comanagement of Forest Resources in 
Clayoquot Sound. Society and Natural Resources 19: 875-888 
MacDonald, K. I., 2010. The Devil is in the (bio)Diversity: Private Sector ‘Engagement’ and the 
Restructuring of Biodiversity Conservation. Antipode 42(3), 512-49 
MacLaren, I.S., 2007. Culturing Wilderness in Jasper National Park: Studies in Two Centuries of 
Human History in the Upper Athabasca River Watershed. Edmonton: The University of Alberta 
Press. 
MacLaren, I.S., 2011. Rejuvinating Wilderness: The Challenge of Reintegrating Aboriginal Peo-
ples into the “Playground” of Jasper National Park. In Campbell, Claire [Ed.] A Century of Parks 
Canada 1911-2011. Calgary: Calgary University Press. pp. 333-370 
Maligne Tours. 2013. A Conceptual Proposal for Responsible Experiential Enhancement at Ma-
ligne Lake. 
Manowong, E., and Ogunlana, S., 2006. Public hearings in Thailand's infrastructure projects: ef-
fective participations? Engineering, Construction and Architectural Management 13(4):343-363 
Marchart, O. 2007. Post-Foundational political thought - Political difference in Nancy, Lefort, 
Badou and Laclau. Edinburgh: University Press. 
!200
Masayuki, N., 2011. The Emergence of a Nature Conservation Ritual: Local Negotiations with 
Environmentalism in Northern Thailand. In Masayuki, N. Negotiating Community: Local Adap-
tation Strategies in State Forest Policy in Northern Thailand. Australian National University. 
Mathews, A., 2011. Instituting Nature. MIT Press. 
Matichon, 2014. Civil society writes open letter to protest cable car to Doi Suthep. Matichon On-
line News 07/18/2014 
McCarthy, J., 2012. The Financial Crisis and Environmental Governance ‘After’ Neoliberalism. 
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie 103(2): 180-195 
Mertz, E., 2015. Conservation groups challenge Jasper National Park development concept in 
court. Global News 10/27/2015 
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada, 2005. Supreme Court Case 30246, Minister of Canadian 
Heritage 
Mitchell, T., 2002. The Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-politics, Modernity. University of Cali-
fornia Press. 
Mouffe, C. 2005. On the political. London: Routledge. 
Murphy, Peter, 2007. Homesteading in the Athabasca Valley to 1910. In MacLaren [Ed.] Cultur-
ing Wilderness in Jasper National Park: Studies in Two Centuries of Human History in the Up-
per Athabasca River Watershed. Edmonton: The University of Alberta Press. pp 123-154 
Murray, G. and King, L., 2012. First Nations Values in Protected Area Governance: Tla-o-qui-aht 
Tribal Parks and Pacific Rim National Park Reserve. Human Ecology 40: 385-395 
Nadasdy, Paul, 2005. The Anti-Politics of TEK: The Institutionalization of Co-Management Dis-
course and Practice. Anthropologica 47(2): 215-232 
Nancy, JL. 1992. La comparution/The compearance. From the existence of “communism” to the 
community of “existence”. Political Theory 20: 371-398 
The Nation, 1987. Nation Publishing Group Co., Ltd: Bangkok. 24/09/1987 
The Nation, 2007. Tourism Infrastructure: State firms to take lead role. Available at < http://
www.nationmultimedia.com/home/TOURISM-INFRASTRUCTURE-State-firms-to-take-lead-
ro-353.html>  
The Nation, 2014. Doi Suthep group opposes cable car project. 05/02/2014, Available at < http://
www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Doi-Suthep-group-opposes-cable-car-
project-30226084.html> 
Neumann, Roderick P., 2005. Making Political Ecology.  New York:  Oxford University Press, 
and London:  Hodder Arnold.   
!201
Nichols, T., 2014. Protestors mobilize against Maligne developments. The Fitzhugh 07/02/2014 
Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada (OCL-C), 2013. Registration – Consultant: 
Brewster Travel Canada/Brian Klunder, Consultant. Government of Canada 
Olynyk, John, 2005. The Haida Nation and Taku River Tlingit Decisions: Clarifying Roles and 
Responsibilities for Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation. The Negotiator, Lawson Lun-
dell LLP 
Ong, A., 2006. Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in Citizenship and Sovereignty. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press. 
Parks Canada, 2011a. The State of Canada’s Natural and Historic Places 2011. Available at 
<www.pc.gc.ca/docs/pc/rpts/elnhc-scnhp/2011/part-b.aspx> 
Parks Canada, 2011b. Questions and Answers – The Proposed Brewster Travel Glacier Walk. 
Glacier Discovery Walk Project Materials 
Parks Canada, 2012. What We Heard: A Summary of Public Comments on the Brewster’s Pro-
posed Glacier Walk in Jasper National Park and Parks Canada’s Response. Available at < http://
www.pc.gc.ca/eng/pn-np/ab/jasper/plan/plan15.aspx> 
Parks Canada, 2014. Parks Canada Attendance 2009-10 to 2013-14. Available at < http://
www.pc.gc.ca/eng/docs/pc/attend/notes.aspx> 
Peepre, J and Dearden, P, 2002. The Role of Aboriginal Peoples. In Dearden and Rollins [Eds] 
Parks and Protected Areas in Canada: Planning and Management. Toronto: Oxford University 
Press. 
Peet, R. & Watts, M. eds., 2004. Liberation ecologies: environment, development, social move-
ments 2nd ed., London: Routledge.  
Peluso, N., 1992. Rich Forests, Poor People. London: University of California Press. 
Peyton, J. and A. Franks. 2015. The new nature of things? Canada’s conservative government 
and the design of the new environmental subject. Antipode 48(2): 453-473 
Pholpoke, C., 1998. The Chiang Mai cable-car project: Local controversy over cultural and eco-
tourism. In Hirsch, P. and Warren, C. [Eds.] Politics of the Environment in Southeast Asia. Lon-
don: Routledge. 
Pinkaew Laungaramsri, 2002. Redefining Nature: Karen Ecological Knowledge and the Chal-
lenge to the Modern Conservation Paradigm. Chennai: Earthworm Books. 
Plummer, E., 2013. Plans to expand tourism at Maligne Lake. Hinton Parklander 25/11/2013 
Polanyi, K., 1944. The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press.  
!202
Pragtong, K., 2000. Recent decentralization plans of the Royal Forest Department and its impli-
cations for forest management in Thailand. In Enters, T., Durst, P.B., and M. Victor [Eds] Decen-
tralization and devolution of forest management in Asia and the Pacific. RECOFTC Report N.18 
and RAP Publication 2000/1. Bangkok, Thailand. 
Pratt, S. 2015. Open letter supports fired Alberta park employee, warns of 'deep fear' in civil ser-
vice. Edmonton Journal 09/23/2015 
Proulx, B., 2017. The hunt is on - and I don’t like it. Sherwood Park News 10/26/2017 
Rancière, J. 1998. Disagreement. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Rocheleau, D. E., 2008. Political ecology in the key of policy: From chains of explanation to 
webs of relation. Geoforum 39(2), 716-727 
Rodon, T, 1998. Co-management and Self-determination in Nunavut. Polar Geography 22(2): 
119-135 
Ross, H., Buchy, M., and Proctor, W., 2002. Laying down the ladder: A Typology of Public Par-
ticipation in Australian Natural Resource Management. Australian Journal of Environmental 
Management 9(4): 205-217 
Roth, R., 2004. Spatial organization of environmental knowledge: conservation conflicts in the 
inhabited forest of northern Thailand. Ecology and Society 9(3) 
Roth, R., 2008. ‘Fixing’ the Forest: The Spatiality of Conservation Conflict in Thailand. Annals 
of the Association of American Geographers 98(2):373-391 
Roth, Robin and Dressler, Wolfram, 2012. Market-oriented conservation governance: The partic-
ularities of place. Geoforum 43: 363-366 
Sandilands, C., Hessing, M. and Raglon, R., 2005. This Elusive Land: Women and the Canadian 
Environment. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 
Sandlos, John, 2008. Not Wanted In the Boundary: The Expulsion of the Keeseekoowenin Ojib-
way Band from Riding Mountain National Park. The Canadian Historical Review 89(2): 
189-221 
Sandlos, John, 2014. National Parks in the Canadian North: Co-management or Colonialism? In 
Stevens, Stan [Ed.] Indigenous Peoples, National Parks and Protected Areas: A New Paradigm 
Linking Conservation, Culture and Rights. University of Arizona Press. pp 133-149 
Scott, J., 2009. The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia. 
Yale University Press. 
!203
Spak, S, 2005. The Position of Indigenous Knowledge in Canadian Co-Management Organiza-
tions. Anthropologica 47(2): 233-246 
Sopranzetti, C., 2017. Framed by Freedom: Emancipation and Oppression in Post-Fordist Thai-
land. Cultural Anthropology 32(1): 68-92 
Stephenson, A and Ellis, C., 2012. Parks Canada seeks private operators for mountain hot 
springs. The Calgary Herald, 02/05/2012 
Sullivan, S., 2006. The elephant in the room? Problematising ‘new’ (neoliberal) biodiversity con-
servation. Forum for Development Studies 33(1): 105-135 
Sullivan, S., 2013. Banking Nature: The Spectacular Financialization of Environmental Conser-
vation. Antipode 45(1): 198-217 
Sundberg, J., 2004. Identities in the making: conservation, gender, and race in the Maya Bios-
phere Reserve, Guatemala. Gender, Place and Culture 11(1): 43-66 
Swangjang, KB, Wathern, P. and Rochanaburanon, T., 2004. Ecological issues in Thai environ-
mental assessment scoping guidance. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 22(4): 271-281 
Swearer, D., 2001. Principles and Poetry, Places and Stories: The Resources of Buddhist Ecolo-
gy. Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Science, Fall 2001 
Swyngedouw, E. 2010. Apocalypse forever? Post-political populism and the spectre of climate 
change. Theory, Culture & Society 27(2-3): 213-232 
Swyngedouw, E. 2011. Interrogating post-democratization: Reclaiming egalitarian political spa-
ces. Political Geography 30: 370-380 
Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia, 2004. Supreme Court Case 29146, British 
Columbia 
Thongchai Winichakul, 2000. The Quest for "Siwilai": A Geographical Discourse of Civiliza-
tional Thinking in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth-Century Siam. The Journal of Asian 
Studies 59(3): 528-549 
Thongchai Winichakul, 2008. Nationalism and the Radical Intelligentsia in Thailand. Third 
World Quarterly 29(3): 575-591. 
Tomforde, M., 2003. The Global in the Local: Contested Resource-use Systems of the Karen and 
Hmong in Northern Thailand. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34(2): 347-360 
Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. 2016. Strategic and Operating Overview. Available at: 
https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/corporate/transparency/strategic-operating-
review.html 
!204
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014. Supreme Court Case 34986, British Columbia 
Tsing, A. 1999. Becoming a Tribal Elder, and Other Green Development Fantasies.  In Tania Li 
(ed.) Transforming the Indonesian Uplands. Harwood Academic Press. 
Turner, C. 2013. The war on science: Muzzled scientists and wilful blindness in Stephen Harper’s 
Canada. Vancouver: Greystone Books. 
United Nations Development Program, 2007. Thailand Human Development Report: Sufficiency 
Economy and Human Development. 
Urquhart, I., 2012. Letter to the Editor. Fitzhugh, Japser, 29/03/2012 
Vandergeest, P., and Peluso, NL., 1995. Territorialization and State Power in Thailand. Theory 
and Society 24: 385-426. 
Vandergeest, P., 1996. Mapping Nature: Territorialization of Forest Rights in Thailand. Society 
and Natural Resources 9: 159-175 
Vandergeest, P., and Chusak Wittayapak [Eds.], 2002. The Politics of Decentralization: Natural 
Resource Management in Asia. Silkworm Books. 
Vandergeest, P., 2003. “Racialization and citizenship in Thai forest politics”. Society & Natural 
Resources, 16(1): 19-37 
Vandergeest, P., and Peluso, NL., 2006. Empires of Forestry: Professional Forestry and State 
Power in Southeast Asia, Part 1. Environment and History 1: 3-64 
Veerman, N. 2016. Judge dismisses Maligne court battle in Jasper park. The Fitzhugh 02/12/2016 
Walker, A., 2001. The ‘Karen Consensus’, Ethnic Politics and Resource-Use Legitimacy in 
Northern Thailand. Asian Ethnicity 2(2): 145-162 
Walker, A., and Farrelly, N., 2008. Northern Thailand’s Specter of Eviction. Critical Asian Stud-
ies 40(3): 373-397 
Waterstone, M. and de Leeuw, S., 2010. A sorry state: Apology expected. Human Geography 
3(3): 1-28 
Weber, B., 2014. Former Parks Canada Bosses Fight Proposal for Hotel at Maligne Lake Near 
Jasper. The Canadian Press 04/09/2014 
West, P, Carrier, J., 2004. Ecotourism and authenticity: getting away from it all?. Current An-
thropology, 45(4): 483-498 
Whatmore, S., 2002. Hybrid geographies: Natures, cultures, spaces. London: Sage Publications.  
!205
Wittmeier, B., 2012. Federal government approves Jasper glacier walkway. Edmonton Journal, 
02/10/12 
Wondolleck, J. M., Manring, N. J and Crowfoot, J. E., 1996. Teetering at the top of the ladder: 
the experience of citizen group participants in alternative dispute resolution processes. Sociologi-
cal Perspectives, 39(2): 249–62.  
Yos Santasombat, 2003. Biodiversity, Local Knowledge, and Sustainable Development. Regional 
Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development (RCSD), Chiang Mai. 
Youdelis, M. 2013. The Competitive (Dis)advantages of Ecotourism in Northern Thailand. Geo-
forum 50: 161-171  
Youdelis, M. 2016. “They could take you out for coffee and call it consultation!”: The Colonial 
Antipolitics of Indigenous Consultation in Jasper National Park. Environment and Planning A 
48(7): 1374-1392 
Young, E, 2003. Balancing Conservation and Development in Marine-Dependent Communities: 
Is Ecotourism an Empty Promise? In Bassett, T. & Zimmer, K. [eds] Political ecology: An inte-
grative approach to geography and environment-development studies. pp 29-49 
Zizek, S. 1999. The ticklish subject - The absence centre of political ontology. London: Verso. 
Zizek, S. 2008. Trouble in paradise: From the end of history to the end of capitalism. Penguin 
UK. 
!206
Appendix A: Interview Questions 
 Interview questions were tailored for each particular respondent as I interviewed a wide 
cross-section of people in varying positions (private companies, park authorities, environmental 
organizations, local residents, etc.). The following are some sample questions for people in each 
of these categories.  
Questions for Private Business Owners in Jasper (eg. for the President of Brewster Travel) 
Background 
1) You recently took over as President of Brewster from Michael Hannan. Please describe 
your job role and responsibilities. 
2) Why did you choose to start working with Brewster? Tell me a bit about yourself, educa-
tion, etc. 
Conservation 
1) What do you think is(are) the role(s) of national parks? In your opinion, has the role of 
national parks changed over the last few decades? 
2) A lot has been written on the dual mandate of National Parks in Canada (ecological in-
tegrity and visitor experience), how do you see this dual mandate? Is there a good balance 
in Jasper National Park? Does the balance between the two need to be changed? 
3) Are national parks important to you? Why or why not? 
4) What is your understanding of the role of the private sector in parks? Has your opinion 
changed in your time working with Brewster? 
5) How does the Glacier Skywalk relate to the park’s conservation goals?  
6) The 2001 National Parks Act states ecological integrity is Parks Canada’s first priority. Do 
you believe that the Glacier Skywalk is in accordance with this agenda? 
7) In your opinion, how does the Glacier Skywalk help people to connect with nature?  
8) How would you respond to people who claim the Glacier Skywalk will set a precedent for 
further private tourism development in Jasper? 
9) How do you respond to UNESCO’s draft report that lists the Glacier Skywalk as a ‘high 
threat’ for Jasper National Park? 
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10) How do you respond to public concerns regarding the length and breadth of the environ-
mental assessment study? Do you feel the GS will impact wildlife in the area? 
11) Opponents have argued that the Glacier Skywalk is not in keeping with the Jasper Man-
agement Plan, which directs that only projects that require a minimum of built facilities 
will be considered. How would you respond to this? 
12) Brewster is also funding the Wildlife Guardian Program for 5 years, can you tell me a bit 
about this program? 
Logistics 
1) How does the partnership between Parks Canada and Brewster Travel operate?  
2) How long is your current lease contract with Parks Canada? What are the conditions for 
renewal? The GS was a new lease? 
3) Does Parks Canada receive a percentage of the Glacier Skywalk revenues? If yes, what 
percentage? What percentage goes to the Crown versus Jasper park? 
4) Are there limits to the size and number of attractions that Brewster can develop within the 
park? How are these limits determined? 
5) You also sit on the AMPPE Board of Directors along with other CEOs of tourism opera-
tors in Jasper. Can you explain AMPPE’s relationship with Parks Canada? To what extent 
are AMPPE board of directors involved in park decision-making? (AMPPE encourages 
parks to value visitor experience as an equal part of park mandate) 
6) Explain to me the process through which the Glacier Walkway got approved. To your 
knowledge, was there a lot of debate internal to Parks Canada? Who were you dealing 
with primarily? 
7) The media has been running stories claiming that Greg Fenton requested more time to de-
liberate on the decision, but then Minister of the Environment Peter Kent stepped in to 
make the final decision. Is this an accurate assessment? Please explain how the final deci-
sion on the Glacier Walkway was made. 
8) Opponents argue that Peter Kent stepped in in part due to the fact that Brewster sent a 
lobbyist to Ottawa. To what extent do you think this influenced the decision? 
9) The media has been running stories about budget cuts to Parks Canada over recent years. 
To what extent do Brewster’s operations in the park help to mitigate this fiscal situation? 
10) What social science evidence did you use to determine that visitors to Jasper wanted an 
attraction like the Glacier Skywalk? What evidence is there to support that the Skywalk 
will attract new Canadians and urban youth? 
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11) Do you measure visitor experience at your attractions? What criteria are used to assess 
whether you have increased understanding, appreciation and enjoyment? 
Advertising 
1) How did you go about advertising the Glacier Walkway? 
2) What strategies or tools did Brewster employ to inform people of the merits of the devel-
opment? What obstacles did you face? 
Public Consultation / Opposition 
1) Please explain the public response leading up to the approval of the Glacier Walkway.  
2) How much public input did you receive? How many feedback letters and comments at 
public meetings did Parks Canada receive? 
3) Approximately what percentage of public input was in support of the projects versus in 
opposition to the projects? (Global TV Poll on should they build the Skywalk, 78% said 
no) 
4) Did residents have a chance to vote on whether the project should be built at all? Why or 
why not? (Is there a difference between an open house and a public hearing?) 
5) What do you think were/are the main concerns of opponents? 
6) Please explain how Parks Canada and Brewster weighed public concerns against both 
agencies’ understandings of the merits of the projects. 
7) Do you feel as though the public was meaningfully involved in the decision-making 
process?  
8) Have opponents’ concerns been addressed in the planning and development of these at-
tractions, and if so, how? 
9) Opponents requested information from ATIP, asking for all correspondence between 
Brewster and senior park management prior to the approval of the Glacier Skywalk. ATIP 
granted this request but before the information was made public, Brewster sued Parks 
Canada over the release of that information. Can you tell me why Brewster felt they need-
ed to take such an action to stop the public from accessing that information? 
12) Please explain to me how Indigenous engagement proceeded. How many members of 
each community were included in the deliberation process? 
13) How did each different Indigenous  nation respond to the proposal to build the Glacier 
Walkway?  
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14) Approximately what percentage of those consulted were in support of the project, how 
many were opposed, and how many were indifferent? 
15) Were there any concerns voiced by different Indigenous nations, and if so, what were 
they?  
16) Were Indigenous nations offered employment opportunities at the Glacier Skywalk? 
17) Do you feel that Indigenous communities were meaningfully included in the decision-
making process? 
10) How do you understand citizens’ an Indigenous communities’ roles in park decision-mak-
ing? 
11) Do you foresee further public-private partnerships for tourism development in Jasper in 
the next 5-10 years? 
Questions for the Pingkanakorn Development Agency (eg. for Plodprasop Suraswadi, fa-
ther of the cable car idea) 
Background 
1) Please tell me a bit about yourself and education background.   
2) Are you still active in the Pheu Thai party? Are you now starting your own party? 
3) How long have you worked with the Pingnakorn Development Agency (PDA)? Please 
explain your current role and responsibilities. 
4) What are the goals of the PDA? 
5) How does the PDA get its funding?  
6) Are the Night Safari or International Convention Centre private businesses, or govern-
ment owned? Are the benefits from those meant to support the PDA or do they go back to 
the central govt? 
Conservation 
1) What do you think is(are) the role(s) of national parks? 
2) What do you think is the role of tourism and the private sector within protected areas? 
3) What are your reasons for proposing this cable car? 
4) What do you think are the social, economic and environmental implications of building 
the cable car? 
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Benefits 
1) How will the cable car help boost tourism in your opinion? 
2) Who will receive the majority of the benefits of the cable car? How will benefits be 
shared/used? 
Public Consultation 
1) Please explain to me how public consultation on the cable car has operated.  
2) Please explain the public response to the cable car at public hearings so far. 
3) The cable car was proposed twice before, in the 1980s and around 2006. What obstacles 
are you facing in trying to build the cable car this time? 
4) Do you think you have a better chance of building the cable car now than in 2006, why or 
why not? 
5) Do you feel as though the public is/will be meaningfully involved in the decision-making 
process?    
6) How will the final decision on the cable car be made? 
7) The PDA works closely with Tesco – Do members of the PDA also work for Tesco? Your 
wife and son are major shareholders in Tesco, is that correct? 
8) Are the Night Safari and International Convention Centre making a profit or are they cur-
rently being subsidized by the govt? 
Questions for Park Officials in Jasper 
Background 
1) Please tell me a bit about yourself, your education background, how you got involved with 
PC, current role/responsibilities 
Conservation 
1) What do you think is(are) the role(s) of national parks? Has the role changed in recent 
decades? 
2) How do you see the balance between ecological integrity and visitor experience in Jasper 
National Park? Do you think the balance needs to be changed? 
3) How do you understand the private sector’s role in protected areas? Has your opinion 
changed in your time with Parks Canada? 
!211
4) Has park policy changed over the last several years to allow for increased tourism devel-
opment?  Has policy been altered to allow for more partnerships with private sector ac-
tors? 
5) Do you feel it is important to support the development of these two tourist attractions, and 
if so, why?  
6) In terms of the Maligne tent cabins, how do you respond to opponents who say that this 
should not be considered because the management plan and Parks Canada’s 2007 policy 
state there should be no new land released for outlying commercial accommodations? 
What are the implications of altering those guidelines?  
7) Can the park management plan be amended without consultation? 
8) Is Jasper management concerned about the possible effects of overnight guests on the en-
dangered caribou population, which PC identifies as the most pressing conservation issue 
in the Maligne Valey?  
9) Are you confident in the Environmental Assessment process in general? Do you feel there 
may be a conflict of interest having proponents pay for EAs? 
Logistics 
1) Does Parks Canada receive a percentage of the revenues from each tourist site? If yes, 
what percentage (if you are able to divulge this)? Does the gross from each lease go to the 
Crown or to Jasper park? 
2) Explain to me the process through which the Glacier Walkway got approved. Was there a 
lot of debate internal to Parks Canada? 
3) Who had final say over whether the Glacier Walkway should be built?  Did the decision 
come from Jasper National Park or from the Ministry of the Environment? 
4) Explain to me the process through which the decision on the Maligne Tours Hotel is being 
made. Is there a lot of debate internal to Parks Canada? Who will make the final decision 
on the Maligne Tours Hotel? 
5) To what extent did budget cuts to Parks Canada and/or the need to increase visitor num-
bers contribute to the decision to build the Glacier Walkway? To what extent did these 
contribute to Parks Canada’s willingness to consider the Maligne Tours Hotel? 
6) What other challenges have you faced due to budget cuts, if any? 
7) What social science evidence is there that visitors to Jasper, particularly new Canadians 
and urban youth, want attractions like the Glacier Walkway and Maligne Hotel?  
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8) Does PC have specific criteria to evaluate whether new attractions are succeeding in con-
necting people to nature or increasing visitor experience in the park? 
Public Consultation / Opposition 
1) Please explain the public response leading up to the approval of the Glacier Walkway. 
Please explain the public response received thus far for the Maligne Hotel. 
2) How much public input did you receive for each project?  
3) Approximately what percentage of public input was in support of the projects versus in 
opposition to the projects?  
4) Please explain how Parks Canada weighed public concerns against the agency’s under-
standing of the merits of the projects.  
5) Is PC obligated to make decisions based on public feedback? Are public comment submis-
sions a matter of public record? 
6) Do you feel as though the public was meaningfully involved in the decision-making pro-
cesses?  
7) How do you understand citizens’ roles in park decision-making? 
8) Has the public consultation process changed over the last few decades, and if so, how?  
Indigenous Consultation 
1) Please explain how the consultation processes with Indigenous communities operated. 
How many members of each community were included in the deliberation process for 
each site? Were these mainly Elders groups or political leaders? 
2) Please explain the responses received by different Indigenous communities – what % were 
in favour versus in opposition? What were some of the main concerns?  
3) Were employment opportunities promised to Indigenous communities, were these ful-
filled? 
4) The reports written by PC and Brewster mention that Indigenous groups were consulted 
but give little information about what was said or how concerns were addressed. What is 
PC’s obligation in terms of ensuring the consultation process is satisfactory to Indigenous 
communities and sharing their comments with the public? 
5) How do you understand Indigenous communities’ roles in park decision-making? 
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Questions for Park Officials in Doi Suthep-Pui 
Background 
1) Please tell me a bit about yourself, your education background, how you got involved with 
Parks, current role/responsibilities. 
2) Please describe local park responsibilities. Do you report direction to the Chiang Mai of-
fice or the National Office? How much autonomy do local parks have in decision-making 
within the park? 
3) What authority/Ministry controls the Night Safari?  
Conservation 
1) What do you think is(are) the role(s) of national parks? Has the role changed in recent 
decades? 
2) How would you describe the role of tourism in parks? The private sector? 
3) How do you see the balance between ecological integrity and visitor experience in Doi 
Suthep-Pui national park? Do you think the balance needs to be changed? 
4) Has park policy changed over the last several years to allow for increased tourism devel-
opment?  Has policy been altered to allow for more partnerships with private sector ac-
tors? 
5) Does park policy allow for this kind of development in a park? In class 1 watershed for-
est? 
6) Do you support or oppose the development of the cable car and for what reasons? 
7) What impacts might the cable car have on wildlife and vegetation? Conservation con-
cerns? 
8) What are the implications for taxi drivers in the city? For religious groups? 
9) Are you confident in the Environmental Assessment process in Thailand? Do you think 
there may be a conflict of interest in that private proponents pay for EAs? 
10) Did you have any concerns with the EA for the cable car? 
Logistics 
1) Would the Parks Dept receive a percentage of the revenues from the cable car? If yes, 
what percentage (if you are able to divulge this)? Does the gross go to the federal level or 
to Doi Suthep park? 
2) Would the cable car operators pay land rent to parks? Would they pay tax? 
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3) Has visitation to the park been increasing or decreasing over the last decade? 
4) Will the cable car attract greater numbers to the park in your opinion? What challenges 
might this present for park management? 
5) Have there been budget cuts to parks in the last few years?  
6) Would the benefits mainly accrue to the Pingkanakorn Development Agency? To vil-
lagers? 
Public Consultation / Opposition 
1) What was the parks department’s role in public consultations? 
2) Please explain the public response so far on the cable car. 
3) How much public input did you receive? 
4) Approximately what percentage of public input was in support of the projects versus in 
opposition to the projects?  
5) Who makes the final decision- the Cabinet? What is the Parks Dept role in decision-mak-
ing? 
6) Do you feel as though the public has been meaningfully involved in the decision-making 
processes?  
7) How do you understand citizens’ roles in park decision-making? 
8) Has the public consultation process changed over the last few decades, and if so, how?  
Aboriginal Consultation 
1) Are Hmong communities to be consulted with on the cable car as well? Why or why not? 
2) Is parks obliged to consult with indigenous communities within parks when making park 
decisions? 
3) To what extent are indigenous communities participating in park decision-making/man-
agement? 
4) What implications might the cable car have for the Hmong communities? 
Questions for Environmental Organizations in Jasper (eg. for the Jasper Environmental 
Association) 
Background 
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1) How long have you worked with the Jasper Environmental Association? Please explain 
your current role and responsibilities. Background, education, etc. 
2) Why did you choose to get involved with the JEA? How many members are there? 
Conservation 
1) What do you think is(are) the role(s) of national parks? 
2) A lot has been written on the dual mandate of National Parks in Canada (ecological in-
tegrity and visitor experience), how do you see this dual mandate? Is there a good bal-
ance? Does the balance between the two need to be changed? 
3) Are there benefits of private tourism services for conservation? 
4) In your opinion, has the role of national parks changed over the last few decades? 
5) To your knowledge, have there been changes to park policy to allow for greater private 
involvement? 
6) What is your understanding of the role of the private sector in parks? Has your opinion 
changed in your time working with the JEA? 
7) Main concerns with Maligne Tours’ hotel? With the Glacier Skywalk? 
8) Parks Canada, Brewster and Maligne Tours argue that these new attractions will help visi-
tors to better connect with nature. Do you agree with this argument, why or why not? 
9) To your knowledge, has UNESCO been informed about the proposal to construct the Ma-
ligne Hotel? 
10) Your organization has argued that the 2010 management plan and Parks Canada’s 2007 
OCA policy state that no new outlying commercial accommodations should be consid-
ered. In your opinion, why is Jasper considering the Maligne Tours proposal despite this? 
11) Do you believe the hotel will have an impact on the endangered caribou herd in the area? 
On the harlequin duck population? On the grizzly population? (Evidence?) 
12) Did you have any concerns with the ecological assessment for the Glacier Skywalk, and if 
so, what were they? 
13) Do you feel confident in the environmental assessment process in Canada, why or why 
not? 
Visitor Experience 
1) Do you believe it is important to attract new Canadians and urban youth to parks? Why or 
why not? 
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2) Do you believe it is important for Parks Canada to take steps to improve visitor experi-
ence in the park, why or why not? 
3) Do you believe it is important to create more attractions for differently abled visitors in 
parks, why or why not?  
4) In your opinion, will the Glacier Skywalk and the Maligne Hotel succeed in attracting 
new Canadians and urban youth, as are the stated target markets for these attractions? 
5) In your opinion, will the Glacier Skywalk and Maligne Hotel improve visitor experience 
for differently abled visitors? 
6) In your opinion, will the Glacier Skywalk help to reduce traffic accidents around the cor-
ner where the lookout has been built? 
7) Has Parks Canada and/or Brewster and Maligne Tours demonstrated evidence that the 
Glacier Walkway and the Maligne Hotel will attract new Canadians, urban youth, and/or 
disabled visitors? What evidence have they shown? 
8) How would you respond to people who argue that private tourism and visitor experience 
have always been present within parks, and particularly Jasper, such as the Marmot Basin 
ski hill and Brewster’s ice coaches?  
9) Do you think there has been an increase in private involvement in parks in the last 5-10 
years, or is this a continuation of previous models of conservation practice? 
10) The media has been running stories about recent budget cuts to Parks Canada. In your 
opinion, to what extent did budget cuts to Parks Canada and/or the need to increase visi-
tor numbers contribute to the decision to build the Glacier Skywalk? To what extent did 
these contribute to Parks Canada’s willingness to consider the Maligne Tours Hotel? 
Public Opposition/Consultation 
1) What strategies or tools did you/your organization use to reach people and inform them of 
the issues you took with the attractions? 
2) How did you organize your campaign against the each proposal? 
3) What tools/strategies were available to you? What obstacles did you face? 
4) Please explain to me how public consultation on the two developments operated.  
5) Please explain the public response leading up to the approval of the Glacier Walkway. 
Please explain the public response thus far for the Maligne Hotel. 
6) Approximately what percentage of public input was in support of the projects versus in 
opposition to the projects? 
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7) Does it matter to you that Brewster Corporation is owned by Viad, an American tourism 
company? Does it make any difference to you that Maligne Tours is a Canadian-owned 
company? 
8) Who/which groups came out in support of the projects? 
9) Were there people/groups who should have been consulted but were not informed or in-
cluded in the process? 
10) How did Parks Canada weigh public concerns against the agency’s understanding of the 
merits of the projects? 
11) Have opponents’ concerns been addressed in the planning and development of these at-
tractions, and if so, how? 
12) Do you feel as though the public was meaningfully involved in the decision-making 
process for the Glacier Skywalk?    
13) Do you think that members of the public and Maligne Tours will have an equal ability to 
influence the decision on the hotel? 
14) Were you satisfied with the way public consultation was sought? Why or why not? If not, 
how could it be improved in your opinion? 
15) How do you understand citizens’ roles in park decision-making? What do you think citi-
zens’ roles should be? 
16) To your knowledge, has the public consultation process changed over the last few 
decades, and if so, how? 
17) Do you foresee further private-public partnerships in Jasper in the next 5-10 years? 
Questions for Environmental Organizations in Chiang Mai (eg. for Anuchat Thananchai, 
head of Rak Doi Suthep) 
Background 
1) Tell me a bit about yourself, your education etc. How long have you worked with the Rak 
Doi Suthep Group? What are the group’s goals? 
Conservation 
1) What do you think is(are) the role(s) of national parks? In your opinion, has the role of 
national parks changed over the last few decades? 
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2) Can you tell me a bit about the cable car controversy? The idea was first proposed in the 
1980s and again around 2006 but was shelved due to protest. Before it was a private com-
pany to fund/run the service, now it’s a semi-private government agency? What role will 
private business have/ what companies are involved?  
3) Did the cable car have a Thaksin connection in previous years (2006)? Did that have any 
bearing on the nature of the opposition? 
4) To your knowledge, have there been changes to park policy to allow for greater private 
involvement? 
5) What is your understanding of the role of the private sector in parks?  
6) Please explain the reasons why you are opposed to the cable car project.  
7) What impacts do you believe these projects will have on wildlife?  
8) What implications might the cable car project have for taxi drivers in Chiang Mai? Reli-
gious implications? 
9) To your knowledge, does park policy allow for this kind of development within a national 
park? 
10) Did you have any concerns with the ecological assessment for the cable car, and if so, 
what were they?  
11) Do you feel confident in the environmental assessment process in Thailand, why or why 
not? 
Visitor Experience 
1) Proponents argue that the cable car will help reduce accidents and pollution along the 
road to Doi Suthep. Do you agree with this argument, why or why not? 
2) Do you believe it is important to attract more visitors to parks? Why or why not? Will the 
cable car help boost tourism? 
3) Will the cable car help people who are disabled or elderly to reach the sites in the park? 
4) Do you think there has been an increase in private involvement/tourism development in 
parks in the last 5-10 years, or is this a continuation of previous models of conservation 
practice? 
5) To your knowledge, have there been any budget cuts to the parks department in the last 
few years?  
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Public Opposition/Consultation 
1) How did you organize your campaign against the cable car? Did you coordinate with any 
other organizations? If so, which ones? 
2) What obstacles did you face? 
3) Please explain to me how public consultation on the cable car operated.  
4) Please explain the public response to the cable car at public consultation meetings 
5) Approximately what percentage of public input was in support of the projects versus in 
opposition to the projects? 
6) Who/which groups are the main opponents of the project? 
7) Who/which groups came out in support of the project? 
8) Were there people/groups who should have been consulted but were not informed or in-
cluded in the process? 
9) Do you feel as though the public is/will be meaningfully involved in the decision-making 
process?    
10) Who will make the final decision on the cable car? 
11) Were you satisfied with the way public consultation was sought? Why or why not? If not, 
how could it be improved in your opinion? 
12) How do you understand citizens’ roles in park decision-making? What do you think citi-
zens’ roles should be? 
13) To your knowledge, has the public consultation process changed over the last few 
decades, and if so, how? 
14) Are parks people obliged to consult with the indigenous communities living in the park?  
15) Are there other contacts you can share for people protesting/opposing the project? 
 Questions for local residents in each site followed the same structure (Background, Con-
servation, Visitor Experience, and Public Consultation), although did not ask questions specific 
to organizations or private businesses. Emphasis was placed more on the degree to which they 
felt meaningfully involved in decision-making processes.  
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Appendix B: List of Interviewees 
Jasper  
Alan Latourelle (Former Chief Executive Officer of Parks Canada)  
Alison Woodley (Director of CPAWS, National Level)  
Art Jackson (Alpine Art Eco Tours)  
Barry Robinson (Lawyer at EcoJustice)  
Ben Gadd (Former Parks Canada Interpreter, Naturalist)  
Bob Covey (Editor of the Jasper Local)  
Brian Rode (Management at Marmot Basin Ski Hill)  
Danielle Pendlebury (CPAWS Northern Alberta)  
Dave McKenna (President of Brewster Travel)  
Descendent of John Moberly A  
Descendent of John Moberly B  
Donald Flook (Canadian Wildlife Service)  
George Mercer (Former Jasper Warden and Wildlife Specialist)  
Graeme Pole (Author and Naturalist)  
Grant Potter (Former Business Liaison with Parks Canada)  
Greg Fenton (Former Superintendent of Jasper National Park)  
Ian Urquhart (University of Alberta)  
Jill Seaton (Jasper Environmental Association)  
John McKay (Liberal Environment Critic)  
John Ogilvy (SkyTram Engineer)  
Karsten Heuer (Yellowstone 2 Yukon)  
Katie Worobec (Tourism Jasper)  
Kelly Sloan (CPAWS Northern Alberta)  
Kevin Van Tighem (Former Superintendent of Banff)  
Kim Wallace (Jasper School Teacher and Rally Organizer)  
Loni Klettl (Former Olympian, Jasper Trail Alliance)  
Marc LeBlanc (Local Business Owner)  
Michael Wasuita (Owner of Pine Bungalows)  
Monika Schaefer (Former Jasper Warden)  
Mrs. Ogilvy (Longtime Resident of Jasper)  
Nicole Veerman (Former Editor of the Fitzhugh)  
Nik Lopoukhine (Former Director General of Parks Canada, IUCN)  
Parks Canada Visitor Experience Manager in Jasper  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Pat Crowley (Manager of Maligne Tours)  
Pattie Pavlov (Jasper Chamber of Commerce)  
Paulette and Volker (Owners of Maligne Canyon Hostel)  
Peter Duck (Former Master Interpreter for Parks Canada, Bow Valley Naturalists)  
Respondent from Alexis Nakota Sioux Nation  
Respondent from Aseniwuche Winewak Nation  
Respondent from Confederation of Treaty Six Nations  
Respondent from Kelly Lake First Nation  
Respondent from Mountain Cree Band  
Respondent from Samson Cree Nation  
Respondent from Stoney Nakoda Nation  
Respondent from Sucker Creek First Nation  
Respondent from Upper Athabasca Elders Council  
Sean Nichols (Alberta Wilderness Association)  
Senior Land Use Manager in Jasper National Park  
Stephen Woodley (Former Chief Ecosystem Scientist for Parks Canada, IUCN)  
Terry Winkler (Former Jasper Warden)  
Doi Suthep-Pui  
Adul Islam (Tesco Ltd.)  
Amporn Panmongkol (Head of Doi Suthep-Pui National Park)  
Anonymous Villager (Ban Too Pong)  
Anonymous Villager (Khun Chang Kian)  
Anonymous Villager (Khun Chang Kian)  
Anonymous Villager (Khun Chang Kian)  
Anonymous Villager (Mae Hia Nai)  
Anonymous Villager (Mae Hia Nai)  
Anonymous Villager (Suthep Subdistrict)  
Anonymous Villager (Suthep Subdistrict)  
Dr. Anuchat Thananchai (Rak Doi Suthep)  
Sakda Darawan (Rak Mae Ping)  
Daycha Niamkun (Villager, Suthep Subdistrict)  
Dr. Attachak Sattayanurak (Chiang Mai University)  
Dropop Sayan (Farmer’s Group in Ban Doi Pui)  
Duangtip (Headman in Nong Khwai Subdistrict)  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General Mithila (Mayor of Nong Khwai Subdistrict)  
Governor of Chiang Mai 
Gwa Han (Villager in Ban Too Pong)  
Jansom (Villager in Mae Hia Nai)  
Yang Yin Goon (Headman of Khun Chang Kian)  
Kamonrath (Headman in Suthep Subdistrict)  
Khajon (Headman in Suthep Subdistrict)  
Mae Tapan (Headman of Ban Doi Pui)  
Monk in Suthep Subdistrict 
Nawalat (Villager in Mae Hia Nai)  
Nopporn and Pani (Headman and Assistant in Mae Hia District)  
P’Ya (Villager in Ban Too Pong)  
Dr. Paiboon Hengsuwan (Chiang Mai University)  
Panapai (Head of Welfare Office in Suthep Subdistrict)  
Phisit Kasikorn (Vice-Mayor of Mae Hia Subdistrict)  
Pira (Villager in Ban Doi Pui)  
Plodprasop Suraswadi (Pingkanakorn Development Agency, Department of National Parks, 
Wildlife and Plant Conservation, Royal Forestry Department, Pheu Thai Party)  
Praphan Janta (Headman in Mae Hia Subdistrict)  
Prayat (Community Rights Advocacy Network)  
Dr. Sammakkee Boonyawat (Kasetsart University, Environmental Assessment)  
Singkham Nunti (Chairman of Lanna Transportation)  
Dr. Somikat Chaipiboon (Responsible for Maejo University Poll)  
Searched Thakumma (Headman in Suthep Subdisctrict)  
Tatthaya Anusorrakit (Chiang May Link NGO)  
Teeramon Bua-ngam (Journalist with Prachatham News)  
Temple Administration for Doi Suthep Temple  
Tha Luangjai (Headman of the Headmen in Nong Khwai Subdistrict)  
Thawatchai (Headman in Mae Hia Subdistrict)  
Tritsadee Chutiwongsa (Vice-Director of Pingkanakorn Development Agency)  
Wa Lam Tong (Villager in Ban Doi Pui)  
Wakana Seehorn (Northern Development Foundation NGO)  
Wee Lai (Villager in Ban Doi Pui)  
Wisoot Buachoom (Tourism Authority of Thailand)  
Yinyot (Former Headman of Ban Doi Pui) 
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Appendix C: Open Letter from Former Parks Canada Bosses to Minister of 
the Environment, Leona Aglukkaq 
April 9, 2014  
Honourable Leona Aglukkaq  
Minister of the Environment  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, ON K1A 0A6  
Re: Maligne Tours proposal for overnight accommodation at Maligne Lake, Jasper National Park  
Dear Minister:  
As former senior national park staff, we are writing to strongly urge you to take a stand now that 
will safeguard Canada’s national parks for years to come. Please reject the proposal by Maligne 
Tours for a hotel resort at Maligne Lake in Jasper National Park, part of the UNESCO Canadian 
Rocky Mountain Parks World Heritage Site.  
Approving overnight accommodation at the Maligne Lake would contravene a Parks Canada pol-
icy designed specifically to limit development in the mountain national parks, and could open the 
floodgates to more commercial development, putting the ecological integrity of the mountain 
parks and quality of park visitor experiences at risk.  
It is our view that the Canadian people, Jasper and other national park ecosystems and Parks 
Canada have nothing to gain and plenty to lose if this development is approved.  
Currently only day use is allowed at Maligne Lake. Maligne Tours’ proposed resort contravenes 
Parks Canada’s 2007 policy that prohibits any new commercial accommodations outside park 
town sites and places clear negotiated limits on all existing “outlying commercial accommoda-
tions”. This policy was developed after significant study by an expert panel and considerable 
public dialogue. It is a principled response to a widely-held view among a large majority of 
Canadians - as shown repeatedly in public opinion polling and management plan consultations - 
that nature protection and public enjoyment need to be protected against commercial develop-
ment in our national parks. In our considered view, making an exception to this policy would un-
dermine the entire policy foundation for controlling commercial development in our national 
parks. As such, it would be a betrayal of the public trust and a repudiation of what Canadians 
have consistently shown they expect of those entrusted with the care of their national treasures. 
There is no doubt that other businesses and corporations would use the approval of this proposal 
as a precedent to try and secure new developments and expansions elsewhere, and that Parks 
Canada would be compromised in its ability to argue that these proposed developments contra-
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vene policy. The Maligne Tours’ proposal is a very real “thin edge of the wedge” that could jeop-
ardize the natural values of our national parks that Canadians have entrusted the federal govern-
ment to protect on their behalf.  
Further, the Maligne resort proposal is inconsistent with your legislative requirement under the 
Canada National Parks Act and the Parks Canada Agency Act to prioritize ecological integrity in 
park management decisions, as well as your responsibilities under the Species at Risk Act. The 
Maligne Valley is home to a Threatened Southern Mountain caribou herd that has declined pre-
cipitously in the past 15 years from more than 60 to just 5 animals. This endangered herd re-
quires less disturbance, not more, if there is to be any chance for its survival and recovery.  
Were it to proceed, the proposed Maligne Lake hotel development would extend the time of day 
that visitors and hotel staff use the area and its access road from daytime to 24 hour use. More 
staff and accommodation would be needed at the lake to service the hotel, leading to more 
wildlife disturbance. Losing just one caribou on the road because of increased traffic at dawn or 
dusk, or during the night, could be the final “nail in the coffin” for this herd. The northern end of 
Maligne Lake is also important habitat for grizzly bears and harlequin ducks, both sensitive 
species which could be harmed by the expanded activity that would result from overnight ac-
commodation at the lake.  
At a broader scale, the incremental commercial development that would result from allowing this 
precedent-setting contravention of park policy would threaten the ecological integrity of all of 
our Rocky Mountain national parks by enabling more development in sensitive ecosystems criti-
cal for the survival and movement of wildlife.  
Any development proposal that could add risk to the well-being of vulnerable species in national 
parks is inconsistent with the requirement to maintain or restore ecological integrity as a first 
priority in park management decisions.  
The Maligne resort proposal is being considered by Parks Canada on claims that it could im-
prove visitor experience. A survey of Maligne Lake visitors showed 99% were satisfied with 
their visit, which raises the question whether the proposed development would in fact address the 
1% that were not fully satisfied, and if so, if it is worth the risks noted above. Fundamentally, 
Parks Canada surveys show that Canadians are attracted to national parks for their wildlife and 
pristine natural beauty and not for built developments, regardless of whether they are tasteful, 
green or rustic.  
In our view, the resort development at Maligne Lake and the anticipated subsequent incremental 
development would corrupt the natural beauty of Maligne Lake and of our parks. The question is 
whether you want to be known as the Minister who stood up for, and protected our national parks 
for Canadians, now and in the future?  
Jasper is part of the Canadian Rocky Mountain Parks World Heritage Site which Parks Canada is 
entrusted to protect on behalf of Canadians and the global community. As you know, World Her-
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itage is a very special designation given by the United Nations to places on Earth that are of out-
standing universal value to humanity and, as such, are to be protected by the responsible State 
Party for the global community to appreciate and enjoy, now and in the future. We have a global 
responsibility to ensure Jasper’s natural values are not compromised.  
As the local Jasper Fitzhugh newspaper noted in a recent editorial:  
Policies exist for a reason. They are there to shape what is and is not acceptable. They are there 
to guide governments through tough decisions. And they are there to ensure fairness and due 
process…  
...Parks’ policies are in place to limit the growth of our town and park to ensure the protection of 
our wild spaces and wildlife. If the agency is planning to hold true to its mandate of protection 
and maintenance of ecological integrity, exceptions to longstanding policies on limited develop-
ment are not an option.  
We agree. National Parks are ultimately about natural heritage and future generations. We strong-
ly urge you to stand up for the long term public interest and legacy by telling Maligne Tours that 
their operation is, and will always be, a day-use facility that serves the visiting public, not a pri-
vate resort that excludes the public, contributes to the final loss of the Maligne caribou herd and 
fills a peaceful place with disturbance, noise and memory of broken promises.  
We would be pleased to discuss this important matter with you, and look forward to your re-
sponse.  
Sincerely,  
Nikita Lopoukhine Former Director General, National Parks, Parks Canada Former Chair, World 
Commission on Protected Areas, IUCN  
Stephen Woodley, PhD Former Chief Ecosystem Scientist, Parks Canada  
Kevin Van Tighem Former Superintendent, Banff National Park, Parks Canada 
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